4. Hence, when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal substances, as horse, stone, &c., though the idea we have of either of them be but the complication or collection of those several simple ideas of sensible qualities, which we used to find united in the thing called horse or stone; yet, BECAUSE WE CANNOT CONCEIVE HOW THEY SHOULD SUBSIST ALONE, NOR ONE IN ANOTHER, we suppose them existing in and supported by some common subject; which support we denote by the name substance, though it be certain we have no clear or distinct idea of that thing we suppose a support.
4. Horregatik, edozein gorpuzdun substantziaz mintzo garenean, adibidez, zaldiaz, harriaz eta abarrez, nahiz eta horietako edozeinetaz dugun ideia zaldia edo harria izeneko gauzetan aurkitu ohi ditugun koalitate sentigarri ezberdin horien nahasketa edo bilketa besterik ez den, eurek ez bakarrik ez bata bestearen baitan nola iraun dezaketen bururatu ezin dugunez, suposatzen dugu subjektu komun baten baitan existitzen direla eta hark eusten diela, eta subjektu honi substantzia deitzen diogu, nahiz eta euskarritzat hartzen dugun gauza horren ideia argi eta bereizirik ez daukagun.