This, namely, as a typic of the judgement, guards against the empiricism of practical reason, which founds the practical notions of good and evil merely on experienced consequences (so-called happiness). No doubt happiness and the infinite advantages which would result from a will determined by self-love, if this will at the same time erected itself into a universal law of nature, may certainly serve as a perfectly suitable type of the morally good, but it is not identical with it.
Horrek, beraz, juzgamenaren tipika den aldetik, arrazoimen praktikoaren empirismotik gordetzen gaitu, zeinak ongiaren eta gaitzaren adigai praktikoak esperientziako emaitzetan baino ez dituen ezartzen (zoriona esaten zaion horretan), nahiz eta horiek eta norberaren maitasunaren bidez determinatutako nahimenaren ondorio baliagarri amaigabeak, horrek bere burua aldi berean natur lege orokor bihurtuko balu, oso tipo egokiak liratekeen etikoki ona denarentzat, horrekin berdintzen ez bada ere.