Sufficient communications
Bombs, guns, personnel etc
Requirements to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation
Planning the operation
Guns
Ability to move people
Secret hideout
A plane
"What they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm."
What requirements was Al Qaeda able to meet by spring and summer of 2000?
Foreign government
KSM
Al Qaeda
From Al Queda. Not from any foreign government-or foreign government official
U.S
From KSM, Not from Al Queda
19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country, no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance, no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding
Where did money to fund the 9/11 plotters come from and where didn't it come from?
11
9
Summer of 2000
Late 1999
By the spring and summer of 2000
Before 1999
By what period was al-Qaeda able to meet the requirements for a successful attack?
Foriegn goverment funded Hamburg
Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance.Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding
Two governments funded
Foriegn goverment was behind everything
No government funded for the attack
Foreign goverment officials collaborated with al Qaeda
Foriegn government didn't fund anything
What did the investigators conclude in terms of government funding for the terror attacks?
Foreign government
Hamburg cell members
KSM  and Binalshib
KSM
Al Qaeda
Hamburg
Who supported themselves before Al Qaeda began giving them funding in late 1999?
11
9
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive
By late May 2000
May 2000
Late 1999
September
During 1990
When did al Qaeda members plotting the 9/11 attacks arrive in the U.S.?
Another plot facilitator
19
Two, Hamberg cell members
There were there and they were waiting on four
Three other cell members
There were 19 and they were waiting on 3
Two
How many operatives were there in the United States already and who were they waiting on?
Plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States
Between $400,000 and $500,000. Nearly $10,000 by the operators
$10,000
$5,000
$150,000
Around $500,000
$10,000 -$56000. $25000 by operators
How much did the 9/11 plotters spend and how much was given to Hamburg operators in regards to their role in the plot?
Binalshibh
Foreign government-or foreign government official
Any person in the United States, any foreign government-or foreign government official
Al Qaeda
Hamburg
Al queda
Any foreign government
Who do they believe did NOT give the terrorist money?
Between $400,000 and $500,000
$10,000
Less than $400,000
Over $500,000
Approximately $450,000
Approximately how much money did the 9/11 plotters spend to plan and conduct their attack?
By the spring and summer
Spring and summer, chapter 7
Before May
You can find more details about financial transactions in chapter 7 al Queada meets the requirements after the Hamberg members joined the conspiracy
Chapter 7
Chapter 9
They met the requirements in late May and you can find more details in chapter 7
What time in 2000 does al Queada meet the requirements and what chapter can you find more details about financial transactions?
The Hamburg cell
Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh
Hamburg cell members
KSM, Binalshibh
Mustafa al Hawsawi
KSM
Al Qaeda
What cell operatives arrived in the US shortly after May 2000?
11
9
After May 2000
After 2001
September 2000
Late 1999
After what time would three of four Hamburg cell members soon arrive?
$5000
The amount of money spent is murky and each Hamberg cell member got $10,000
The knowledge of the funding before this period was murky and each Hamberg cell member received $5,000
$10,000
When the operatives entered the United States
Funding, $5,000
knowledge of the funding
What remains murky about the knowledge we knew during this period and how much money did each Hamberg cell member receive?
The Hamburg cell members
Foreign government
Al Queda
KSM
Al Qaeda
Hamburg
Who supported themselves before late 1999?
Late May and the development of the planes operation
Access to communication systems
The spring and summer of 2000
May, development of planes operation
September
Late June and training
By what Month were the two operatives in the United States and what information did we provide to make al Queda so successful?
Foriegn government
Between $400,000 and $500,000. Al Queda funded the plotters
Between $400,000 and $560,000. Foreign government funded the plotters
$10,000
KSM
Al Qaeda
Around $500,000
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack.The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United
What was the amount that the plotters used to fund their attack?Which entities funded these plotters?
By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States.Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive
11
9
In July 2000
May 2000
Late 1999
September
Between May and June in 2000
When did the operatives who were assigned to planes arrive in the US?
As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. It appears they supported themselves. KSM, Binalshibh, and another plot facilitator, Mustafa al Hawsawi, each received money, in some cases perhaps as much as $10,000, to perform their roles in the plot. After the Hamburg recruits joined the 9/11 conspiracy, al Qaeda began giving them money. Our knowledge of the funding during this period, before the operatives entered the United States, remains murky. According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States. Financial transactions of the plotters are discussed in more detail in chapter 7. Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive. 