57. BUT WHY THEY SHOULD SUPPOSE THE IDEAS OF SENSE TO BE EXCITED IN US BY THINGS IN THEIR LIKENESS, and not rather have recourse to SPIRIT which alone can act, may be accounted for, FIRST, because they were not aware of the repugnancy there is, (1) as well in supposing things like unto our ideas existing without, as in (2) attributing to them POWER OR ACTIVITY. SECONDLY, because the Supreme Spirit which excites those ideas in our minds, is not marked out and limited to our view by any particular finite collection of sensible ideas, as human agents are by their size, complexion, limbs, and motions.
Lehenengo, ez zirelako ohartu kontraesana dela hala gure ideien antzeko gauzak adimendua gabe existitzen direla suposatzea, nola berauei ahalmena edo eragina atribuitzea. Bigarren, adimenduan ideia horiek eragiten dizkigun izpiritu gorena ez zaigulako agertzen begi bistara ideia sentigarrien multzo mugatu partikularren baten bidez, giza eragileei gertatzen zaien moduan, euren garaiera, gorpuzkera, menbro eta mugimenduen bidez.