1. “Cambodia - UNAMIC Background – Introduction,” United Nations, accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamicbackgr.html.
2. “Sihanouk Ends Exile, Returns to Cambodia; Troops, Rebels Clash Despite Cease-Fire,” Washington Post, November 14, 1991, A37.
3. “Defence Ministry alleges cease-fire violation,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 19, 1991; SPK News Agency, Phnom Penh, in English, November 1991, 0407 gmt 15.
4. “Resolution 745 (1992),” UN Security Council (S/RES/745), February 28, 1992, par. 8.
5. “SECOND PHASE OF CEASEFIRE, MAY - NOVEMBER 1992,” Cambodia-UNTAC Background, accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr2.html#two.
6. “Khmer Rouge Frees 6 U.N. Soldiers in Cambodia,” The New York Times, December 5, 1992.
7. “Khmer Rouge Ceasefire Violations Reported,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 31, 1992.
On January 4, Prince Sihanouk, Chairman of the Supreme National Council (SNC), declared his withdrawal from the peace process and cooperation with UNTAC. He claimed that the increasing political violence against his party, FUNCINPEC (a French acronym that translates into the ‘National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia’), and the failure of UNTAC to curtail this violence were main reasons for his withdrawal. After meetings with UNTAC officials, Sihanouk agreed to return to the peace process a week later. In late January, the transitional government forces launched a large-scale military offensive against the Khmer Rouge.
8. Benny Widyono, Dancing in Shadows: Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge, and the United Nations in Cambodia, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 17.
9. “Cambodians Return to an Uncertain Future,” Sydney Morning Herald, March 31, 1993,10.
10. “Khmer Rouge rejects cease-fire schedule,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 30, 1994.
11. “Cambodian parliament passes law banning Khmer Rouge,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, July 7, 1994.
12. "Cambodia," Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=27®ionSelect=7-Eastern_Asia#1992.
The Cambodian government had offered amnesty to members of the Khmer Rouge, which expired on January 15, 1995. According to government figures, almost 2,000 fighters had surrendered in the month prior to January. The government estimated the current strength of the Khmer Rouge was between 5,000 and 10,000 hard-core troops.13 There were some positive developments in August: members of the Khmer Rouge were reported to have said that they would go to Phnom Penh to lay the groundwork for negotiations with the Cambodian Government in order to end the country's long-running civil war. The rebels, however, “agreed to the talks once the government dropped demands that a ceasefire be signed before negotiations.”14 A ceasefire agreement was not reached.
13. "January, 1995, Cambodia," in Keesing's Record of World Events, vol. 41, 40366.
14. “Khmer Rouge in Peace Talks Offer,” Herald Sun, August 11, 1995.
Though the Khmer Rouge still controlled areas of Cambodia, particularly in the north near Anlong Veng, it had lost more than half of its military strength and the area around Pailin, which was rich in natural resources, including gems and logs.
15. “Khmer Rouge "coup" faction agrees to ceasefire,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, August 20, 1996.
16. “Rebel leader given amnesty Cambodian peace talks back on track,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), September 16, 1996.
intense due to the fact that many KR members had defected.
17. Bruce Sharp, “Butchers on a Smaller Scale: Hun Sen and the Cambodian People's Party,” 1997, accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.mekong.net/cambodia/hun_sen1.htm.
18. “Cambodian king talks with new strongman Hun Sen,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, September 6, 1997.
The Khmer Rouge guerrilla movement broke the ceasefire agreement between Cambodia's two main warring political factions on Sunday, March 1, 1998, and vowed to keep fighting the Phnom Penh government.20 Many KR fighters that had come over to the government with the KR leadership, including Khiev Samphan, defected in December 1998. The last armed resistance ended with the capture of the last remaining KR soldiers, led by Ta Mok in December 1999.
19. “Ceasefire puts exiled prince back in poll picture,” The Weekend Australia, February 28, 1998.
20. “Khmer Rouge blast Cambodian ceasefire, vow to keep fighting Hun Sen,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 1, 1998.
In the 1997 coup, the leader of the royalist faction, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, was effectively ousted from his position as co-prime minister by rival Cambodian leader Hun Sen; also, several leaders of the royalist faction, including their military leaders, were executed. More than 5,000 of the royalist fighters who fought against Cambodian armed forces loyal to the CPP during the bloody 1997 coup officially rejoined a united military during a ceremony on Friday, February 26, 1999. The ceremony marked the final integration of the remaining royalist forces into the army. Thousands of Khmer Rouge fighters were also integrated as the guerrilla movement collapsed from mass defections.21 The ceasefire was finally holding.
21. “Royalist resistance forces rejoin Cambodian army,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, February 26, 1999.
The informal meeting of the parties to the conflict took place in Jakarta on September 10, 1990. In this meeting the composition of the Supreme National Council (SNC) was finalized. The Cambodian parties present in the informal meeting agreed that the 12 member SNC would be comprised in the following way: Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk as President; six members from the State of Cambodia; 2 members from the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF); 1 member from the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC); and 2 members from the Democratic Kampuchea or Khmer Rouge. 1 Throughout the transitional period, the SNC was the legitimate body and source of authority in which the sovereignty, independence, and unity of Cambodia were enshrined.
1. Nady Tan, “National Conference on Peace, National reconciliation and Democracy Building: Ten Years after the Paris Peace Agreement,” 2001, accessed July 14, 2010, http://www.camnet.com.kh/ocm/government102.htm.
2. “Alliance between CPP and FUNCINPEC,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 22, 1991.
Throughout the transitional period, the SNC continued to work as the legitimate governing body and source of authority in which the sovereignty, independence, and unity of Cambodia were enshrined.
