In drawing up a balance sheet of why Chavez’s constitutional reform proposal — that aimed to create a framework for the transition towards socialism — was narrowly defeated in a national referendum on December 2, one factor stands out. The Bolivarian revolution’s Achilles heel is the lack of a political instrument capable of confronting the challenges faced in the struggle to construct a new, socially just, Venezuela.
It is in this context that the 1676 delegates elected to the PSUV’s founding congress are meeting to debate the program, principles and statutes of this new political instrument.
The draft statement of principles of the PSUV presented to the congress argued that this political instrument “is born as an expression of the revolutionary will of the people and their political leadership”.
According to the draft program, in order for this instrument to be an anti-capitalist tool, it “requires the full and democratic participation of workers, peasants, youth, intellectuals, artists, housewives, small producers and petty traders from the countryside and the city, in the formation and running of all its component organs, in discussion and decision making in regards to programs and strategies, and in the promotion and election of its leadership”.
Chavez argued that the PSUV had to fight to avoid the rise of a “new Bolivarian oligarchy”, of a new layer of capitalists, because these groups could easily convert themselves into traitors and counterrevolutionaries. He added it is important to stop capitalists infiltrating the PSUV.
This led to moves by those associated with different power blocs in the now dissolved Movement for the Fifth Republic (MVR) — Chavez’s party and the largest pro-Chavez group until the PSUV — to make moves towards controlling selection of promoters. These promoters went on to become de facto organisers of a large number of the local battalions.
At the same time, the aggressive discourse of Chavez who called on existing pro-Chavez groups not willing or reluctant to dissolve and become part of the new party “to go over to the ranks of the opposition”, increased scepticism among some groups about joining the PSUV.
Some of this was to be expected, given the different levels of commitment, consciousness and time among the great mass of supporters of the revolution. However it is certain that the massive number of registrations, which in some states exceeded the number that who had voted for Chavez in the December 2006 elections, was in some areas the result in part of “stacking” and pressure.
Cases of battalions being “kidnapped” by “aspiring leaders” linked to the old power blocs came to light as elections for spokespeople and delegates began to occur in October. In some cases this lead to violent clashes.
The “rebellion of the battalions” against the provisional leadership of the PSUV in the aftermath of the referendum was another example that the bureaucrats haven’t been able to get it all their own way.
Ultima Noticias reported on January 23 that the congress had also voted to allow media access to the congress. “Sometimes it seems that they don’t want people to know what is happening in the congress. The governors fear losing their positions because that is where they get their money from” said Henry Soto, a delegate from the state of Falcon. He added that he regretted the fact that some delegates “were imposed in order to maintain quotas of power”.
Acknowledging some of the errors, Chavez has withdrawn his call for all Chavista parties to dissolve, instead calling for an alliance of all “patriotic and revolutionary” forces to fight the elections. He has also publicly stated that tendencies and currents are part of the new party.