 VOIGT, Justice, dissenting. [T48] I respectfully dissent. The appellant's convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary should be reversed because the jury was not adequately instructed as to the findings it had to make beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the appellant guilty. As a result, we cannot have confidence in the verdict because we do not know if the jury made those findings. [149] The issue that requires reversal of the appellant's convictions grows out of the language of Wyoming's accessory before the fact statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-201 (LexisNexis 2001): (a) A person who knowingly aids or abets in the commission of a felony, or who counsels, encourages, hires, commands or procures a felony to be committed, is an accessory before the fact. (b) An accessory before the fact: @ May be indicted, informed against, tried and convicted as if he were a principal; (i) May be indicted, informed against, tried and convicted either before or after and whether or not the principal offender is indicted, informed against, tried or convicted; and (Gi) Upon conviction, is subject to the same punishment and penalties as are prescribed by law for the punishment of the principal. The specific problem is created by subsection (b)(i)-what does it mean to be "informed against, tried and convicted" as if a principal? In particular, how can a defendant be tried as a principal if the facts suggest he acted, if at all, as an accessory? 1 The appellant posits his argument as follows: (1) he was charged as a principal; (2) he had no notice he would be tried as an accessory; (8) the lack of notice violated his constitutional right to know the nature and cause of the accusation; and (4) there was insufficient evidence to convict him as a principal. I would reverse, despite the fact that the record does not fully substantiate this argument. It is true that neither the original information nor the two amended infor-mations contained any accessory language or mentioned Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-201. We have previously held, however, that "it is not necessary that the information refer to the aiding and abetting statute," because proof of a defendant's participation in the erime as an aider and abettor is sufficient to convict him *308of the principal crime. Hawkes v. State, 626 P.2d 1041, 1043 (Wyo.1981). Beyond that, nearly a month before trial in this case, the State filed and served on defense counsel a Notice of Intent which reads as follows: COMES NOW, the State of Wyoming, by and through its undersigned attorney, and gives the Defendant notice, as it has at preliminary hearing, that the State will rely on the extent necessary on theories of co-defendant liability, aider and abett[olr theory and Pinkerton liability under the conspiracy charges; as well as any liability as a principal in each of the charged offenses in the above-captioned matter. [T51] Admittedly, the language of this notice is less than precise, but it was sufficient to apprise the appellant of the State's aiding and abetting theory. Further, the probable cause affidavit attached to the original information clearly detailed the suspected roles of the appellant and his accomplices. And finally, although no transcript of such is included in the record, the appellant was afforded a preliminary hearing in the circuit court where, we may presume, he was further informed as to the factual allegations. [152] It is not enough to say that an accessory before the fact may be tried as a principal or that the appellant knew that he would have to defend against the accusation that he acted as an accessory before the fact. We must inquire whether the jury was sufficiently instructed as to how to apply the law to the facts. A person who has not committed the acts of a principal may not be found guilty of the principal crime, under an aiding and abetting theory, unless the jury finds that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the person knowingly aided or abetted in the commission of a felony, or counseled, encouraged, hired, commanded or procured a felony to be committed. [T 53] - Accessory before the fact is a separate and distinct offense from that of the principal crime. Linn v. State, 505 P.2d 1270, 1275 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983, 93 S.Ct. 2277, 36 L.Ed.2d 959 (1973); Goldsmith v. Cheney, 447 F.2d 624, 627 (10th Cir.1971). Consequently, the State must prove not just that someone committed the principal crime, but that the defendant " 'associated himself with and participated in the accomplishment and success of the criminal venture."" Fales v. State, 908 P.2d 404, 408 (Wyo.1995) (quoting Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686-693 (Wyo.1995)). See also Haight v. State, 654 P.2d 1232, 1238 (Wyo.1982). What that means is the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the statutory crime of accessory before the fact. [154] Wyoming has three pattern jury instructions (W.Cr.P.J.I.) covering accessory before the fact. The district court gave one of those instructions, but omitted the other two. Instruction No. 18 was based on W.Cr.P.J.I. 7.01A: It is not