Elections took place from May 23 to 28, 1993. FUNCINPEC won 58 seats in the Constituent Assembly, CPP won 51, the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) won 10, and a fourth political party, the National Movement for the Liberation of Kampuchea (MOLINAKA), won 1. At the June 10 meeting of the SNC, which was presided over by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General issued a statement on behalf of the Secretary-General and the United Nations declaring that the elections as a whole had been free and fair. The Security Council endorsed the results of the elections with resolution 840 (1993) of June 15. However, the CPP began to make numerous allegations that electoral irregularities had occurred as the counting proceeded. It also requested that the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) hold new elections in seven provinces. At the June 10 meeting of the SNC, the CPP announced that it could not recognize the results of the elections and demanded an investigation of the irregularities.
Over time, the CPP softened its position. The duly elected Constituent Assembly began work on June 14, 1993. At the inaugural session, it adopted a resolution to make Prince Sihanouk Head of State retroactive to 1970, thus making the coup d'état of March 18, 1970 null and void. The Assembly gave the Prince full powers as Head of State. The following day, Prince Sihanouk proposed the formation of an Interim Joint Administration (GNPC) with Prince Ranariddh and Mr. Hun Sen as Co-Chairmen.3 This occurrence indicated a degree of confidence between FUNCINPEC and the CPP.
On June 16, FUNCINPEC and the CPP agreed to interim power sharing – an agreement brokered by Sihanouk. As per this agreement, all four political parties that had won representation in the Constituent Assembly would be represented in the Provisional National Government of Cambodia (PNGC). FUNCINPEC and the CPP would divide control of the major ministries, and Ranariddh and Hun Sen would serve as Co-Chairs of the PNGC and as Co-Ministers of Defense, Interior, and Public Security.
3. “Cambodia - UNTAC Background,” United Nations, accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr2.html#two.
4. “June, 1993 Cambodia,” Keesing's Record of World Events, vol. 39, 39513.
Sihanouk’s proposed formation of an Interim Joint Administration (GNPC), with Prince Ranariddh and Mr. Hun Sen as Co-Chairmen of the Council of Ministers, continued into 1994.
Sihanouk’s proposed formation of an Interim Joint Administration (GNPC), with Prince Ranariddh and Mr. Hun Sen as Co-Chairmen of the Council of Ministers, continued into 1995.
Joint leadership of the government continued between FUNCINPEC and the CCP (both signatories of the Paris agreement). Power-sharing shifted dramatically in the new coalition government.5 The CPP never really shared power in the coalition government, but obstructed all efforts by FUNCINPEC to govern. FUNCINPEC, for its part, lacked qualified administrators. The coalition never functioned well, and over the course of the three years, it descended in an ever-worsening spiral.
5. Sorpong Peou, Intervention & Change in Cambodia: Towards Democracy? (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), ch. 5-6.
Power-sharing between FUNCINPEC and the CPP collapsed during the July 7, 1997 coup. Hun Sen, the leader of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), overthrew Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh in a brutal, bloody coup.6 This formally brought about the termination of the power-sharing deals, which had extended beyond 1993 – the year when the Constituent Assembly restored the monarch and UNTAC concluded its mission in Cambodia.
6. “Butchers on a Smaller Scale: Hun Sen and the Cambodian People's Party,” accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.mekong.net/cambodia/hun_sen1.htm.
In a July election, Hun Sen's ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) won 64 of parliament's 122 seats, but was short of the number required to form a new government alone. The CPP and FUNCINPEC formed a coalition government. The CPP received 12 ministries, FUNCINPEC took 11, and two were shared, while each party appointed a deputy premier.7 The new government was not evenly split in terms of power; the FUNCINPEC ministries were those that largely provided social services, like education, health, culture, and women’s affairs, while the CPP ministries were those with real power, including defense, interior, finance, and information. In this new arrangement, the CPP secured control over state power. As a matter of fact, this coalition government was formed not because of provisions in the peace agreement but because of the electoral outcome.
7. “Back from the Brink: Cambodian Democracy Gets a Second Chance,” International Crisis Group, Asia Report N°4 (January 1999), 8.
Multiparty elections took place in 1998. A coalition government was formed, which was different from the power-sharing provisions in the Paris Agreement.
1. “Cambodian SNC Reaches Three More Agreements,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 2, 1991.
2. “National Assembly Meets to Adopt Measures Following Recent Unrest,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 30, 1991.
3. “Phnom Penh and FUNCINPEC Release Communiques on 10th September SNC Meeting,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 September 1992.
The elections for the Constituent Assembly took place from May 23 to 28, 1993.
4. “Hun Sen, Ranariddh and Chea Sim to present constitution to Sihanouk in Pyongyang,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 23, 1993.
5. “Constituent Assembly begins constitution debate,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 16, 1993.
6. “Son Sann's closing speech at Constituent Assembly: constitution adopted,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 22, 1993.
Political party reform began before the signing of the Paris peace agreement. On October 18, 1991, the ruling party in Cambodia, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), declared a formal end to more than 13 years of communism, replacing its president and embracing multiparty democracy and a free-market system.1 This could be coded as political party reform.
1. “Cambodians officially end communism,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), October 19, 1991.
- a person born outside of Cambodia, with a mother (or father born) in Cambodia whose mother or father was also born in Cambodia.
''The symbol of a political party cannot be accepted for registration if it contains a portrait of His Royal Highness Prince Norodom Sihanouk”.
''Voting facilities for overseas voters are to be provided at one polling station in Europe, one in North America and one in Australia. Registration of voters is to take place exclusively in Cambodia”.
