 Chief Judge Kaye (dissenting). Like the courts below, I would grant defendants summary judgment because plaintiffs failed to tender the outstanding storage fees and demand return of their goods. That is clearly the better, and correct, result in the present circumstances — where the commercial warehouseman was the sole bidder, bought the 60,000 yards of ultra cashmere at a price less than the value of the lien and, even after the sale, itself retains the goods. This is the first case in which we are called upon to construe *177UCC 7-210. It is not, however, the first case in which a warehouseman is accused of conducting a warehouse sale improperly, and therefore misappropriating plaintiffs’ goods. Such cases arose under General Business Law § 118, the predecessor to UCC 7-210 (see e.g. Lake v Dye, 232 NY 209 [1921]; Maritime World Corp. v Grefe Steel Warehouse Corp., 154 NYS2d 684 [Sup Ct, Trial Term, NY County 1956]). As those cases illustrate, courts likened the bailor’s cause of action to a claim for conversion, although that term did not appear in General Business Law § 118 (see Lake, 232 NY at 212; Maritime, 154 NYS2d at 685). They did so because they recognized the cause of action as one based on an alleged interference with an owner’s right to possess personal property, even when aspects of the interference arose within a statutory framework. As those cases further illustrate, courts assessing the conduct of warehouse sales routinely drew on the common law to fill gaps in the existing legislative scheme. For example, in Lake we used common-law precedents to determine the measure of damages. We also recognized that while the statutes creating warehouse sale procedures were enacted in derogation of the common law, it would be “unreasonable” to expect warehouse-men advertising such sales to list the items offered in as much detail as the bailors inevitably wished. And we brushed aside a bailor’s arguments based on a discrepancy between the warehouse sale date on the notice to her and the date on the public announcement — for we recognized that this discrepancy did not harm the plaintiff under the circumstances. In short, we construed the statute with sensitivity to commercial reality. And we did so with considerably less statutory encouragement than we have today — for unlike UCC 7-210, General Business Law § 118 did not explicitly authorize courts to apply a rule of reason to any aspect of a disputed warehouse sale. UCC 7-210 departs from its predecessor, General Business Law § 118, in several respects. First, it provides a simplified procedure for warehouse sales when the bailor is a merchant, and permits such sales to be conducted “on any terms which are commercially reasonable” (see UCC 7-210 [1]). Second, it permits a warehouseman conducting a public warehouse sale to buy the goods (see UCC 7-210 [4]). Finally, it provides for a lesser level of damages in case of nonwillful violation of the statutory sale procedures (see UCC 7-210 [9]). Each of these provisions differs from previous law, as the 1955 Report of the Law Revision Commission observed (see 1955 NY Legis Doc No. 65 [H], at 43-44). Their cumulative effect is clearly to liberalize the law to the advantage of warehousemen. *178In adopting these procedures, the drafters doubtless anticipated cases in which a warehouseman would sell bailed goods to a third party to satisfy a lien — as was already possible under General Business Law § 118 — and cases in which the warehouseman would buy the goods at a public sale and resell them, or even possibly utilize them. Here, however, the warehouseman has bought the bailed goods, and has neither sold them nor done anything else with them. In these unusual circumstances, we look to related statutory provisions and the common law for guidance. Article 1 of the UCC sets forth the Legislature’s intention for the statute to be construed to promote the continued expansion of commercial practices; presumes a general obligation of good faith; and leaves intact principles of law and equity not displaced by particular provisions of the statute (see UCC 1-102, 1-103). More specifically, in reviewing a claim under UCC 7-210 we may consider how this section relates to the remainder of article 7 and — where article 7 is silent — the common law. Under UCC 7-403, a warehouseman generally must deliver bailed goods to a person entitled to the goods under a warehouse receipt, but is excused from doing so if — among other possibilities — the claimant fails to satisfy the bailee’s lien upon request (UCC 7-403 [2]) or the warehouseman establishes “previous sale or other disposition of the goods in lawful enforcement of a lien * * *” (UCC 7-403 [1] [c]). Thus, the design of UCC 7-403 contemplates that a lawful warehouse sale may be asserted as a defense under that section when a bailor claims a warehouse has wrongfully withheld goods. It also presupposes that bailors want to possess their goods and will seek to reclaim them from the warehouse if they are still available. UCC 7-210, with its procedures for the conduct of warehouse sales, should be construed to harmonize with this provision. As commentators have recognized, UCC 7-210 is part of an integrated statutory scheme, to be read in pari materia with UCC 7-403: “Section 7-210 (1) and (2) set forth procedures