Hanson argues that the focus of Greek warfare was not the destruction of crops, but a response to a perceived threat to crops, and the insult of foreign troops marching into ones territory. What makes this study so unique is the paucity of sources available to the students of ancient Greece compared to those available to the modern historian. Could soldiers have fought for long carrying 70+ pounds of armor? In short, I think this is a bad book for a large number of reasons, the most important one is that it presents an entirely fictitious reconstruction of the nature of warfare in ancient Greece, relying on ideology and cheap rhetorical tricks to convince the reader into thinkin Much of what I write here about Hanson's Western Way of War is a summary of an older blog post of mine that was originally published on my personal website, but is now available on the website of Ancient Warfare magazine. This history was accessible and detailed without becoming dryly technical, but still conveyed a lot of well-documented information. The purpose of this was to centralize the violence away from the home and village, and make the battle end as quickly as possible to limit human death and damage.
Unlike the Persians and many other Near Eastern armies, they did not rely upon cavalry although some modification will come under Alexander the Great , along with chariots as those armies had. Също така обаче, не е зле да погледнете и това ревю, щото човек трябва да мисли за историята критично, а не романтично: He has college kids mess about with Greek Hoplite armor and concludes that it's too heavy to wear for more than a couple of minutes. On page 13 of the revised edition, Hanson contrasts the supposedly honest and open style of fighting used by Western armies with the tactics employed by their our? In cambio, come sempre, vi parlo sinceramente di questo libro. The author was tearing out trees from his Fresno farm when he realized Much has been said about this book in other reviews, so I'll focus on one interesting aspect. He sees the results of this error in the carnage of Verdun, the Somme, and Omaha Beach, all ostensible products of a foolish preference for direct battle. And Hanson deliberately skews the picture when he considers pitched battles typical of the West, creating a dichotomy that does more harm than good. The city-states had consensual governments composed of small, free, property-owning farmers.
Според автора, този начин на воюване води началото си от древна Гърция, от наследството на нейните хоплити, които опаковани в тежка бронзова броня си уговаряли място за битка, подрежда Военните историци и теоретици отдавна са отчели, че има съществена разлика между Изтока и Запада не само в начина на живот и световъзприятие, но и в начина на водене на война. While war was an ever present reality, the conventions of hoplite battle were designed to limit the scope of war and therefore casualties. Hanson also discusses the physical condition and age of the men, weaponry, wounds, and morale. In this bold, original study, Victor Davis Hanson shows how this brutal enterprise was dedicated to the same outcome as consensual government--an unequivocal, instant resolution to dispute. An excellent piece of work that demystifies the art of hoplite warfare.
Hanson also discusses the physical condition and age of the men, weaponry, wounds, and morale. He also includes a significant chapter on his sources, as well as a long supplementary bibliography and a lengthy Index Locorum of primary sources. Self-consciously borrowing a page from famed military historian, John Keegan, who wrote the introduction, Hanson uses a structure similar to the one used in the The Face of Battle. Hanson insightfully shows that the apparent madness of hoplite shock battles had an undeniable logic in Classical Greece society. This is not a work of history. No maneuvering, ambushes or deceptions for the Ancient Greeks, instead they suited up in their armor, picked their massive hoplon shields and marched out to fight a short, bloody battle that would settle the war, and then they matched home again to either acclaim or derision based on whether they won or lost. Each chapter in the second part offers a survey of individual aspects of battle, from who the individual soldiers were and what bound them to step-by-step assessment of the battle itself.
This is all just speculation and musing by Hanson without any real evidence or further exploration. Greek men of all ages participated, and each felt more allegiance to his neighbors and family than higher ideals or notions. Yet, Hanson depends on these less than direct sources. . In short, while decisive infantry battle is indeed part of the model for Western warfare it is not the only part. Linking this new style of fighting to the rise of constitutional government, Hanson raises new issues and questions old assumptions about the history of war.
Along with the historical record as pieced together from plays and archeological findings and art, Hanson refers to actual experiments in which graduate students replicated Greek armor, wore it, and tested how long they could sustain a charge, in phalanx formation, under a California sun that in turn substituted for the Mediterranean weather of the time. Further, Hanson also used ancient sources that are some five centuries removed from the Classical era; in point of fact, such works become almost secondary source material, rather than primary ones. But Hanson never considers this evidence: he is either unable or unwilling to put the Greeks in a larger, let alone global, perspective. Every detail is examined, from equipment to preparation of the battle to advancement to the initial clash, the collapse of one side and the pursuit of the defeated, medical consequences and the aftermath of a battle. But not in the manner we may be accustomed to envision him but as a human being trying to survive a few hours of horrible,devastating violence. Already the peoples of the ancient Near East and Egypt fought pitched battles much earlier than Hanson's imaginary Archaic and Classical Greeks. Hanson finds that both victorious and defeated generals ranked among the first killed in the initial clash.
We like to keep things fresh. In the introduction and the conclusion, he contends that Western strategists have romanticized the pitched battle even though the Greeks saw it as a pragmatic way of resolving disputes. Finally, the author closes with a look at the aftermath of battle V , with chapters on the killing field 17 , wounded 18 , and an epilogue 19 after which the author includes various supplemental material. Hanson defines the 'Western Way of War' as being the Ancient Greek practice of lining up men to engage in a brutal, yet short and efficient, solver of disputes. This compelling account of what happened on the killing fields of the ancient Greeks ultimately shows that their style of armament and battle was contrived to minimize time and life lost by making the battle experience as decisive and appalling as possible. He pieces together a wide variety of literary and archeological sources to describe something that nobody alive today has or probably ever will experience.
The claim is conjectural and Hanson offers no real evidence to back up his assertion. What was it like to carry 50-70 lbs The book is at its best when Hanson sticks with his true purpose: relating the experience of hoplite warfare to the reader. Despite its short length, this book manages to have nineteen chapters in five parts. The battles, he states, did not last more than an hour, and their outcome was accepted by both parties. It is the first study to explore the actual mechanics of classical Greek battle from the vantage point of the infantryman--the brutal spear-thrusting, the difficulty of fighting in heavy bronze armor which made it hard to see, hear and move, and the fear.