''The election campaign period is to start on the day that the (chief) electoral officer publishes the final list of registered parties and ends four days before the start of polling”.
''Any omission which would be an offence if committed during the campaign period shall also be an offence if committed before or after the campaign''.
Parties to the conflict did not agree on the amendments to the electoral law during the August 5, 1992 meeting of the SNC. Yasushi Akashi, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Cambodia, used his power as stated in Annex 1, Part D, Paragraph 3A and adopted the law. The electoral law adopted a formula to provide voting rights to Cambodians, as had been stipulated in the 1954 Cambodian Civil Code. The law required that the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) prepare elections for Cambodians living abroad, prohibited the use of HRH Prince Norodom Sihanouk's picture as the symbol of a party on the ballots, and also permitted amendments of the bill in accordance with the situation.4 The Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) opposed the draft law on the grounds that it would give voting rights to the Vietnamese.
This could be coded as reform in electoral law.
The registration of voters was to start on October 5, 1992, and 16 parties were expected to be provisionally registered.
2. “Communique on 10th June Supreme National Council Meeting,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 16, 1992.
3. “UNTAC; The Elections; The Peace Process,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 20, 1992.
4. “Communique on 5th August SNC Meeting,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 15, 1992.
5. “Election campaign a success, says UNTAC chief,” The Straits Times, May 21, 1993.
No information was available on judiciary reform for 1991.
1. “Supreme National Council Meeting on 10th September,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 14, 1992.
2. “Hun Sen Presents Transitional Government’s Action Plan to Assembly,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 7, 1993.
3. “Legal Reforms Urged to Ensure Economic Growth,” Emerging Markets Data File in NATION, August 28, 1996.
“The lack of an independent judiciary also continued to pose a problem. A Supreme Council of Magistracy, mandated by Cambodia's constitution to appoint and discipline judges, was expected to meet for the first time in November, but a Constitutional Council that is to provide independent confirmation of legislative compliance with the constitution had yet to be established."
4. “Human Rights Watch World Report 1998 – Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch 1998, accessed July 20, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport/Asia-02.htm#P210_63166.
On March 19, 1998, the Cambodian parliament passed legislation that created the Constitutional Council as the country's supreme judicial body. The nine-member council is mandated to interpret Cambodia's constitution and its laws.6 The body's two eldest members, Chau Sen Cocsal Chhum and Son Sann, boycotted the meeting of the Constitutional Council, claiming many of their colleagues were illegally appointed and that the body was stacked in favor of strongman Hun Sen's ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP). The CPP, which effectively controlled Cambodia's judiciary, would now also control the Constitutional Council.7 Judiciary reform did not take place.
5. “Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch 1999, accessed July 20, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport99/asia/cambodia.html.
6. “Cambodian parliament passes law establishing supreme judicial body,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 19, 1998.
7. “Cambodia's top judicial body finally convenes despite boycott,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 15, 1998.
8. “Human Rights Watch World Report 2000 – Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch 2000, accessed July 20, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Asia-02.htm#TopOfPage.
9. “Human Rights Watch World Report 2001 – Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch 2001, accessed July 20, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/asia/cambodia.html.
1. “Speed up Cambodia UN force – Evans,” The Age (Melbourne, Australia), December 18, 1991; “Cambodia - UNAMIC Background,” United Nations, accessed July 22, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamicbackgr.html.
Demobilization was several months behind schedule. Military reform had yet to begin.
After the May 1993 election, the new Army brought together forces previously under the control of former Prime Minister Hun Sen (i.e., the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP)), the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF). The Khmer Rouge fighters were not part of the new armed force, which started offensive attacks against the Khmers.2 The army remained unreformed and military brutality continued in secret military camps.
2. “Cambodia's Army, Now Unified, Attacks Recalcitrant Khmer Rouge,” Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA), August 26, 1993.
3. “Murder, torture, corruption charges: Cambodia's infamous army,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, October 18, 1994.
A major military reform took place in Cambodia during March 1995. The Cambodian Defense Ministry announced major cuts in its officer corps, with the number of generals slashed from around 2,000 to a number less than 200. Similarly, the number of colonels after the cuts went down from over 10,000 to 307. All 199 of the one-, two-, and three-star generals survived the reform.4 The reform was intended to please the major donor countries in order to spur military support.
4. “Cambodia slashes back generals and colonels,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 17, 1995.
In June 1996, new legislation was passed that related to the neutralization of the Cambodian military. It prohibited members of political factions from holding positions in the armed forces and required that the armed forces choose between their political and military posts. It also required that the armed forces personnel give up their party positions and their seats in the National Assembly. The bill effectively neutralized the armed forces.5 The government was also planning on scaling down its military from about 130,000 troops to about 70,000.
5. "Embassy of Cambodia News Letter," August 1997, accessed August 3, 2010, http://www.embassy.org/cambodia/newsletter/newslett97/aug.htm.
A new integrated armed force was formed. The new integrated armed forces fought amongst themselves for two days of clashes in Phnom Penh. FUNCINPEC military leaders were executed in extrajudicial killings.
6. “Cambodia: Minister on Troop Demobilization,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, December 21, 1998.
7. “Cambodia to Demobilize 79,000 Security Personnel Over Five Years,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, January 18, 1999.
8. “Cambodia Seeks 104M to Demobilize Soldiers at Japan Aid Conference,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, February 25, 1999.
9. “Cambodia: Army Officers Promoted as Part of Restructuring Programme,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, March 3, 1999.
10. “Cambodia donors satisfied but military demobilization slow,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, October 29, 1999.
12. “Royalist resistance forces rejoin Cambodian army,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, February 26, 1999.
