 CORNELIUS, Chief Justice, concurring. Although I agree that this case should be affirmed, I cannot consent to the conclusion that the legal opinion of Mr. Davis was properly admitted. It is well settled that a witness, regardless of his training, is not permitted to give an opinion which constitutes a legal conclusion. Brown v. Mitchell, 88 Tex. 350, 31 S.W. 621, 36 L.R.A. 64 (1895); 2 R. Ray, Texas Evidence § 1423, p. 71 (3d ed. 1980), and cases cited; 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1952, p. 81 (3d ed. 1940); 23 Tex.Jur.2d Evidence § 413, p. 619, and cases there cited. The basis for that rule is not that the witness lacks the training or competence in the law necessary to understand and apply the legal definition or test. The reason for the rule is that the legal effect of a given set of facts is not a matter for the opinions of witnesses, but is a matter of law which is to be decided and applied solely by the tribunal trying the case. 2 R. Ray, Texas Evidence § 1423, pp. 71-72 (3d ed. 1980), and cases there cited: 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1952, p. 82 (3d ed. 1940). In the case of a mixed question of law and fact, such as testamentary capacity, to per*349mit a witness to state his conclusion would allow that witness to interpret and apply for the jury the legal test involved in the question, which is properly the exclusive prerogative of the judge. The rule has been universally applied to attorneys and it specifically applies to conclusions concerning a person’s testamentary capacity. Witnesses may testify to the facts bearing upon legal capacity, but not to the ultimate conclusion. Carr v. Radkey, 393 S.W.2d 806 (Tex.1965); Lindley v. Lindley, 384 S.W.2d 676 (Tex.1964); 61 Tex.Jur.2d Wills § 25, p. 126; 23 Tex.Jur.2d Evidence § 413, p. 619, and cases cited. Attorneys may give expert opinions on legal questions only when they are testifying about foreign law when it must be proved as a fact. 2 R. Ray, Texas Evidence § 1424, p. 74 (3d ed. 1980); 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1953, p. 82 (3d ed. 1940); 23 Tex.Jur.2d Evidence § 452, p. 658, and cases cited. I dp agree, however, that in view of the abundance of evidence supporting testamentary capacity in this case, the error in the admission of Mr. Davis’ opinion did not constitute reversible error. HUTCHINSON, J., joins in this concurrence. 
Bleil, Cornelius, Hutchinson
Faulkner v. Thrapp
Lola FAULKNER and Rose Stacy, Appellants, v. Kathy Ann Granberry THRAPP, Appellee
<parties id="b378-11">
    Lola FAULKNER and Rose Stacy, Appellants, v. Kathy Ann Granberry THRAPP, Appellee.
   </parties><br><docketnumber id="b378-14">
    No. 8828.
   </docketnumber><br><court id="b378-15">
    Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Texarkana.
   </court><br><decisiondate id="b378-16">
    April 14, 1981.
   </decisiondate><br><otherdate id="b378-17">
    Rehearing Denied May 12, 1981.
   </otherdate><br><attorneys id="b379-22">
<span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="345"> 
     *345
     </span>
    Thomas R. Newman, Texarkana, for appellants.
   </attorneys><br><attorneys id="b379-23">
    Lynn Cooksey, Texarkana, for appellee.
   </attorneys>
Court of Appeals of Texas
Court of Appeals of Texas