At 0600 hrs on Friday, June 9, Brig. Gen. Dado Elazar of the Northern Command was woken up by a phone call from Dayan: Can you attack? Then attack. Dayan had changed his mind. He told his chief of staff, If the Syrians sit quietly, I won't approve any action against them, but if in spite of all our restraint they continue shelling, I will recommend to the Cabinet that we take the entire Heights. Operation Hammer had been planned as a night attack. It was dangerous enough even in darkness, but an assault on the Golan Heights during daylight would be suicidal. The offensive was planned for 1130 hrs to give the IAF enough of time to continue its bombardment and to give the Israeli combat engineers time to create a path through enemy mine fields. Fortunately the winter rains had exposed many of the mines and the Syrians had not replaced them. The IAF was dropping some 400 tons of ordnance on the Heights from Mount Hermon in the north to Tawfiq (near Hamat Gader) in the south, including some captured rockets from Egyptian stocks.