For just as the universal propositions of mathematics deal not with objects which exist separately, apart from extended magnitudes and from numbers, but with magnitudes and numbers, not however qua such as to have magnitude or to be divisible, clearly it is possible that there should also be both propositions and demonstrations about sensible magnitudes, not however qua sensible but qua possessed of certain definite qualities.
Matematikarien proposizio unibertsalak magnitudeez eta zenbakiez aparteko gauza bananduei buruzkoak ez diren bezala, magnitudeei eta zenbakiei buruzkoak baizik-baina ez horrelakoak diren 20) aldetik, hots, magnitudedunak eta bananduak-, argi dago sentimenezko magnitudeei buruz ere esakuneak eta demostrazioak izan daitezkeela, ez sentimenezkoak diren aldetik, ezaugarri zehatzak dituzten aldetik baizik.