necessary that the defendant personally did every act necessary to constitute the crime of Aggravated Robbery and Aggravated Burglary. It is enough if, acting with the intention that the crime be committed, he knowingly aided and abetted someone else to commit the crime of Aggravated Robbery and Aggravated Burglary or that he counseled, encouraged, hired, commanded or procured some other person to commit the erime of Aggravated Robbery and Aggravated Burglary and the crime was attempted or committed.2 In addition, Instruction No. 19 recited for the jury the language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-201: You are instructed that pertinent portions of the Wyoming Statutes provide as follows: a. A person who knowingly aids or Abets in the commission of a felony, or who counsels, encourages, hires, commands or procures a felony to be committed, is an accessory before the fact. b. An accessory before the fact: i. May be indicted, informed against, tried and convicted as if he were a principal. Finally, Instruction No. 20 defined "principal:" *309A principal is a person involved in the commission of a felony who directly and actively commits the act constituting the crime. [155] The district court did not, however, give W.Cr.P.J.L. 7.01B or 7.01C. W.Cr.P.J.I. 7.01C reads as follows: Merely being present at the scene of a crime or merely knowing that a crime is being committed or is about to be committed is not sufficient conduct for the jury to 'find that the defendant was an accessory before the fact to that crime. The State must prove that the defendant knowingly associated himself with the crime in some way as a participant-someone who wanted the crime to be committed-and not as a mere spectator. Omission of that particular instruction in any given case may or may not be error. The same cannot be said for W.Cr.P.J.I. 7.01B, which is the elements instruction for the crime of accessory before the fact: The elements of being an Accessory Before the Fact to the Crime of are: 1. On or about the _ day of: [200] ? 2. In County, Wyoming 3. The Defendant, 4. Knowingly [aided or abetted another person in the {commission of} {attempt to commit} the crime of ] [counseled, encouraged, hired, commanded or procured the crime of to be committed by another person}, and 5. That other person [committed] [attempted to commit] the crime of If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the Defendant guilty. If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the Defendant not guilty. Without the giving of this instruction, or something akin to it, for each of the three non-conspiracy crimes, we cannot .be sure that the jury submitted facts tending to prove the appellant was an accessory before the fact to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" test.3 We would never countenance the failure to give an elements instruction with any other crime, and we should not countenance it with the crime of aiding and abetting. [1 56] I would reverse. . For a brief analysis of the role of this statute in abrogating the common law distinctions between principals and accessories, see Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 920-21 (Wyo.1984). Jahnke suggests the following legislative intent: The result is that differences in the manner of participation by the parties to the commission of a felony do not affect their individual culpability for the crime. Each, whether he is the principal, an aider and abettor, or an accessory before the fact, is treated as a principal for purposes of punishment. Id. at 921 (emphasis added). . This instruction, in and of itself, may have created reversible error because it lists only aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, leaving out aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. . See Virgilio v. State, 834 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Wyo.1992) and Kavanaugh v. State, 769 P.2d 908, 911 (Wyo.1989) for examples of accessory before the fact elements instructions that were given to the jury. 
Lehman, C.J., and Golden, Hill, Kite, and Voigt
Black v. State
Troy Dwayn BLACK, Appellant (Defendant), v. the STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff)
<citation id="b330-7">
    2002 WY 72
   </citation><br><parties id="b330-8">
    Troy Dwayn BLACK, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
   </parties><br><docketnumber id="b330-11">
    No. 00-182.
   </docketnumber><court id="AqYE">
    Supreme Court of Wyoming.
   </court><decisiondate id="AGh">
    May 14, 2002.
   </decisiondate><attorneys id="AsB">
<span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="299"> 
     *299
     </span>
    Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Ryan R. Roden, Assistant Appellate Counsel, Representing Appellant. Argument by Mr. Roden.
   </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b331-20">
    Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kimberly A. Baker, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Representing Ap-pellee. Argument by Ms. Baker.
   </attorneys><br><judges id="b331-21">
    Before LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ. '
   </judges>
Wyoming Supreme Court
Wyoming Supreme Court