Now it is clear enough that those determining principles of the will which alone make maxims properly moral and give them a moral worth, namely, the direct conception of the law and the objective necessity of obeying it as our duty, must be regarded as the proper springs of actions, since otherwise legality of actions might be produced, but not morality of character. But it is not so clear;
Argi dago, noski, maximak benetan moral bihurtzen dituzten eta horiei balio etikoa esleitzen dien nahimenaren determinazio-oinarriek ekintzen benetako bultzagai bezala errepresentatu behar dituztela legearen bitartegabeko errepresentazioa eta horren objektiboki beharrezkoa den betetzea betebehar gisa, zeren bestela ekintzen legezkotasuna bai, baina jaiduren moraltasunik ez bailitzateke eragingo.