Military reform continued along with the demobilization process. “The last experimental demobilization was held in Battambang Province involving 421 troops starting from 11th July, 2000.”13 The World Bank was also involved in the demobilization process – it provided 15 million dollars for military demobilization in Cambodia in 2001. The World Food Program (WFP) also promised to provide rice for demobilized soldiers. “In a pilot project, the government had cut off 1,500 soldiers from government's pay rolls while WFP had assisted. 150 kilograms of rice to each demobilized soldier.”14 This process was plagued by corruption, so much so that the funders decided to withhold funds.
13. "Last experimental demobilization" to be held in northwest Cambodia 15th July,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, July 7, 2000.
14. “World Bank Pledges to Assist Demobilization in Cambodia, Emerging Markets Datafile,” Xinhua, December 20, 2000.
15. “Cambodia,” ECP Escola de Cultura de pau, accessed May 10, 2010, http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/mapa/camboyai.pdf.
16. “Cambodia to downsize troops by 40,000,” Xinhua, October 16, 2006, accessed May 10, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/16/content_5210561.htm.
2. “UN deterrent or ploy in hands of rival militias? CAMBODIA, As Khmer Rouge regularly violates a truce, critics wonder if they are using peacekeepers in a bid to expand control,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), May 4, 1992.
3. “PM calls on Cambodia at a point of no return,” The Age (Melbourne, Australia), September 25, 1992.
4. “SECOND PHASE OF CEASEFIRE, MAY - NOVEMBER 1992," United Nations, Cambodia - UNTAC Background, accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr2.html#two.
5. “SECOND PHASE OF CEASEFIRE, MAY - NOVEMBER 1992,“ United Nations, Cambodia - UNTAC Background, accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr2.html#two.
The demobilization and disarmament process was suspended. With the Khmer Rouge's refusal to respect the terms of "Phase Two," the other factions stopped disarming and, in most cases, called their demobilized men back into service.6 A new Cambodian armed force comprised of the CPP, FUNCINPEC, and KPNLF armies was formed. The demobilization process was terminated without implementation.
6. “UN struggles on despite failure of peace accord Kevin Barrington reports on the difficulties the UN has faced in trying to bring the main factions together in Cambodia,” The Irish Times, April 10, 1993.
With the formation of a new armed force, the demobilization process terminated without implementation.
7. “CAMBODIA: MINISTER ON TROOP DEMOBILIZATION,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, December 21, 1998.
8. “Cambodia to Demobilize 79,000 Security Personnel Over Five Years,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, January 18, 1999, http://www.camnet.com.kh/ocm/government35.htm.
9. “Cambodia Seeks 104M to Demobilize Soldiers at Japan Aid Conference,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, February 25, 1999.
10. “Cambodia: Army Officers Promoted as Part of Restructuring Programme,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, March 3, 1999.
11. “Cambodia donors satisfied but military demobilization slow,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, October 29, 1999.
“The last experimental demobilization was held in Battambang Province. It involved 421 troops and began on the 11th of July, 2000” (BBC, 2000).12 The World Bank was also involved in the demobilization process. It provided $15 million dollars for military demobilization in Cambodia in 2001. The World Food Program (WFP) had also promised to provide rice for demobilized soldiers. “In a pilot project, the government had cut off 1,500 soldiers from government's pay rolls while WFP had assisted 150 kilograms of rice to each demobilized soldier” (Xinhua, 2000).13 Even if the experimental demobilization ended, there were efforts to demobilize soldiers from the Royal Cambodian Army and downsize the armed force.
12. “"Last experimental demobilization" to be held in northwest Cambodia 15th July,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, July 7, 2000.
13. “World Bank Pledges to Assist Demobilization in Cambodia, Emerging Markets Datafile,” Xinhua, December 20, 2000.
14. “Cambodia,” ECP Escola de Cultura de Pau, accessed May 10, 2010, http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/mapa/camboyai.pdf.
15. “Cambodia to downsize troops by 40,000,” Xinhua, October 16, 2010, accessed May 10, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/16/content_5210561.htm.
1. “Cambodia - UNTAC Background,” United Nations, accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr2.html#two.
3. "UNTAC suspends disarmament in Cambodia, Report From Japan," United Nations, October 22,1992.
The demobilization and disarmament process was suspended. With the Khmer Rouge's refusal to respect the terms of "Phase Two," the other factions stopped disarming and, in most cases, called their demobilized men back into service.4 A new Cambodian armed force comprised of the CPP, FUNCINPEC, and KPNLF armies was formed. The disarmament process terminated without implementation.
4. “UN struggles on despite failure of peace accord Kevin Barrington reports on the difficulties the UN has faced in trying to bring the main factions together in Cambodia,” The Irish Times, April 10, 1993.
With the formation of a new armed force, the disarmament process did not make any progress. There was a dramatic increase in armaments in the run-up to the July 1997 coup; Rannaridh was convicted on charges of smuggling guns into the country.
5. “Cambodia donors satisfied but military demobilization slow,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, October 29, 1999.
After the May 1993 election, the new army brought together forces previously under the control of former Prime Minister Hun Sen (or CPP), the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), and the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF). The newly formed armed force started offensive attacks against the Khmers.1 The Khmer Rouge fighters were not part of the new armed force. No reintegration of former combatants into civilian life took place.
1. “Cambodia's Army, Now Unified, Attacks Recalcitrant Khmer Rouge,” Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA), August 26, 1993.
A new integrated armed force was formed. Splinter factions from the Khmer Rouge were integrated into a new armed force. The Cambodian government was in the process of downsizing the armed force and reintegrating the demobilized personnel into civilian life.
