 JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, dissenting. 1 38 Active case management by the judge is essential to running an efficient docket and administering justice. The rules encourage it, and caselaw, at times, demands it. Yet, today the majority taps the brakes on active case management and sends the message that unless the rules specifically authorize a docket management technique, judges lack the authority to use it in handling their cases. In my view, the modified case management order (MCMO) at issue in this case was expressly authorized by the plain language of Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 16, which allows trial courts to adjust the timelines for disclosures and discovery. Because Rule 16 allows for these modifications, I do not believe that it is necessary for the rule to expressly state that trial courts have the authority to issue Lone Pine orders. Accordingly, I would hold that Rule 16 provided the trial court with the authority to issue the MCMO in this case, and I respectfully dissent. 139 The trial court's MCMO required the Strudleys to provide contamination reports from their property, medical records, and expert affidavits establishing exposure and causation before they could engage in discovery. As the trial court noted, the information required by the MCMO composed the basic foundation of the Strudleys' case against Antero Resources, and they would have had to produce it in order to make their case at trial. Because the Strudleys would have had to furnish these pieces of information even if the trial court had never issued the MCMO, in my view, the MCMO simply accelerated the timeline for the Strudleys to disclose records and expert testimony and delayed the timeline for when the Strudleys could engage in full discovery. 1 40 Rule 16 expressly authorizes the trial court to make these modifications to the timelines for disclosures and discovery. Rule 1l6(c) states that "any of the provisions of section (b) .... may be modified by the entry *160of a Modified Case Management Order." C.RC.P. l6(c). And among the modifiable rules in 16(b) are provisions governing disclosures and discovery. Specifically, Rule 16(b)(5) states the presumptive rule that "{tlhe parties shall disclose expert testimony in accordance with C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)," which defines the form, content, and timing of expert testimony disclosures. CRCP. 16(b)(5). Rule 16(c) thus authorizes the trial court, in its discretion, to enter an MCMO that changes the substance of what must be included in expert disclosures and the timing of when they must be provided to the other side. This provides ample justification for the trial court's requirement that the Strud-leys disclose records and expert testimony at an earlier time in the case. Rule 16(b)(10) also states the presumptive rule that "discovery may commence 42 days after the case is at issue." C.R.C.P. 16(b)(10). Thus, Rule 16(c) empowers the trial court to modify the timeline for when discovery commences. In my view, the trial court's MCMO in this case was simply the trial court exercising its discretionary authority to modify these Rule 16(b) provisions, thus moving up the time for disclosures and moving back the time for the commencement of discovery. € 41 The cases cited by the majority do not compel a different result. While it is true that this court in Curtis Inc. v. District Court, 186 Colo. 226, 526 P.2d 1335 (1974), and Direct Sales Tire Co. v. District Court, 686 P.2d 1316 (Colo.1984), reversed the trial court for issuing Lone Pine orders, these cases were decided under antiquated versions of Rule 16 and Rule 26, and they are factually distinguishable from the present case. 142 At the time that Curtis and Direct Sales were decided, this court had not yet amended Rule 16 to give trial courts the authority to issue MCMOs. Compare C.R.C.P. 16 (1978) (lacking a section authorizing trial courts to issue MCMOs), and C.R.C.P. 16 (1984) (same), with C.R.C.P. 16 (2002) (including a section authorizing trial courts to issue MCMOs). As such, when the court rendered those decisions, there was no language in Rule 16 giving trial courts the ability to change the timeline for disclosures and discovery. The 2002 amendments to Rule 16, however, expressly authorized trial courts to make these changes. C.R.C.P. 16(c) (2002). 43 The facts of Curtis and Direct Sales are also distinguishable from this case. The information that the MCMO required the Strudleys to produce was entirely within their possession or control; they had to demonstrate that their own land had been contaminated, that they had been exposed to chemicals, and that they currently suffered from an illness. This is markedly different from the situation this court confronted in Curtis and Direct Sales. In those cases, the plaintiffs were unable to make the required prima facie showing because they needed information from the defendants in order to do so. Curtis, 526 P.2d at 1886 (plaintiffs alleged that defendants copied their record-keeping methods, and they needed the defendants' records to establish a prima facie case); Direct Sales, 686 P.2d at 1817, 1820 (plaintiffs alleged that defendants were selling gasoline at prices below cost, and they needed the defendants' cost of doing business in order to make their prima facie case). 