whereby the warehouseman may foreclose its lien through sale of stored goods. These procedures are designed to protect the owner or other claimant’s right to redeem the goods (7-210 (3)) as well as to secure the likelihood that a fair price will be real*179ized from the sale foreclosing the warehouseman’s specific lien. The warehouseman is not to sell more goods than reasonably necessary to satisfy the warehouseman’s claims. Further, 7-403 (1) (c) provides that a proper foreclosure sale gives the warehouseman a lawful excuse for non-delivery of the goods sold. The warehouseman must, however, account for any surplus from the sale proceeds under 7-210 (6)” (3 White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 28-6, at 314 [Practitioner’s 4th ed] [emphasis added]). As the emphasized language recognizes, a violation of UCC 7-210 may take away whatever “lawful excuse” a warehouseman would otherwise have had for nondelivery under UCC 7-403. And, of course, most warehouse sales will result in the goods’ passing into the hands of a third party who will hold them “free of any rights of persons against whom the lien was valid” (UCC 7-210 [5]), rendering delivery of the goods by the warehouseman impossible and demand by the bailor futile. But UCC 7-210 was not intended to obviate a request for the goods when circumstances overwhelmingly suggest that their return is possible and would occur immediately upon tender. Under these circumstances, plaintiffs generally should be required to demand the goods, regardless of whether they style their claims as negligence or conversion (see I.C.C. Metals v Municipal Warehouse Co., 50 NY2d 657, 660-662 [1980]; Schwartz v Capital Liquidators, Inc., 984 F2d 53, 54 [2d Cir 1993]). In a situation such as the one before us, requiring demand would discourage meritless lawsuits by ensuring that bailor-plaintiffs consider their goods to be worth at least the amount of the lien. Had plaintiffs tendered the outstanding fees to the warehouseman, I suspect they would have had their fabric instead of a decade of litigation, and now the prospect of more litigation. Judges Smith, Levine, Wesley, Rosenblatt and Graffeo concur with Judge Ciparick; Chief Judge Kaye dissents and votes to affirm in a separate opinion. Order modified, without costs, and case remitted to Supreme Court, New York County, for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion herein and, as so modified, affirmed. 
Ciparick, Kaye
Shimamoto v. S&F Warehouses, Inc.
Midori Shimamoto, as Administrator of the Estate of Bart Schwartz, Deceased, Et Al., Appellants, v. S&F Warehouses, Inc., Et Al., Respondents, Et Al., Defendants
<citation data-order="0" data-type="citation" id="AoU">
    [783 NE2d 484, 753 NYS2d 419]
   </citation><br><parties data-order="1" data-type="parties" id="b231-3">
    Midori Shimamoto, as Administrator of the Estate of Bart Schwartz, Deceased, et al., Appellants, v S&amp;F Warehouses, Inc., et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.
   </parties><br><otherdate data-order="2" data-type="otherdate" id="b231-4">
    Argued September 4, 2002;
   </otherdate><decisiondate data-order="3" data-type="decisiondate" id="AdJ">
    decided October 24, 2002
   </decisiondate><br><attorneys data-order="4" data-type="attorneys" id="b233-12">
<span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="167"> 
     *167
     </span>
    POINTS OF COUNSEL
   </attorneys><br><attorneys data-order="5" data-type="attorneys" id="b233-13">
<em>
     William Joseph Apuzzo,
    </em>
    New York City, and
    <em>
     David D. Chase
    </em>
    for appellants.
   </attorneys><p data-order="6" data-type="legal" id="AKY">
    I. Appellant was not required to demand return of his goods.
    <em>
     (Proctor &amp; Gamble Distrib. Co. v Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp.,
    </em>
    16 NY2d 344;
    <em>
     MacDonnell v Buffalo Loan, Trust &amp; Safe Deposit Co.,
    </em>
    193 NY 92;
    <em>
     Todd v Haeger,
    </em>
    120 NY 645;
    <em>
     Viner v New York, Alexandria, Georgetown &amp; Washington S.S. Co.,
    </em>
    50 NY 23;
    <em>
     Colgate v Pennsylvania Co.,
    </em>
    102 NY 120;
    <em>
     Pierpoint v Hoyt,
    </em>
    260 NY 26;
    <em>
     Bradley v Roe,
    </em>
    282 NY 525;
    <em>
     Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, Tex.,
    </em>
    87 NY2d 36;
    <em>
     Sporn v MCA Records,
    </em>
    58 NY2d 482;
    <em>
     Gillet v Roberts,
    </em>
    57 NY 28.) II. Respondent’s sale was not commercially reasonable as a matter of law.
    <em>
     (Maddox v City of New York,
    </em>
    108 AD2d 42, 66 NY2d 270;
    <em>
     Martin v Herzog,
    </em>
    228 NY 164;
    <em>
     Brown v Shyne,
    </em>
    242 NY 176;
    <em>
     Van Gaasbeck v Webatuck Cent. School Dist. No. 1,
    </em>
    21 NY2d 239;
    <em>
     Gain v Eastern Reinforcing Serv.,
    </em>
    193 AD2d 255;
    <em>
     Shepard Co. v Taylor Publ. Co.,
    </em>
    234 NY 465;
    <em>
     Todd v Haeger,
    </em>
    120 NY 645;
    <em>
     Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v Herald Sq. Fabrics Corp.,
    </em>
    81 AD2d 168;
    <em>
     Bankers Trust Co. v Dowler &amp; Co.,
    </em>
    47 NY2d 128;
    <em>
     Mercantile Fin. Corp.