1. “Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch World Report 1992, accessed July 30, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/ASW-04.htm#P195_67809.
2. “Cambodian government reportedly holding about 1,000 political prisoners,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 14, 1991.
3. “Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch World Report 1993, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/WR93/Asw-04.htm#P105_41321.
4. “Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch World Report 1993, accessed July 30, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/WR93/Asw-04.htm#P105_41321.
8. “Cambodia Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996,” U.S. Department of State, January 30, 1997, accessed July 30, 2010, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/cambodia.html.
9. “Cambodia Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997,” U.S. Department of State, January 30, 1998, accessed July 30, 2010, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1997_hrp_report/cambodia.html.
10. “Cambodia Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998,” U.S. Department of State, February 26, 1999, accessed July 30, 2010, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/cambodia.html.
11. “Cambodia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 1999,” U.S. Department of State, February 23, 2000, accessed July 30, 2010, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/283.htm.
12. “Cambodia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000,” U.S. Department of State, February 23, 2001, accessed July 30, 2010, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eap/681.htm.
On November 21, 1991, a tripartite memorandum of understanding was reached between the Thai government, the Supreme National Council (SNC), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This memorandum related to the repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons from Thailand. Thailand’s cooperation was essential in the safe and orderly return of all Cambodian refugees and displaced persons to their homeland.3 The return of refugees and displaced persons was perceived as an essential element of the peace process. It was essential that these Cambodians be given the opportunity to take part in the Constituent Assembly election and in the building of the Cambodian nation.
1. “Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch World Report 1992, accessed July 26, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/ASW-04.htm#P182_63937.
2. “Cambodia - UNTAC Background,” United Nations, accessed July 25, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr2.html.
3. “Thai-Cambodian Joint Communique Issued,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 25, 1991.
On April 20, 1992, the Khmer Rouge, together with the leaders of Cambodia's three other mutually hostile factions, signed two international covenants that committed them to far-reaching respect for human rights.4 The Supreme National Council then ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. On September 10, the SNC agreed to accede to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.
4. “Khmer Rouge Sign Rights Covenants,” The New York Times, April 21, 1992.
5. “Cambodia - UNTAC Background,” United Nations.
9. “Vietnam and Cambodia; Hanoi Says UNTAC Responsible for Safety of Vietnamese; Cited Paris Agreement,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 29, 1993.
10. “Repression and intimidation, now a Cambodian election,” The Age (Melbourne, Australia), May 22, 1993.
11. “Cambodia Votes to Give Crown Back to Sihanouk; Prince's critics fear he will bypass constitutional curbs on his powers,” The Guardian (London), September 16, 1993.
12. “Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch World Report 1995, accessed July 2, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/WR95/ASIA-02.htm#P133_39951.
13. “Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch World Report 1995, accessed July 2, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/WR95/ASIA-02.htm#P133_39951.
The Human Rights situation continued to deteriorate.
15. “Cambodia Asks U.N. to Close Office Protecting Human Rights,” The New York Times, March 21, 1995.
16. “Cambodia agrees to extend U.N. human rights office mandate,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, May 4, 1995.
17. “RELATIONS WITH UN; Cambodia accepts UN proposal on human rights,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 13, 1995.
According to the Human Rights Watch World Report of 1996, “political tensions rose between the two partners in the coalition government; political violence increased, as did restrictions on freedom of the press; and a pattern of impunity continued to favor those responsible for human rights abuses, including former Khmer Rouge officials” (Human Rights Watch, 1997). In the report it was noted that the “U.N. Commission on Human Rights passed a resolution expressing concern over continuing abuses, including violence and intimidation directed at political parties and the press” (Human Rights Watch, 1997).18 Nevertheless, the report suggested that the UN Human Rights Center in Phnom Penh was able to carry out its activities without threats from the government. During this period, UN and other human right workers were routinely harassed, including the kidnapping of the son of one member of the UNCHR staff.
18. “Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch World Report 1997, accessed July 25, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/WR97/ASIA-02.htm#P126_70556.
According to the Human Rights Watch World Report of 1998, “in February 1997,factional fighting erupted in Battambang province between FUNCINPEC and CPP forces, with human rights workers reporting as many as twenty soldiers killed during the armed clashes. On March 30 (1997), a grenade attack on a peaceful rally in front of the National Assembly led by KNP President Sam Rainsy left at least sixteen dead and more than one hundred wounded. The two prime ministers continued to build up their personal arsenals and private armies, with Hun Sen's security forces numbering at least 1,500 and Ranariddh's approaching 1,000. Tensions continued to escalate as the two factions competed to recruit defecting Khmer Rouge units, as well as to build new rival political alliances, which led to virtual paralysis of the fragile coalition. The beginning of the National Assembly's planned three-month session, slated originally for April 21, was postponed after divisions broke out within FUNCINPEC, with a renegade faction led by Minister of State Ung Phan and Siem Reap Governor Toan Chay announcing their intention to oust Ranariddh. During the ensuing political stalemate, the National Assembly failed to convene for nearly six months, holding up passage of crucial legislation regulating the upcoming elections, nongovernmental organization (NGO) activity, political parties, and access to broadcasting frequencies” (Human Rights Watch, 1998).
“When military authorities in late May seized a shipment of weapons and ammunition, addressed to Ranariddh and marked ’spare parts,’ the first prime minister said he ‘did not have any choice‘ but to procure weapons in order to protect himself from CPP forces. On June 17 (1997), fighting broke out in the streets of Phnom Penh for several hours between Ranariddh's personal security unit and troops under CPP loyalist National Police Chief Hok Lundy, in which several people were killed” (Human Rights Watch, 1998).19 Hun Sen gradually consolidated his power by neutralizing the opposition parties.