44 Understandably, this court was sympathetic to those plaintiffs, who were asked to do the impossible and make a prima facie case when they could do so only with information that was exclusively in the defendants' control. This was not the situation in the Strudleys' case for two reasons: first, the information they had to produce was within their possession or control, and second, the Strudleys benefitted from the 1994 amendments to Rule 26, pursuant to which Antero Resources provided roughly 50,000 pages of initial disclosures at the outset of this case. C.R.GC.P. 26, Comm. Cmt., Federal Committee Notes (stating that the most dramatic change of the 1994 amendments was the addition of a disclosure system whereby parties must disclose information without receiving a discovery demand). For the foregoing reasons, it is my view that Curtis and Direct Sales are distinguishable from the case at hand, and this court should use the current text of Rule 16 to hold that trial courts are authorized to modify the timelines for disclosures and discovery. *16145 The Committee Comments to Rule 16 demonstrate the soundness of this reading. The Committee emphasized that it intended Rule 16 to be flexible by stating that: "Rule[] 16 ... should work well in most cases filed in Colorado District Courts. However, where a case is complex or requires special treatment, the Rules provide flexibility so that the parties and Court can alter the procedure." C.R.C.P. 16, Comm. Crmt., Operation. Thus, the Committee expressed its intent that trial courts have the flexibility to modify the provisions of Rule 16 when issues are complex and when the standard rules do not fit the needs of the case. The Committee also stated its desire to have trial courts take an active role in the discovery process, providing that "[i]t is expected that trial judges will assertively lead the management of cases to ensure that justice is served." Id. T 46 Cases from this court have echoed the same principles. In DCP Midstream, LP v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., for example, this court analyzed the Committee's 2002 changes to Rules 16 and 26, noting that these two rules had evolved to encourage active judicial management in pre-trial matters. 2013 CO 36, 127, 303 P.3d 1187, 1194. And in Burchett v. South Denver Windustrial Co., we instructed trial courts to treat cases according to their specific needs and not feel obligated to impose caseflow management plans that treat all cases the same. 42 P.3d 19, 21 (Colo.2002). The majority today, however, sends a different message to trial courts, telling them that if a specific case management technique is not explicitly provided for in the text of Rule 16, then it is outside the scope of their authority to manage the cases in their dockets. I disagree because I believe the plain language of Rule 16 authorizes trial courts to issue these orders and that this reading best comports with our obligation to liberally construe the rules in order to achieve their objectives. DCP Midstream, 11 24, 308 P.3d at 1198. 147 I am sympathetic to the majority's concerns that, in certain situations, Lone Pine orders could create a catch-22 whereby the order would prevent a plaintiff from acquiring the very information he needs to establish a prima facie case. But this is simply not the situation in this case. The only information the MCMO required the Strudleys to produce was proof that their own land had been contaminated, that they had been exposed to chemicals, and that these chemicals caused them to suffer injuries. This information was so central to their claims against Antero Resources that the Strudleys should have had it before even filing their case. Accordingly, there is nothing inequitable about adhering to the plain language of Rule 16 and holding that the trial court was authorized to enter the MCMO in this case. 48 I would also uphold the trial court's dismissal of the Strudleys' case for their failure to comply with the MCMO. Although this sanction was severe, Rule 37(b)(2) authorizes trial courts to enter "such orders . as are just" when a party fails to obey a discovery order, and this includes "dismissing the action or proceeding or any part therefore," C.R.C.P. 87(b)(Q)(C). As we have previously noted, Rule 37 was written broadly to give trial courts the discretion to choose what sanctions to threaten in order to ensure compliance with discovery orders. Kwik Way Stores, Inc. v. Caldwell, 745 P.2d 672, 677 (Colo.1987) ("Requiring a finding of willfulness as a condition precedent to default would vitiate much of the discretion which C.R.C.P. 37(d) intended to repose in the trial court for abuse or disregard of the discovery process."). We have instructed trial courts that in selecting sanctions, they should exercise their discretion to "impos[e] a sanction which is commensurate with the seriousness of the disobedient party's conduct." Id. 1 49 The trial court acted within its discretion when it dismissed the Strudleys' case. The Strudleys failed to establish a prima facie case of exposure, injury, and causation as was required by the trial court's MCMO. Their failure came despite the fact that the Strudleys had all of the required information in their possession or control. In the face of this failure of proof, I believe that the trial court acted within its discretion in dismissing *162the case and not forcing Antero Resources to go forward defending claims that the Strud-leys were unable to even minimally substantiate. €50 For the foregoing reasons, I would uphold the trial court's entry of the MCMO and its subsequent order dismissing the I respectfully dissent. Strudleys' case. 
