Observers around the world are stunned by the speed and scope of this week's assaults on every major city in the upper Tigris River Valley -- including Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city -- by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS. But they shouldn't be. The collapse of the Iraqi government's troops in Mosul and other northern cities in the face of Sunni militant resistance has been the predictable culmination of a long deterioration, brought on by the government's politicization of its security forces. The politicization of the Iraqi military For more than five years, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and his ministers have presided over the packing of the Iraqi military and police with Shiite loyalists -- in both the general officer ranks and the rank and file -- while sidelining many effective commanders who led Iraqi troops in the battlefield gains of 2007-2010, a period during which al Qaeda in Iraq (the forerunner of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) was brought to the brink of extinction.
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Writers: Troop collapse in Mosul predictable since Iraq's politicization of security forces
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Prime Minister marginalized Sunnis, Kurds, replaced them with Shiite loyalists, they say
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Writers: He's dismantled Sunni "Awakening" forces that helped rout al Qaeda in Iraq
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Nuri al-Maliki should seek security forces he's shunned, but he's unlikely to, they say
Iraq
Iraqi
Iraqi
Iraqi
Iraqi
Iraq
Iraq
Iraq
The vast system of security forces and Sunni tribal auxiliaries that had made the Sunni provinces of @placeholder hostile territory for al Qaeda was dismantled.
al Qaeda
al Qaeda
The vast system of security forces and Sunni tribal auxiliaries that had made the Sunni provinces of Iraq hostile territory for @placeholder was dismantled.
Mosul
Mosul
Mosul
The Shiite troops unwilling to fight to hold onto @placeholder will be far more motivated to fight to protect Shiite territories in central and southern Iraq and to defend the sectarian fault line.
Shiite
Shiite
The Shiite troops unwilling to fight to hold onto Mosul will be far more motivated to fight to protect @placeholder territories in central and southern Iraq and to defend the sectarian fault line.
Sunni
Sunnis
Sunni
If al-Maliki chooses to regroup and move on Sunni population centers controlled by the ISIS, we are likely to see Shiite troops unfamiliar with @placeholder neighborhoods employing heavy-handed tactics, bluntly targeting Sunni military-age males (12-60) not affiliated with the insurgency and further inflaming sectarian tensions as they do so -- reminiscent of the situation in many parts of Iraq in 2005-2006.
Iraq
Iraqi
Iraqi
Iraqi
Iraqi
Iraq
Iraq
Iraq
If al-Maliki chooses to regroup and move on Sunni population centers controlled by the ISIS, we are likely to see Shiite troops unfamiliar with Sunni neighborhoods employing heavy-handed tactics, bluntly targeting Sunni military-age males (12-60) not affiliated with the insurgency and further inflaming sectarian tensions as they do so -- reminiscent of the situation in many parts of @placeholder in 2005-2006.