For, being a creature, and therefore always dependent with respect to what he requires for complete satisfaction, he can never be quite free from desires and inclinations, and as these rest on physical causes, they can never of themselves coincide with the moral law, the sources of which are quite different; and therefore they make it necessary to found the mental disposition of one's maxims on moral obligation, not on ready inclination, but on respect, which demands obedience to the law, even though one may not like it; not on love, which apprehends no inward reluctance of the will towards the law. Nevertheless, this latter, namely, love to the law (which would then cease to be a command, and then morality, which would have passed subjectively into holiness, would cease to be virtue) must be the constant though unattainable goal of his endeavours.
Izan ere, sorkari bat denez eta, beraz, bere egoerarekin erabat asebetetzeko eskatzen denari dagokionez beti menpekoa denez, orduan inoiz ezin da izan irrikatik eta joeretatik erabat aske, zeinak oso bestelako iturria duen lege moralarekin ezin diren euren kabuz adostu, kausa fisikoetan oin hartzen dutelako, eta beraz, beti beharrezkoa duten euren maximen jaidura behartze moralean oinarritzea, ez laguntza prestu batean, baizik eta legea betetzea, gogoz kontra gertatuta ere, agintzen duen begirunean, ez legearen aurrean nahimenaren barne ukazioa eskaintzen duen maitasunean, nahiz eta azken hori, legeari zaion maitasun soila (horrenbestez utzi egingo bailioke agindu izateari, eta moraltasunak, orain subjektiboki santutasun bihurtuko litzatekeenak, utzi egingo lioke bertute izateari) bere ahaleginen helburu iraunkor baina lortezina bihurtzen duen.