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5 5 too can explain (3), for instance in terms of some principle of practical syllogism. And since none of the claims (a) (f) appeal to any notion of correspondence, the deflationist can adopt them as well. Combining his practical-syllogistic explanation of (3) with an assimilation of Kitcher s explanation of (2), the deflationist would claim that the resulting extended version of Horwich s explanation is at least as good as Kitcher s own. But Kitcher has a ready reply: the resulting extended explanation is inferior because it leaves the deflationist beguiled by vocabulary, blind towards a certain mystery and lacking the resources to solve it. By using the same words to describe Ophelia s world and her propositional attitudes, Kitcher says, the deflationist renders it mysterious why the action issued by Ophelia s practical syllogism makes her succeed. Only by removing the beguilement can the deflationist solve the mystery, and there are just two ways for him to remove the beguilement. One is to produce a derivation of (3'): [(O wants <D> & O believes <B>)] O follows the path past the willows. The other is to produce a derivation of (3'') [O wants <O gets to the brook> & O believes <O follows the path past the willows O gets to the brook>] O does some action A such that A(q), where (q) is fulfilled by any action that gets Ophelia to the brook. But, Kitcher tells us, the deflationist lacks the resources to derive (3') or (3''), because no principle of practical syllogism entails such schematic statements.
8 8 (3'') (O wants <O gets to the brook> & O believes <O follows the path past the willows O gets to the brook>) O does some action A such that A(q). The derivation of which is, by Kitcher s own lights, sufficient for solving the mystery. So the deflationist s actual extension of Horwich s explanation consists in a deflationary reading of Kitcher s derivation of (2), a derivation of (3) from a principle of practical syllogism, and the foregoing solution of the mystery. The only task remaining for the deflationist in answering Kitcher s hybrid argument, then, is to address the point about unification. And, indeed, the deflationist has the resources to do so. These resources stem from the fact that the elements of S form a special case in which the deflationary recipe calls for extra ingredients. The deflationary extension of Horwich s general recipe with respect to S attributes to each agent a belief concerning the map. In our example, the relevant belief is that the map is accurate and shows a line joining castle, willows, and brook. If other people succeeded in getting from the castle to the brook by using the map, then the extended deflationary explanations of those successes would unify them with the following property: the agents having the belief that the map is accurate and shows a line joining castle, willows, and brook. While Kitcher unifies the successes in S by attributing the same etiological structure to the agents beliefs, the deflationist unifies these successes by attributing the same beliefs to the agents. Thus the deflationist can provide extended versions of Horwich s explanations that are unificatory as well as unmysterious. Kitcher s hybrid argument is unsound because its third premise is false.
14 14 reference supports his defense of progress arguments from incommensurability objections. But it is far from clear that the causal theory is necessary for this task. And by no means do progress arguments exhaust Kitcher s realist resources. Indeed, the vast success of current science may well establish that realism its own. Besides, that realism is obvious enough to not require an argument, at least insofar as it is concerns observables. Otherwise it is more contentious, but still independent of deflationism. The third reason, like the first two, fails to sufficiently ground the resistance. Unable to think of any additional reasons, I conclude that deflationary theories of truth are no threat to Kitcher s realism. His hybrid success argument, then, is unmotivated as well as unsound. 10 References Boyd, Richard. (1984). The Current Status of Scientific Realism In J. Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism, University of California Press, pp Field, Hartry. (1986). The Deflationary Conception of Truth. In G. Macdonald and C. Wright (eds.), Fact, Science, and Value, Oxford University Press, pp (1992). Critical Notice: Paul Horwich s Truth, Phil Science (59): (2001). Truth and the Absence of Fact. Oxford University Press. Fine, Arthur. (1986). The Shaky Game. University of Chicago Press. Gupta, Anil. (1993). A Critique of Deflationism, Phil Topics (21/2): Reprinted in S. Blackburn and K. Simmons (eds.), Truth, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp Horwich, Paul. (1998). Truth, 2 nd Edition. Oxford University Press. Kitcher, Philip. (1978). Theories, Theorists, and Theoretical Change, Phil Review (87): (1993). The Advancement of Science. Oxford University Press (2001a). Real Realism: The Galilean Strategy, Phil Review (110): (2001b). Science, Truth, and Democracy. Oxford University Press (2002). On the Explanatory Role of Correspondence Truth, PPR (66): Laudan, Larry. (1981). A Confutation of Convergent Realism, Phil Science (48): Leeds, Stephen. (1995). Truth, Correspondence, and Success, Phil Studies (79): 1-36.
15 15 Maxwell, Grover. (1962). The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities, in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (eds.) Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time, University of Minnesota Press, pp Psillos, Stathis. (1999). Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. Routledge. Van Fraassen, Bas. (1980). The Scientific Image. Oxford University Press. 1 In the first tradition, see Field (1986, 1992, 2001), Leeds (1995), and Horwich (1998). In the second tradition, see Maxwell (1962), Van Fraassen (1980), Laudan (1981), Boyd (1984), Fine (1986), and Kitcher (1993), and Psillos (1999). 2 Versions of this argument can be found in several of Kitcher s recent writings. It appears in broad outline in Kitcher (2001a) and (2001b), where it plays a role in defending his overall moderate realist philosophy of science. Its most detailed exposition is in Kitcher (2002), especially pp Less detailed arguments of a similar variety can be found in Gupta (1993: ) and Psillos (1999: 248). 3 Kitcher (2002: 347). He parenthetically suggests that this theory applies only to typical beliefs. 4 Kitcher (2001a, 2001b, 2002). For an earlier and less moderate realism, see Kitcher (1993). 5 Horwich (1998a: 22-23). Following Horwich, I use <p> to abbreviate the proposition that p. 6 Field (1986, 1992, 2001). 7 Kitcher (2002: 349, 352). 8 This is an abridged version of Kitcher s Galilean argument; see Kitcher (2001a, 2001b: 19-24). 9 Kitcher (1978, 1993: 75-80, ). The extent to which he still advocates progress arguments is not clear; see Kitcher (2001b). 10 Thanks to Frank Arntzenius, Martin Bunzl, Kevan Edwards, Philip Kitcher, and Barry Loewer for helpful discussions.