Now, leaving on one side the question as to whether it is good theology-and I do not say good reasoning because all this lies outside the sphere of reason-to confound the substance of the body-the body, not the soul-of Christ with the very substance of Divinity-that is to say, with God Himself-it would appear impossible that one so ardently desirous of the immortality of the soul as William James, a man whose whole philosophy aims simply at establishing this belief on rational grounds, should not have perceived that the pragmatic application of the concept of substance to the doctrine of the Eucharistic transubstantiation is merely a consequence of its anterior application to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul.
teologia onean, eta ez diot arrazoimen onean, hau guztiau hartatik kanpoan gelditzen baita, Kristoren gorputzaren-gorputzaren, ez arimaren-substantzia, jainkotasunaren substantzia berarekin, hau da, Jainkoarekin berarekin, nahas ote daitekeen delako galdera alde batera utzirik ere, sinestezina dirudi arimaren hilezintasunaren hain irrikazale suharra, W. James moduko gizona, bere filosofia guztiaz sineskera hori arrazionalki ezartzera besterik jotzen ez duena, honetaz ez konturatzeak, hots, substantziaren kontzeptuaz Eukaristiaren transubstantziazioaren doktrinari eginiko aplikazio pragmatikoa, ez dela arimaren hilezintasunaren doktrinari aurretik eginiko aplikazioaren ondorio bat besterik.