19. “Human Rights Watch World Report 1998 – Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch 1998, accessed July 25, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport/Asia-02.htm#P210_63166.
20. “U.N. official leaves Cambodia after assessing human rights problems,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, January 25, 1998.
21. “Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch 1999, accessed July 25, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/worldreport99/asia/cambodia.html.
23. “Human Rights Watch World Report 2000 – Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch 2000, accessed July 27, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Asia-02.htm#TopOfPage.
24. “Cambodian parties agree on delay in Khmer Rouge leader trial,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, August 2, 1999.
25. “U.N. Plans Joint War Crimes Tribunal for Khmer Rouge,” The New York Times, August 12, 1999.
26. “Human Rights Watch World Report 2001 – Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch 2001, accessed July 27, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/asia/cambodia.html.
On November 21, 1991, a tripartite memorandum of understanding was reached between the Thai government, the Supreme National Council (SNC), and the UNHCR. This memorandum related to the repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons from Thailand. Thailand’s cooperation was essential in the safe and orderly return of all Cambodian refugees and displaced persons to their homeland.3 The return of refugees and IDPs was perceived as an essential element of the peace process. It was essential that these Cambodians be given the opportunity to take part in the Constituent Assembly election and in the building of the Cambodian nation.
1. “Cambodia - UNAMIC Background,” United Nations, accessed July 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamicbackgr.html.
2. “Grant to Help Displaced Cambodians Go Home,” COURIER-MAIL, October 23, 1991.
4. “Cambodia - The Facts: A Shattered Nation,” New Internationalist, Issue 242 (April 1993), accessed July 25, 2010, http://www.newint.org/issue242/facts.htm.
5. “Cambodia,” Human Rights Watch World Report 1993, accessed July 25, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/WR93/Asw-04.htm#P105_41321.
6. Shaun Williams, “Internally Displaced Persons and Property Rights in Cambodia,” Refugee Survey Quarterly (2000): 19(2): 194-200.
7. “Returning to a home in ruins REFUGEES: A few Cambodians return, braving mines and devastation,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), June 29, 1992.
8. “Cambodia: Cambodian refugee repatriation "progressing as scheduled,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 14, 1993.
9. “Cambodia: Last Cambodian Refugee Camp in Thailand Closed,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 2, 1993.
10. Grant Curtis, “Transition to What? Cambodia, UNTAC and the Peace Process,” UNRISD Discussion Paper (1993): DP48, accessed July 25, 2010, http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/%28httpAuxPages%29/2F0008467C7D3E...$file/dp48.pdf.
5. “Thousands of Internal Refugees Missed by Aid Program,” Sydney Morning Herald (Australia), April 1, 1992.
6. “INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS UNDP - Aid for internally displaced persons,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 15, 1992.
7. Grant Curtis, “Transition to What? Cambodia, UNTAC and the Peace Process,” UNRISD Discussion Paper (1993): DP48, accessed July 25, 2010, http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/%28httpAuxPages%29/2F0008467C7D3E...$file/dp48.pdf.
People were displaced by fighting between government forces and the Khmer Rouge in 1994-95.
People were displaced by fighting in 1997-98.
1. “Foreign Ministry to send reconstruction team to Cambodia, Report from Japan,” United Nations, December 11, 1991.
2. “Sihanouk’s Speech Emphasizes Assisting the Poor and Agriculture,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 23, 1992.
3. “Tokyo Declaration on the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Cambodia,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 24, 1992.
4. “CAMBODIA; Road and bridge construction and reconstruction agreement signed with Japan,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 23, 1993.
5. “CAMBODIA; Japanese aid agency to open Phnom Penh office,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 21, 1993.
6. “Cambodia braces for U.N. pullout: SHOCK TO ECONOMY THREATENS STABILITY,” The Nikkei Weekly (Japan), October 4, 1993.
7. “Cambodia signs loan accords with World Bank, ADB,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, December 16, 1994.
8. “Foreign relations: Ranariddh tells Japan to manage aid itself as "Cambodians might embezzle it,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 21, 1995.
9. “Cambodia: A United Nations Success Story Going Awry?” Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA), March 8, 1995, 8.
10. “Cambodia to receive 1.35 billion dollars in 1995 and 1996,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 16, 1995.
11. “Participation in reconstruction of Cambodia renewed,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, April 4, 1995.
12. “E.U. officials inspect demining in Cambodia,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, August 5, 1996.
13. “Working together to re-construct war-torn Cambodia,” New Straits Times (Malaysia), October 28, 1996.
Another conference of donor countries met in Paris on July 1-2, 1997. In the multilateral donor meeting, Cambodia was expected to win international aid commitments of about 449 million dollars. In the conference, Cambodia was told to put its house in order or face dwindling support. Donor countries also criticized Cambodia for spending too much money on its security forces.14 On July 7, 1997, Hun Sen, the leader of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), overthrew Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh in a brutal, bloody coup, which created resentment in the donor community. This impacted economic and infrastructure reconstruction efforts.
14. “Cambodia ‘spending too much on military’,” The Straits Times (Singapore), July 3, 1997.
15. “Cambodian strongman vows to push reforms despite political deadlock,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, October 22, 1998.
In a donor conference held on Feb 25-27, 1999, Cambodia received pledge support of $470 million from the international community.
16. “Premier Mahathir discusses ASEAN entry, investment with Cambodian counterpart,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 6, 1999.
Note: The information above gives the amount of money pledged at the donor conferences, but not the amounts that were actually spent. On the topic of socio-economic development, the boom of the garment and tourism industries that had been taking place in Cambodia since 1993 is also worth mentioning.
