America's Quest for Global Dominance.
Henry Holt & Company. $22.
''9-11,'' a slight collection of interviews (largely conducted via e-mail), was published in 26 countries and translated into 23 languages, finding its way onto best-seller lists in the United States, Canada, Germany, India, Italy, Japan and New Zealand. And at home, as mainstream dissent dissipated in the wake of 9/11, a new generation of disgruntled critics has turned to Chomsky for guidance.
Chomsky finds the Bush administration new in only two ways: the crassness of its motives is far more transparent, and it is now playing for far higher stakes. ''Over the years, tactics have been refined and modified,'' Chomsky writes, ''progressively ratcheting up the means of violence and driving our endangered species closer to the edge of catastrophe.'' Unless American statesmen stop ranking hegemony above survival, he says, our 100,000-year-old experiment in human life may well be doomed.
For Chomsky, the world is divided into oppressor and oppressed. America, the prime oppressor, can do no right, while the sins of those categorized as oppressed receive scant mention. Because he deems American foreign policy inherently violent and expansionist, he is unconcerned with the motives behind particular policies, or the ethics of particular individuals in government. And since he considers the United States the leading terrorist state, little distinguishes American air strikes in Serbia undertaken at night with high-precision weaponry from World Trade Center attacks timed to maximize the number of office workers who have just sat down with their morning coffee.
It is inconceivable, in Chomsky's view, that American power could be harnessed for good. Thus, the billions of dollars in foreign aid earmarked each year for disaster relief, schools, famine prevention, AIDS treatment, etc. -- and the interventions in Kosovo and East Timor -- have to be explained away. The Kosovo and Timor operations' prime achievement, he writes, was to establish the norm of resort to force without Security Council authorization. On this both the Kosovars and the Timorese, whose welfare Chomsky has heroically championed over the years, would strongly disagree.
''Survival or Hegemony'' is not easy to read. Chomsky's glib and caustic tone is distracting. He relies heavily upon quotations, but rarely identifies the speaker or writer. The endnotes supply more frustration. Bill Clinton's humanitarian rationale for the Kosovo war was ridiculed ''by leading military and political analysts'' in Israel, we are told, but the citation leads only to an earlier book by Chomsky himself. When he agrees with a claim, Chomsky introduces it with the word ''uncontroversially'' or credits it to ''distinguished authorities.'' Those who don't share his viewpoint don't simply disagree; they are the ''prevailing intellectual culture'' or the ''educated classes.'' This is a thinker far too accustomed to preaching to an uncritical choir.
Often he meets official falsehoods with exaggerations of his own. President Clinton, he says, ''was flying Al Qaeda and Hezbollah operatives to Bosnia to support the U.S. side in the ongoing wars.'' And ''radical Islamists'' have taken over in Kosovo, leading to a ''Taliban phenomenon.'' These are far-fetched claims that he doesn't adequately back up.
But for all that is wrong with ''Hegemony or Survival,'' reading Chomsky today is sobering and instructive for two reasons. First, his critiques have come to influence and reflect mainstream opinion elsewhere in the world; and second, the radicalism of the Bush administration has laid bare many of the structural defects in American foreign policy, defects that Chomsky has long assailed.
Much blood was shed in the last century by United States forces or proxies in the name of righteous ends. Because every state justifies its wars on the grounds of self-defense or altruism, Chomsky is correct that any ''profession of noble intent is predictable, and therefore carries no information.'' He is also right to object to the historical amnesia that American statesmen bring to their dealings with other states. He seethes at the hypocrisy of Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Colin Powell, who invoked Saddam Hussein's 1988 gassing attacks in order to help justify the recent war, but who did not see fit to explain why the Reagan administration (which they served as senior officials) doubled its aid to Hussein's regime after learning of the gassings.
Chomsky also denounces the dependence of foreign policy elites on special interests. With African agriculture ravaged by American farm subsidies, with Israeli settlements unchallenged by Washington's elites and with campaign contributors to both parties landing mammoth paybacks in overseas contracts, it is certainly well past time to sound the alarm.