10. Whereby yet we may observe how foolish and vain a thing it is for a man of a narrow knowledge, who having reason given him to judge of the different evidence and probability of things, and to be swayed accordingly; how vain, I say, it is to expect demonstration and certainty in things not capable of it; and refuse assent to very rational propositions, and act contrary to very plain and clear truths, because they cannot be made out so evident, as to surmount every the least (I will not say reason, but) pretence of doubting.
10. Horregatik, ohar gaitezke nolako zorakeria alferrekoa den ezagumen laburreko gizaki batek, gauzen nabaritasunaz eta probabilitateaz juzgatzeko eta horren arabera konbentzimendura heltzeko arrazoimenaz horniturik egonik, zein alferreko den, diot, frogapena eta ziurtasuna espero izatea horrelakorik ukan ezin duten gauzetan eta oso arrazoizko proposizioei baiespena ukatzea eta egia argi eta garbien kontra jardutea, egia horiek, zalantzarako, ez jada arrazoirik txikiena, baizik are estakururik txikiena ere gainditzeko bezain nabari ikusterik ez duelako.