17. “Ariston revives stalled US $1.3b Cambodian project,” Business Times (Singapore), February 15, 2000.
18. “ADB loan to help Cambodian farmers increase incomes,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, September 6, 2000.
19. “U.S. Gives Aid to Cambodian Health Sector, Emerging Markets Datafile,” Xinhua, September 27, 2000.
At a news conference on the 16th of December, Senator Evans from Australia announced that the Australian government had decided to grant Vietnam and Cambodia 4.4m Australian dollars as supplementary aid for development projects. Of the sum, 2m dollars would go to Vietnam.2 Japan was also considering drawing up a plan to extend its financial aid, including official development assistance to Cambodia.3 Japan also planned to host a Tokyo conference to discuss the reconstruction of Cambodia.
1. "Cambodia builds on a fragile peace," The Age (Melbourne, Australia), November 4, 1991.
2. "Australian Foreign Minister Concludes Visit to Cambodia," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 21, 1991.
3. "Japan to provide aid to Cambodia, possibly Vietnam, Report From Japan," United Nations, October 24, 1991.
4. "UNTAC Head Says Conference a 'Spectacular Success'," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 25, 1992.
“The rehabilitation aid was meant to support everything from road and bridge repair to well-digging and the purchase of school books and essential medicines. But of the $800 million pledged by donor nations at a conference in Tokyo in June, only about $95 million has been disbursed. According to figures compiled by the United Nations, the United States, the largest donor at the Tokyo conference, has come up with only $14 million of the $145 million it pledged. Japan, the second-largest donor, has turned over only about $9 million of the $135 million it promised.” According to the UN transitional authority in Cambodia's rehabilitation program director, "donor nations had held back hundreds of millions of dollars in promised reconstruction aid out of a fear that the peace process will collapse”.5 In International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia held on 10 Sept. 1993 in Paris, donor community had pledged $119 Million.
5. "Most Cambodians See Nothing of Aid," The New York Times, February 21, 1993.
6. "$773 mil. pledged to Cambodia; for reconstruction projects," The Daily Yomiuri, March 12, 1994.
7. "Half of $ 1.3b aid pledged to Cambodia paid out," The Straits Times (Singapore), August 6, 1994.
8. "Cambodia signs loan accords with World Bank," ADB, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, December 16, 1994.
9. "Cambodia to receive 1.35 billion dollars in 1995 and 1996," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 16, 1995.
10. "Tie aid to democracy: Cambodian dissident," The Weekend Australian, January 27, 1996.
11. "Cambodia "spending too much on military'," The Straits Times (Singapore), July 3, 1997.
12. The Nikkei Weekly (Japan), July 27, 1998.
During the Tokyo donor conference held on Feb 25-27, 1999, 16 donor nations and international organizations approved a $470 million aid package to Cambodia. On Feb 25, Cambodia and the International aid organizations and donor countries decided to set up a monitoring body that would hold quarterly meetings to assess Cambodia’s progress in implementing the reforms that were a condition for continued economic assistance.
13. "Cambodia: Premier ends France visit; official comments on aid, Khmer Rouge trial," BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, May 29, 2000.
14. "World Bank to fund Cambodian demobilization," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, September 2, 2000.
The Paris agreement had strictly banned all parties from seeking outside military assistance. However, UNAMIC had sent military liaison units to only the general military headquarters of each of the Cambodian parties. In addition, teams deployed to two forward positions, Battambang and Siem Reap, which were to be main bases for the mine-awareness programme.
1. "UNTAC Head Addresses SNC on Foreign Troops, Immigrants," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 27, 1992.
“A U.N.-mandated oil embargo against Cambodia's Khmer Rouge guerrillas took effect Friday, but officials were doubtful it would be effective. The embargo, approved by the Security Council on Nov. 30, is intended to pressure the Khmer Rouge to stop undermining U.N. efforts to bring peace to Cambodia after 13 years of civil war. A ban on log exports, imposed by Cambodian leaders to save their nation's forests from depletion, also went into effect.”2 This embargo against Khmer guerrillas, however, was different from the armed embargo which went into effect immediately after the signing of the peace agreement in Paris.
2. "Oil embargo against Khmer Rouge starts," St. Petersburg Times (Florida), January 2, 1993.
3. "Military Aid Gives Diggers Deja Vu," Courier-Mail, January 13, 1995.
1. "Cambodia: UNAMIC Facts and Figures," http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamicfacts.html, accessed July 22, 2010.
Civilian police component: The Paris Agreement had the provision of UNTAC supervision and control of a civilian police force in Cambodia.
Military Component: the military component had four main functions: (1) to verify the withdrawal and non-return of all categories of foreign forces and their arms and equipment; (2) to supervise the ceasefire and related measures including regrouping, cantonment, disarming and demobilization; (3) to control weapons, including monitoring the cessation of outside military assistance; and (4) to assist in mine-clearing, including training and mine awareness programs. The Secretary-General recommended that the military component be fully deployed by the end of May 1992 and that the regrouping and cantonment process, as well as demobilization of at least 70 per cent of the cantoned forces, be achieved by the end of September 1992.
Parties to the conflict did not agree on the electoral law during the August 5, 1992 meeting of the SNC. Yasushi Akashi, special representative of the UN Secretary-General in Cambodia, used his power as stated in Annex 1, Part D, Paragraph 3A and adopted the law. The electoral law adopted a formula to provide voting rights to Cambodians as had been stipulated in the 1954 Cambodian Civil Code. The law required that the UNTAC would prepare elections for Cambodians living abroad, prohibited the use of HRH Prince Norodom Sihanouk's picture as the symbol of a party on the ballots, as well as permitted amendments of the bill in accordance with the situation.9 The PDK opposed the draft law on the grounds that it would give voting rights to the Vietnamese. This can be coded as “reform in electoral law.” The registration of voters started on October 5, 1992, and 16 parties are expected to be provisionally registered. The UNTAC also had a human rights component, Repatriation, and Rehabilitation components.
