The principles that govern this ground of appeal are not in doubt.
 First, the trial judge’s credibility findings are owed significant deference on appeal. They should not be interfered with unlessthey “cannot be supported on any reasonable view of the evidence”: R. v. P.(R.), 2012 SCC 22 (CanLII),  1 S.C.R. 746; and R. v. Burke, 1996 CanLII 229 (SCC),  1 S.C.R. 474, at para. 7.
 Second, significant testimonial inconsistencies should be addressed because, as the Supreme Court noted in R. v. Gagnon,2006 SCC 17 (CanLII),  1 S.C.R. 621, at para. 21, the accused is entitled to know “why the trial judge is left with no reasonable doubt”. However, a trial judge is not required to refer to or resolve every inconsistency raised by the defence in the course of his or her reasons: R. v. R.(C.), 2010 ONCA 176 (CanLII), 260 O.A.C. 52, at para. 48.
 Third, an appellate court should not interfere with a trial judge’s findings of credibility if the core of the complainant’s allegations against an appellant remain largely intact on a review of the entirety of the evidence: R. v. Roy, 2017 ONCA 30 (CanLII), at para. 14; R. v. Barua, 2014 ONCA 34 (CanLII), 315 O.A.C. 83, at paras. 7-8; and R. v. Marleau (2005), 2005 CanLII 8667 (ON CA), 197 O.A.C. 29 (C.A.), at para. 7.
 Applying these principles, I would reject this ground of appeal.