Since, however, this is opposed even to the usage of language, which distinguishes the pleasant from the good, the unpleasant from the evil, and requires that good and evil shall always be judged by reason, and, therefore, by concepts which can be communicated to everyone, and not by mere sensation, which is limited to individual [subjects] and their susceptibility; and, since nevertheless, pleasure or pain cannot be connected with any idea of an object a priori, the philosopher who thought himself obliged to make a feeling of pleasure the foundation of his practical judgements would call that good which is a means to the pleasant, and evil, what is a cause of unpleasantness and pain;
Baina hizkuntzaren erabileraren aurka doanez, gustagarria ongitik, gustagaitza dena gaitzetik bereizteko, eta eskatzen duenez ongia eta gaitza beti arrazoimenaren bidez, eta beraz, orokorki bana daitezkeen adigaien bidez juzgatu behar direla eta ez subjektu banakoetara eta haien harmenera mugatzen den sentsazio soilaren bidez, eta hala ere berez ezin denez a priori ezein objekturen errepresentazioarekin atsegin edo desatsegin bat bitartegabe lotu, orduan juzgaketa praktikoen oinarrian atseginaren sentimendua ezartzera behartuta zegoela uste zuen filosofoak on deituko lioke gustagarri denaren bitartekoari, eta gaitz gustagaiztasunaren eta minaren kausa denari; izan ere, bitartekoen eta xedeen arteko erlazioaren juzgaketa arrazoimenari dagokio.