In the former case, however, the law has the form of an imperative, because in them, as rational beings, we can suppose a pure will, but being creatures affected with wants and physical motives, not a holy will, that is, one which would be incapable of any maxim conflicting with the moral law.
Lehen kasuan, ordea, legeak agindu baten forma du, zeren haiek nahimen hutsa dutela onar badaiteke ere, zerizan arrazoidunak diren aldetik, ezin baitzaie nahimen santua onartu, premiez eta sentimenezko bultzagaiez jota dagoen zerizanak diren aldetik, hau da, ezin zaie onartu lege morala kontraesango lukeen ezein maxima izateko gai izango litzatekeen nahimena.