In this case, the Supreme Court considered the parameters for timeliness of third-party claims in construction defect cases.
The Supreme Court concluded that such claims are timely, irrespective of both the two-year statute of limitations in section 13-80-102 and the six-year statute of repose in section 13-80-104(1)(a) of the Colorado Revised Statutes so long as they are brought at any time before the 90-day timeframe outlined in section 13-80-104(1)(b)(II).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s orders and made its rule to show cause absolute.
In this original proceeding under Colorado Appellate Rule 21, the Supreme Court reviewed trial court orders dismissing the plaintiff’s direct negligence claims against an employer where the employer acknowledged vicarious liability for its employee’s negligence and denying the plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend her complaint to add exemplary damages against the employer and the employee.
The Supreme Court adopted the rule articulated in McHaffie v. Bunch, which holds that an employer’s admission of vicarious liability for an employee’s negligence bars a plaintiff’s direct negligence claims against the employer.
The Supreme Court declined to adopt an exception to this rule where the plaintiff seeks exemplary damages against the employer.
The court concluded that the trial court did not err in dismissing the plaintiff’s direct negligence claims against the employer or in denying the plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint to add exemplary damages.
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court orders and discharged the rule to show cause.
These four cases raise the ultimate question of whether driving under the influence is a lesser included offense of either vehicular assault-DUI or vehicular homicide-DUI.
For the four cases, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed whether a double jeopardy claim can be raised for the first time on direct appeal if it was not preserved and what test courts should apply in evaluating whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another.
The court concluded that unpreserved double jeopardy claims can be raised for the first time on appeal and that appellate courts should ordinarily review such claims for plain error.
The court rejected prosecutors’ contention that defendants waive their double jeopardy claims unless they raise them at trial through a criminal procedure rule 24 12(b)(2) challenge to defective charging documents.
The court further concluded that the applicable test for determining whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another is the strict elements test articulated in Schmuck v. United States, a 1989 U.S. Supreme Court decision.
Under the Schmuck test, an offense is a lesser included offense of another offense if the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the greater offense, such that the lesser offense contains only elements that are also included in the elements of the greater offense.
Applying this test to the cases before it, the court concluded that DUI is a lesser-included offense of both vehicular assault-DUI and vehicular homicide-DUI.
Thus, defendants’ DUI convictions must merge into the greater offenses.
The court further concluded that in not merging such offenses, the trial courts plainly erred and that reversal of the multiplicitous convictions was therefore required.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the divisions’ rulings in People v. Reyna-Abarca and People v. Hill that appellate courts review unpreserved double jeopardy claims for plain error but reversed the portions of the judgments in those cases concluding that DUI is not a lesser included offense of vehicular assault-DUI and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
Similarly, the court reversed the portion of the judgment in People v. Medrano-Bustamante, concluding that DUI is not a lesser-included offense of vehicular assault-DUI and vehicular homicide-DUI and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
The court affirmed the judgments in those cases in all other respects, and affirmed in full the judgment in People v. Smoots.
In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court reviewed two issues: whether a double jeopardy claim can be raised for the first time on appeal, similar to other decisions released the same day and whether defendant William Costello Scott’s convictions for both aggravated robbery-menaced with a deadly weapon (“aggravated robbery-menaced victim”) and menacing amounted to plain error.
In light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Reyna-Abarca v. People, also decided Feb. 27, the state’s highest court concluded, contrary to the division majority in People v. Scott, that unpreserved double jeopardy claims can be raised for the first time on appeal and that courts should ordinarily review such claims for plain error.
The court further concluded, however, that in the circumstances presented, any error that might have occurred when the trial court entered judgment on Scott’s convictions for both aggravated robbery-menaced victim and menacing was not obvious and thus, did not amount to plain error.
The Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant may raise his or her unpreserved double jeopardy claim for the first time on appeal and, if so, what standard of review applies and whether driving under revocation is a lesser included offense of aggravated driving after revocation prohibited In Reyna-Abarca v. People, also decided Feb. 27.
The Supreme Court concluded that unpreserved double jeopardy claims can be raised for the first time on appeal and that appellate courts should ordinarily review such claims for plain error and clarified the applicable test to be employed in determining whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another.
Applying those rulings, the Supreme Court concluded that the division in Zubiate v. People correctly conducted plain error review of Vanessa Ann Zubiate’s unpreserved double jeopardy claim and determined that driving under retention is not a lesser included offense of aggravated driving after revocation prohibited, although the court’s analysis differs somewhat from that of the division.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals.
These two cases presented the issues of whether double jeopardy claims can be raised for the first time on direct appeal and, if so, what standard of review applies.
The Supreme Court addressed the same issues in four cases decided Feb. 27 as Reyna-Abarca v. People. There, the court concluded that unpreserved double jeopardy claims can be raised for the first time on appeal and that appellate courts should ordinarily review such claims for plain error.
Applying that ruling, the court concluded that the divisions in People v. Zadra and People v. Adams, correctly conducted plain error review of the defendants’ unpreserved double jeopardy claims and merged certain of the defendants’ convictions.
Accordingly, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the judgments in both cases.