وَلَعَمْرِي، لَئِنْ كَانَتِ الاْمَامَةُ لاَ تَنْعَقِدُ حَتَّى يَحْضُرَهَا عَامَّةُ النَّاسِ، فـمَا إِلَى ذلك سَبِيلٌ، وَلكِنْ أَهْلُهَا يَحْكُمُونَ عَلَى مَنْ غَابَ عَنْهَا، ثُمَّ لَيْسَ لِلشَّاهِدِ أَنْ يَرْجِعَ، وَلاَ لِلغَائِبِ أَنْ يَخْتَارَ. أَلاَ وَإِنَّي أُقَاتِلُ رَجُلَيْنِ: رَجُلاً ادَّعَى مَا لَيْسَ لَهُ، وَآخَرَ مَنَعَ الَّذِي عَلَيْهِ.
By my life, [1] if the question of Imāmah was not to be decided unless all the people were present, then there would be no such case. But those who agreed about it imposed the decision on those who were absent, so much so that he who was present could not dissent and the one who was absent could not choose (any one else). Know that I shall fight two persons — one who claims what is not his and the other who ignores what is obligatory upon him.