2. "Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation MARQUIS," http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-bdo/di-ri-eng.asp?IntlOpId=25..., accessed July 22, 2010.
3. "Cambodia: UNAMIC Background," http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamicbackgr.html, accessed July 22, 2010.
4. "UNTAC to control civil administration from 1st July," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 1, 1992.
5. "OTHER REPORTS; Interior Minister receives UNTAC civilian police chief," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 24, 1992.
6. "Cambodia-UNTAC Facts and Figures."
9. "COMMUNIQUE ON 5TH AUGUST SNC MEETING," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 15, 1992.
11. "Constituent Assembly begins constitution debate," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 16, 1993.
12. "Son Sann's closing speech at Constituent Assembly: constitution adopted," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 22, 1993.
1. "Cambodia: UNAMIC Background," http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamicfacts.html, accessed July 22, 2010.
4. "Cambodia-UNTAC Background," accessed July 19, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr2.html#two.
6. "UNTAC HEAD ADDRESSES SNC ON FOREIGN TROOPS, IMMIGRANTS," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 27, 1992.
7. "Cambodia-UNTAC Background," accessed July 22, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacbackgr2.html.
8. "Second progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia," United Nations, (S/24578), September 21, 1992.
10. "Second progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia," United Nations.
11. "Cambodia: UNTAC- Facts and Figures," accessed July 22, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacfacts.html.
1. "Cambodia: UNAMIC Facts and Figures," accessed July 22, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamicfacts.html.
3. "Cambodia: UNAMIC Background," accessed July 22, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamicbackgr.html.
6. "Cambodia- UNTAC Facts and Figures," accessed July 22, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacfacts.html.
10. "Second progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia," United Nations, (S/24578), September 21, 1992.
11. "Cambodia: UNTAC- Facts and Figures."
The military invasion of Cambodia by the Vietnamese troops resulted in the removal of Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia. After their defeat, the Khmer started a guerilla insurgency. In this context, the 1991 Paris agreement called for the withdrawal of foreign forces, advisers, and military personnel remaining in Cambodia.
In a news conference, Hun Sen, who was the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and a member of Supreme National Council, addressed the questions related to Vietnamese residents in Cambodia and Vietnamese troops referring statistics on ethnic minorities. He informed SNC that “Vietnamese residents in the country before 1970 under Samdech Norodom Sihanouk's rule numbered from 400,000 to 500,000. They were mostly rubber plantation workers; some lived along the Mekong River and the Tonle Sap. Under Lon Nol's repression, a number of them fled to Vietnam. Under Pol Pot's repression, some fled to Vietnam along with a number of Cambodians. According to the 1987 statistics, there were 130,000. Thus, compared to the 500,000 residents in 1970, it is very different. Following the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, a number of Vietnamese residents, afraid that Pol Pot might be back, returned to Vietnam. There are now over 90,000 Vietnamese residents in Cambodia.”1 This statement can be taken as a verification of the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia.
A complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, however, was contested by the Khmer Rouge.
1. "HUN SEN HOLDS NEWS CONFERENCE IN PHNOM PENH," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, November 20, 1991.
2. "CAMBODIA; Khmer Rouge radio gives details of captured Vietnamese officer in Cambodia," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 30, 1991.
In the SNC meeting held on July 23, 1992, the UNTAC chief recalled the Vietnamese government’s statement that “all Vietnamese troops left Cambodia between 17th July 1982 and 26th September 1989. This statement named the divisions, regiments and battalions involved; the places from where those troops were withdrawn; the types of materiel; the dates; numbers of troops; and the roads they took to return to Vietnam. That statement emphasized that Vietnam no longer had any troops, weapons or materiel left on Cambodian soil, and that Vietnam has not sent troops, weapons or materiel back to Cambodia.”5 In the same meeting, the UNTAC chief told SNC that the UNTAC had personally supervised Cambodia's national defense institution and arranged a number of measures to verify that all foreign troops, advisers and military personnel had left Cambodia and would not be able to return absolutely. Checkpoints had been set up along the borders between Cambodia and its three neighboring countries. Mobile military units had also been employed to monitor and investigate whether foreign troops remained in Cambodia.
In the SNC meeting on December 10, 1992, Tran Huy Chuong, a Vietnamese ambassador accredited to the SNC, affirmed that Vietnam had withdrawn all its volunteer troops from Cambodia in September 1989.6 Because there were no Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, Australia and Japan lifted the trade sanctions on Vietnam.7 As of 1992, there were no Vietnamese troops in Cambodia.
3. "KHMER ROUGE SLOGANS CONDEMN VIETNAM AND URGE UNTAC DEPLOYMENT ALONG BORDER," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 18, 1992.
4. "Vietnam ''has never infiltrated its troops and equipment into Cambodia''," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 9, 1992.
5. "UNTAC HEAD ADDRESSES SNC ON FOREIGN TROOPS, IMMIGRANTS," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 27, 1992.
6. "Vietnamese ambassador denies troop presence in Cambodia," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 16, 1992.
7. "Japan to lift trade sanctions against Vietnam, Report From Japan," United Nations, January 6, 1992.
Foreign troops withdrawn in 1992 or before.