From the first this led to speculation in the British press. Robert Schuman, because of the decoration's special link with Germany, arranged for the French Senator, Madame Eugénie Eboué, to present it at Gelsenkirchen during Buchman's visit for the Moral Re-Armament demonstration in early June - a week before it was officially gazetted. The Evening Standard questioned on l0 June, quite reasonably, whether the honour had actually been conferred.3 It went on, however, to state that Buchman had never met Schuman. Meanwhile the New Statesman attributed the Schuman Plan as a whole to 'Buchman's pious anti-Socialism'.4 Neither report was high in accuracy. Nor were the assertions made by some enthusiasts in after years that Buchman had been almost solely responsible for the Franco-German reconciliation after the war. What was, in fact, his part?
Nor would it be accurate to infer, as some have, that Buchman was in any way responsible for planting in either Schuman or Adenauer the concern to rebuild Europe on a Christian basis. Both were devout Catholics and had long cherished that hope.
Adenauer, too, was deeply rooted in his faith. When Hitler hounded him out of office as Lord Mayor of Cologne in 1933, he sought refuge at Maria Laach Monastery, which was presided over by an old school friend, Ildefons Herwegen; and when Hitler was overthrown he, like Schuman, was convinced that Germany and Europe could only be rebuilt on Christian foundations. He regarded the uniting of Europe as 'not only a political and economic aim worth striving for, but as a real Christian obligation'.10 He too sought God's direction in affairs - often, according to one biographer, while shaving.
The carrying through of the Schuman Plan was made possible by the pressure of outside events - the determination to avoid yet another war between France and Germany, and the emergence of an aggressive Soviet Union - and by the convergence of an unusual group of men who were 'kindred spirits'. Professor Henri Rieben, Director of the Jean Monnet Institute in Lausanne, used that phrase to describe Monnet and Buchman, who never, in fact, met. Buchman, he said, had 'geo-political diagnosis plus inspiration', and did on a spiritual level what Monnet did on a political level.11 The same phrase can be used even more certainly to describe Buchman, Schuman and Adenauer,12 despite the fact that the last two sometimes doubted each other. Each played an essential part, sometimes together, often independently. As far as Buchman was concerned, he had once more been led to people whom he could assist, by word and action, to make their highest hopes come true.
Buchman looked at him. 'Monsieur Schuman, what do you think in your own heart you should do?' he asked.
Buchman replied, 'We have had some excellent men in Caux and I can give you a dozen names.' He gave Schuman a list.
In 1951, two months after the Schuman Plan agreement was finally signed, Adenauer sent to Buchman in America a message which was reported in the New York Herald-Tribune under the headline 'Moral Re-Armament is Credited for Role in Schuman Plan Talks'.46 Adenauer wrote, 'In recent months we have seen the conclusion, after some difficult negotiations, of important international agreements. Here Moral Re-Armament has played an invisible but effective part in bridging differences of opinion between negotiating parties, and has kept before them the object of peaceful agreement in the search for the common good which is the true purpose of human life... It is my conviction too that men and nations cannot outwardly enjoy stable relationships until they have been inwardly prepared for them. In this respect, Moral Re-Armament has rendered great and lasting service.'47 The presentation of the German Order of Merit to Buchman followed in the next year.
Schuman continued to give regular support until Buchman's death in 1961. There has been speculation why Adenauer did not mention Buchman in his Memoirs. Similarly, although his name headed a list inviting a Moral Re-Armament mission to Germany in 1956, he does not seem to have attended its theatre production in Bonn. The latter is easily understandable in a busy statesman; but the former might seem to leave his attitude equivocal. However, he was continually in touch with Buchman through the years, asking his help.
How then can Buchman's contribution to the reconciliation between Germany and France be summarised? First, it appears to be beyond dispute that, as the official Bulletin stated, he 'brought Germany back into the circle of civilised nations' - and, in so doing, reconciled German leaders with their opposite numbers in France and other European countries. Secondly, the work of Moral Re-Armament in the Ruhr and in French industry was an essential prerequisite to the uniting of the French and German coal and steel industries. Thirdly, Buchman's friendship with Adenauer, Schuman and other leading figures played a real, if unquantifiable, part in easing the negotiating process.
1 Files of the Chancery of the Legion of Honour, Paris, 15 June 1950.
2 New York Times, 18 December 1952; The Times, 19 December 1952.
3 Evening Standard, l0 June 1950.
4 New Statesman, 10 June 1950.
5 Robert Rochefort: Robert Schuman (Editions du Cerf, 1968), p. 234.
6 W. A. Visser 't Hooft: Zeugnis eines Boten 7, quoted by Eberhard Bethge: Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Collins, 1970), p. 648.
8 Georgette Elgey: La Republique des Illusions (Fayard, 1965), p. 304.
9 France-Forum, November 1963; Rochefort, p. 231.
10 Interview in Veronese World Crisis and the Catholic, p. 5; quoted by Price, p. 40.
11 Report by Juliet Boobbyer of visits to Jean Monnet Institute, 9 August 1982 and February 1983.
12 Henri Rieben: Des Ententes de Maitres de Forges au Plan Schuman (Centre de recherches européennes, Lausanne, 1954), Part III, Section I, Ch. 5, p.327.
13 Reinhold Maier, Minister-President of Württemberg-Baden, speaking in Stuttgart, 11 October 1948, at an official reception for Buchman and The Good Road.
14 Caux transcripts, 13 September 1948.
15 Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 19 July 1959, 'Das Ruhrgebiet aus der Vogelschau'.
16 Philippe Mottu: The Story of Caux (Grosvenor, 1970), p. 118.
17 Martin MSS; cf. also Mottu, p. 118.
19 Caux transcripts, 13 September 1953.
20 Buchman: Refaire le Monde (La Compagnie du Livre, 1950), p. v.
21 Caux transcripts, 12 September 1953.
22 Buchman to Robert Schuman, 1 May 1949.
23 Buchman to Karl Arnold, 4 May 1949.
24 Konrad Adenauer to Buchman, 13 June 1949.
25 L'Aube, 20 September 1949; New York Times, 6 June 1949.
27 Report of the Caux Conference, 1949 (German edition, p. 45).
29 See Spoerri, Dynamic out of Silence, pp. 166-7.
30 Schuman: Pour l'Europe (Nagel, 1963), pp. 93-4.
31 Konrad Adenauer: Memoirs (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), p. 233.
33 Memo of Robert Murphy, US political adviser to General Clay, FRUS 1948, II, pp. 444-5.
34 Conversations with the author at the time.
36 R. C. Mowat: Creating the European Community (Blandford, 1973), pp. 91-3.
37 Unpublished memo from participants.
38 Jean Monnet: Memoires (Fayard, 1976), p. 336.
42 Richard Mayne: Postwar (Thames and Hudson, 1983), p. 302.
43 New York Times, 4 June 1951.
46 New York Herald-Tribune, 4 June 1951.
47 News Chronicle, 10 May 1950. Also see Franz Rodens: Konrad Adenauer (Knaur, Munich/Zurich 1963), p. 119.
48 Caux transcripts: 12 September 1953.
49 Frank Buchman -Eighty, p. 203.
50 See Spoerri, Dynamic out of Silence, pp. 205-6.
52 The Times, 4 June 1959.
53 Personal letter to Price, 3 September 1979, quoted Price, p. 6.
54 Event recorded in Banner Generalanzeiger, 16 September 1982. Extract taken from verbatim copy of speech issued by President's office.
55 At German Embassy, Delhi, 17 December 1952.