But since a practical rule of pure reason in the first place as practical concerns the existence of an object, and in the second place as a practical rule of pure reason implies necessity as regards the existence of the action and, therefore, is a practical law, not a physical law depending on empirical principles of determination, but a law of freedom by which the will is to be determined independently on anything empirical (merely by the conception of a law and its form), whereas all instances that can occur of possible actions can only be empirical, that is, belong to the experience of physical nature; hence, it seems absurd to expect to find in the world of sense a case which, while as such it depends only on the law of nature, yet admits of the application to it of a law of freedom, and to which we can apply the supersensible idea of the morally good which is to be exhibited in it in concreto.
Baina arrazoimen hutsaren erregela praktiko bat, lehenik, objektu baten existentziari dagokionez, eta bigarrenik, arrazoimen hutsaren erregela praktiko gisa, berekin beharrezkotasuna dakarrenez ekintzaren izateari dagokionez, eta beraz, lege praktiko denez eta ez noski natur legea determinazio-oinarri enpirikoen bidez, baizik eta askatasunaren legea denez, zeinaren arabera horrek nahimena enpirikoa den orotatik beregainki determinagarri izan beharko lukeen;