If we, as is commonly done, represent to ourselves the appearances of the sensible world as things in themselves, if we assume the principles of their combination as principles universally valid of things in themselves and not merely of experience, as is usually, nay without our Critique, unavoidably done, there arises an unexpected conflict, which never can be removed in the common dogmatical way; because the thesis, as well as the antithesis, can be shown by equally clear, evident, and irresistible proofs-for I pledge myself as to the correctness of all these proofs-and reason therefore perceives that it is divided with itself, a state at which the sceptic rejoices, but which must make the critical philosopher pause and feel ill at ease.
Jeneralean gertatzen denez, sentimen-munduko fenomenoak berbaitango gauza bezala bururatzen baditugu, horien lotura-printzipioak berbaitango gauzentzat orokorki, eta ez esperientziarentzat soilik, balio duten printzipio bezala onartzen baditugu-hau ere ohiki gure kritikarik gabe itzuriezinki gertatzen baita-, orduan ustegabeko kontraesan bat agertzen da, ohizko bide dogmatikotik inola ere konpondu ezin litekeena, ba tesia eta antitesia indar berdineko froga argi eta eztabaidaezineko batekin demostra daitezke-froga hauen zuzentasuna neronek garantizatzen dut-, eta hala arrazoia eztabaidan jartzen da bere buruarekin; egoera honek, berriz, poz ematen dio eszeptikoari, baina zer-pentsa eta ezinegona sortzen dio filosofo kritikoari.