Boatright, Hobbs
Antero Resources Corp. v. Strudley
ANTERO RESOURCES CORPORATION, Antero Resources Piceance Corporation, Calfrac Well Services Corporation, and Frontier Drilling LLC, Petitioners v. William G. STRUDLEY and Beth E. Strudley, Individually, and as the Parents and Natural Guardians of William Strudley, a Minor, and Charles Strudley, a Minor, Respondents
<citation id="b183-4">
    2015 CO 26
   </citation><br><parties id="b183-5">
    ANTERO RESOURCES CORPORATION, Antero Resources Piceance Corporation, Calfrac Well Services Corporation, and Frontier Drilling LLC, Petitioners v. William G. STRUDLEY and Beth E. Strudley, individually, and as the parents and natural guardians of William Strudley, a minor, and Charles Strudley, a minor, Respondents
   </parties><br><docketnumber id="b183-8">
    Supreme Court Case No. 13SC576
   </docketnumber><court id="AT1X">
    Supreme Court of Colorado.
   </court><br><decisiondate id="b183-9">
    April 20, 2015
   </decisiondate><br><attorneys id="b184-8">
<span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="150"> 
     *150
     </span>
    Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, Court of Appeals Case No. 12CA1251
   </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b184-9">
    Hogan Lovells US LLP, Daniel J. Dunn, Andrew C. Lillie, David A. DeMarco, Denver, Colorado, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Catherine E. Stetson, Washington, DC, Vinson &amp; El-kins LLP, James D. Thompson III, Marie R. Yeates, Sandra G. Rodriguez, Houston, Texas, Attorneys for Petitioners Antero Resources Corporation and Antero Resources Piceance Corporation.
   </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b184-11">
    Burns Figa &amp; Will, P.C., Matthew B. Dill-man, Sarah M. Shechter, Greenwood Village, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner Frontier Drilling LLC.
   </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b184-12">
    Davis Graham &amp; Stubbs, LLP, Gail L. Wurtzler, Shannon Wells Stevenson, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner Calfrac Well Services Corp.
   </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b184-13">
    Thomas Genshaft LLP, Peter W. Thomas, Aspen, Colorado, Frascona, Joiner, Goodman and Greenstein P.C., Corey T. Zurbuch, Boulder, Colorado, Napoli Bern Ripka Shkol--nik &amp; Assoc. LLP, Mare Jay Bern, New York, New York, Attorneys for Respondents.
   </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b184-14">
    Fennemore Craig, P.C., Terry Cipoletti, Denver, Colorado, Hollingsworth LLP, Richard O. Faulk, Washington, D.C., Attorneys for Amici Curiae National Association of Manufacturers, American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers, American Chemistry Council, American Coatings Association, Independent Petroleum Association of America, and Metals Sérvice Center Institute.
   </attorneys><attorneys id="Ac9">
    Snell &amp; Wilmer LLP., Lee Mickus, Jessi-E. Yates, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Colorado Civil Justice League, Denver Metro Chamber of Commerce, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc., and American Tort Reform Association.
   </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b184-18">
    Steptoe &amp; Johnson LLP, Mark P. Fitzsim-mons, Jared R. Butcher, Washington, D.C., Steptoe &amp; Johnson LLP, Bennett Evan Cooper, Phoenix, Arizona, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae American Petroleum Institute.
   </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b184-19">
    Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Christopher J. Neumann, Gregory R. Tan, Harriet A. McConnell, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Petroleum Association.
   </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b184-20">
    Ruebel &amp; Quillen, LLC, Casey A. Quillen, Jeffrey C. Ruebel, Westminster, Colorado, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Trial Lawyers Association.
   </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b184-21">
    Klibaner Law Firm P.C., David A. Klibaner, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Defense Lawyers Association.
   </attorneys>
Supreme Court of Colorado
Supreme Court of Colorado