In the weeks leading up to the invasion of Normandy (D-Day) on 6 June 1944, the guidance and instructions given by the Allies to the maquis on the Vercors Massif were contradictory and inconsistent. One issue was whether the maquis should rise in armed opposition to the Germans immediately after D-Day or wait until later when they could be of maximum help to the allies. The contradictions are illustrated by the differences in the D-Day messages of allied commander Dwight D. Eisenhower and Free French leader Charles de Gaulle. Eisenhower urged all the maquis in France to be cautious and patient; De Gaulle's emotional message was interpreted by the maquis as a call to take up arms immediately. On D-Day, Cammaerts on the Vercors Massif, gave the message to the maquis that, while clandestine sabotage should continue, they should remain hidden as it would be at least two months before they would be needed. Cammaerts knew also that similar uprisings in other areas had been crushed by the Germans. To the contrary on June 8, , the regional leader of the French Resistance, instructed , the newly-named commander of the Vercors marquis, to mobilize. When Huet objected that he had neither the men nor the arms to defend Vercors, Descour assured him that the allies would send reinforcements.