Voluntary apostate: a person whose parents, or either of them, were Muslim at the time of his or her development in the mother’s womb and who takes up atheism after growing up.
Innate apostate: a person who is born of atheist parents and who accepts Islam after growing up, but returns to atheism later.
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.
2. The Committee observes that the freedom to “have or to adopt” a religion or belief necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views, as well as the right to retain one’s religion or belief. Article 18.2 bars coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to their religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert. Policies or practices having the same intention or effect, such as, for example, those restricting access to education, medical care, employment or the rights guaranteed by article 25 and other provisions of the Covenant, are similarly inconsistent with article 18.2. The same protection is enjoyed by holders of all beliefs of a non-religious nature.
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have a religion or belief of his choice.3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
1. No one shall be subject to discrimination by any State, institution, group of persons, or person on the grounds of religion or other belief.2. For the purposes of the present Declaration, the expression “intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief” means any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on religion or belief and having as its purpose or as its effect nullification or impairment of the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis.
A Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief reports annually to the Human Rights Council, the Commission and the General Assembly on the state of religious tolerance and discrimination throughout the world. For the annual reports, seeÂ http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/religion/annual.htm. In addition, the Special Rapporteur regularly sends communications to governments on these issues, and the annual summaries of communications of the SR and governments™ responses are published on the same website. A recent report (A/HRC/7/10/Add.1) includes communications to the Indonesian and Iranian governments over their treatment of Bahaâ€™is.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR), Article 9: Freedom of thought, conscience and religion1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
American Convention on Human Rights, Article 12: Freedom of Conscience and Religion (adopted 22/11/1969, entry into force 18/7/1978)1. Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience and of religion. This right includes freedom to maintain or to change one’s religion or beliefs, and freedom to profess or disseminate one’s religion or beliefs, either individually or together with others, in public or in private.2. No one shall be subject to restrictions that might impair his freedom to maintain or to change his religion or beliefs.3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion and beliefs may be subject only to the limitations prescribed by law that are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the rights or freedoms of others.4. Parents or guardians, as the case may be, have the right to provide for the religious and moral education of their children or wards that is in accord with their own convictions.
Arab Charter on Human Rights (adopted by the League of Arab States on 15 September 1994) (in force March 2008)Article 26: Everyone has a guaranteed right to freedom of belief, thought and opinion.Article 27: Adherents of every religion have the right to practise their religious observances and to manifest their views through expression, practice or teaching, without prejudice to the rights of others. No restrictions shall be imposed on the exercise of freedom of belief, thought and opinion except as provided by law.
Persecution for reasons of religion may … take various forms. Depending on the particular circumstances of the case, including the effect on the individual concerned, examples could include prohibition of membership of a religious community, of worship in community with others in public or in private, of religious instruction, or serious measures of discrimination imposed on individuals because they practise their religion, belong to or are identified with a particular religious community, or have changed their faith. 8 Equally, in communities in which a dominant religion exists or where there is a close correlation between the State and religious institutions, discrimination on account of one’s failure to adopt the dominant religion or to adhere to its practices, could amount to persecution in a particular case.
Applying the same standard as for other Convention grounds, religious belief, identity, or way of life can be seen as so fundamental to human identity that one should not be compelled to hide, change or renounce this in order to avoid persecution. Indeed, the Convention would give no protection from persecution for reasons of religion if it was a condition that the person affected must take steps – reasonable or otherwise – to avoid offending the wishes of the persecutors. Bearing witness in words and deeds is often bound up with the existence of religious convictions.
Where individuals convert after their departure from the country of origin, this may have the effect of creating a sur place claim. In such situations, particular credibility concerns tend to arise and a rigorous and in depth examination of the circumstances and genuineness of the conversion will be necessary. Issues which the decision-maker will need to assess include the nature of and connection between any religious convictions held in the country of origin and those now held, any disaffection with the religion held in the country of origin, for instance, because of its position on gender issues or sexual orientation, how the claimant came to know about the new religion in the country of asylum, his or her experience of this religion, his or her mental state, and the existence of corroborating evidence regarding involvement in and membership of the new religion.
