For, provided the cause in the appearance is distinguished from the cause of the appearance (so far as it can be thought as a thing in itself), both propositions are perfectly reconcilable: the one, that there is nowhere in the sensuous world a cause (according to similar laws of causality), whose existence is absolutely necessary; the other, that this world is nevertheless connected with a Necessary Being as its cause (but of another kind and according to another law).
Ba aski da bereizkatzea fenomenoango kausa eta fenomenoen kausa, hau berbaitango gauza bezala pentsa daitekeen neurrian, eta bi proposizioak ederki batean izan daitezke baliozko elkarren ondoan; alegia, sentimen-munduan ez dagoela inolako kausarik (kausalitatearena bezalako legeekin), derrigor existitu beharrekoa denik, eta bestalde, mundu hau derrigorrezko izaki batekin lotua dagoela bere kausarekin bezala (baina kausa beste era batekoa izaki eta beste lege bat jarraituz);