Both the specific circumstances in the country of asylum and the individual case may justify additional probing into particular claims. Where, for example, systematic and organised conversions are carried out by local religious groups in the country of asylum for the purposes of accessing resettlement options, and/or where “coaching” or “mentoring” of claimants is commonplace, testing of knowledge is of limited value. Rather, the interviewer needs to ask open questions and try to elicit the motivations for conversion and what effect the conversion has had on the claimant’s life. The test remains, however, whether he or she would have a well-founded fear of persecution on a Convention ground if returned. Regard should therefore be had as to whether the conversion may come to the notice of the authorities of the person’s country of origin and how this is likely to be viewed by those authorities. Detailed country of origin information is required to determine whether a fear of persecution is objectively well-founded.
So-called “self-serving” activities do not create a well-founded fear of persecution on a Convention ground in the claimant’s country of origin, if the opportunistic nature of such activities will be apparent to all, including the authorities there, and serious adverse consequences would not result if the person were returned. Under all circumstances, however, consideration must be given as to the consequences of return to the country of origin and any potential harm that might justify refugee status or a complementary form of protection. In the event that the claim is found to be self-serving but the claimant nonetheless has a well-founded fear of persecution on return, international protection is required. Where the opportunistic nature of the action is clearly apparent, however, this could weigh heavily in the balance when considering potential durable solutions that may be available in such cases, as well as, for example, the type of residency status.
‘… persecution does not cease to be persecution for the purpose of the Convention because those persecuted can eliminate the harm by taking avoiding action within the country of nationality. The Convention would give no protection from persecution for reasons of religion or political opinion if it was a condition of protection that the person affected must take steps – reasonable or otherwise – to avoid offending the wishes of the persecutors.
In Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v VWBA  FCAFC 175 the Full Court by a majority held that the principles in S395/2002 v MIMA (above) were as follows: – (1) The Tribunal will err if it assesses a claim on the basis that an applicant is expected to take reasonable steps to avoid persecution if returned to his or her country of origin – its task is to assess what the applicant will do, not what he or she should do. – (2) If the Tribunal finds that a person will act in a way that will reduce a risk of persecution that would otherwise have been well-founded, the Tribunal must consider why the person will act in that way – if it fails to do so, it commits a jurisdictional error. – (3) It will err if, having found that a person will act in a way that will reduce a risk of persecution, it does not go on to consider whether the person nevertheless has a well-founded fear of persecution because, despite the conduct that reduces the risk, there is still a real risk that the person will be persecuted.
Secretary of State for the Home Department v Ahmed EWCA Civ 3003: Pakistani Ahmadi (considered apostate by authorities and by mainstream Muslims) who intended to propagate his beliefs faced a real risk of religious persecution, entitled him to refugee status.
FS and Others (Iran – Christian Converts) Iran v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, CG  UKIAT 00303, United Kingdom: Asylum and Immigration Tribunal / Immigration Appellate Authority, 17 November 2004, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/42c934fb4.html: A distinction was drawn between the ordinary discreet convert to Protestant Christianity, who would be able to practise Christianity (including attending church) without untoward risk, and the more active convert, pastor, church leader, proselytiser or evangelist, who would be at real risk.
SZ and JM (Christians – FS Confirmed) Iran v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, CG UKAIT 00082, UK AIT/IAA, 12 November 2008, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/491af9092.html: The distinction drawn in FS and others (above) still held good, and generally the situation of ordinary converts to Christianity did not amount to persecution. Conditions for Christians in Iran have not deteriorated sufficiently to necessitate a change in the guidance in FS and others (Iran – Christian Converts)(above). It remains to be seen whether the proposed inclusion of apostasy in the amended criminal code will make a material difference. The amendments to the code are part of a wholesale change in the criminal law and not solely aimed at converts. The proposals are still before Parliament. ‘Proselytising’ and ‘evangelising’ are not terms of art and distinctions should not be drawn between them.
An important and useful paper on the problems of assessing the credibility of claims to be members of persecuted religious minorities. Kagan reveals that over three-quarters of UNHCR’s refusals of religion-based refugee claims are based on negative credibility assessment. Using a sample of transcripts of refugee status determination (RSD) interviews by UNHCR in Cairo, Kagan shows some of the pitfalls of attempting to test religious belief through testing religious knowledge, analysing some of the assumptions behind such questioning (such as the assumption that a genuine believer is likely to be more knowledgeable about matters of religious doctrine than a religious imposter). He offers as a better approach the ‘eyes of the persecutor’ perspective, which leads interviewers to focus more on objectively observable signs of religious faith such as church attendance.
A report which highlights administrative discrimination on religious grounds in Egypt.