    </em>
<span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="168"> 
     *168
     </span>
<em>
     v Miller,
    </em>
    292 F Supp 797.) III. Respondents’ notice of sale failed to advise appellant of his right to bring a UCC 7-211 proceeding rendering respondents liable for violation of the Due Process Clause of the New York State Constitution.
    <em>
     (Sharrock v Dell Buick-Cadillac,
    </em>
    45 NY2d 152;
    <em>
     Wynehamer v People,
    </em>
    13 NY 378;
    <em>
     Fuentes v Shevin,
    </em>
    407 US 67;
    <em>
     Svendsen v Smith’s Moving &amp; Trucking Co.,
    </em>
    76 AD2d 504.) IV. If anything, respondents’ deliberate unwillingness to discover and obey the law supports the trial court’s conversion finding. (Perez
    <em>
     v United States,
    </em>
    844 F Supp 984;
    <em>
     Ingram v Machel &amp; Jr. Auto Repair,
    </em>
    148 AD2d 324, 74 NY2d 792;
    <em>
     Prudential-Bache Sec. v Golden Larch-Sequoia,
    </em>
    118 AD2d 487.) V. The Appellate Division improperly vacated the jury’s damage award.
    <em>
     (Vavosa v Stiles,
    </em>
    220 AD2d 363;
    <em>
     Greenberg v Behlen,
    </em>
    220 AD2d 720;
    <em>
     Calabrese v County of Ontario,
    </em>
    58 AD2d 1008;
    <em>
     Marshall v Mastodon, Inc.,
    </em>
    51 AD2d 21;
    <em>
     Thoreson v Penthouse Intl.,
    </em>
    80 NY2d 490;
    <em>
     Adamy v Ziriakus,
    </em>
    92 NY2d 396;
    <em>
     Forte v Weiner,
    </em>
    200 AD2d
    <em>
     421; Cohen v Hallmark Cards,
    </em>
    45 NY2d 493;
    <em>
     Middleton v Whitridge,
    </em>
    213 NY 499;
    <em>
     Dominguez v Manhattan &amp; Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth.,
    </em>
    46 NY2d 528.)
   </p><br><attorneys data-order="7" data-type="attorneys" id="b234-5">
<em>
     Stuart Halper and Associates,
    </em>
    Briarcliif Manor
    <em>
     (Stuart Halper
    </em>
    and
    <em>
     Steven N. Feinman
    </em>
    of counsel), for S&amp;F Warehouses, Inc. and another, respondents.
   </attorneys><p data-order="8" data-type="legal" id="ATQ">
    I. Pursuant to UCC 7-204 and 7-210, Schwartz has not incurred any damages.
    <em>
     (I.C.C. Metals v Municipal Warehouse Co.,
    </em>
    50 NY2d 657;
    <em>
     Martin v Briggs,
    </em>
    235 AD2d 192;
    <em>
     General Foods Corp. v Pittston Warehouse Corp.,
    </em>
    110 AD2d 520;
    <em>
     Noworyta v Klippert,
    </em>
    122 AD2d 548;
    <em>
     Bradford v Muinzer,
    </em>
    498 F Supp 1384;
    <em>
     Cohen v Hallmark Cards,
    </em>
    45 NY2d 493;
    <em>
     Brotman v Biegeleisen,
    </em>
    192 AD2d 410;
    <em>
     Frances G. v Vincent G,
    </em>
    133 AD2d 254;
    <em>
     Kaminsky v Karmin,
    </em>
    187 AD2d 488;
    <em>
     O’Gorman v Kaplan,
    </em>
    120 Misc 327.) II. Since the trial evidence established that Schwartz’s fabric was worthless, the Appellate Division correctly found that the jury’s verdict on damages was against the weight of the credible evidence.
    <em>
     (I.C.C. Metals v Municipal Warehouse Co.,
    </em>
    50 NY2d 657;
    <em>
     Nicastro v Park,
    </em>
    113 AD2d 129;
    <em>
     Tate v Colabello,
    </em>
    58 NY2d 84;
    <em>
     Cooke v Meltzer,
    </em>
    235 AD2d 517;
    <em>
     Fogliani v Salvato,
    </em>
    205 AD2d 581;
    <em>
     Nordhauser v New York City Health &amp; Hosps. Corp.,
    </em>
    176 AD2d 787.) III. Schwartz has raised numerous irrelevant arguments and has cited numerous irrelevant cases in his brief, which fail to address the relevant issues of the instant appeal.
   </p><br><attorneys data-order="9" data-type="attorneys" id="b234-6">
<em>
     Simon, Meyrowitz &amp; Meyrowitz, LLP,
    </em>
    New York City
    <em>
     (Edward S. Feldman
    </em>
    of counsel), for Simon, Meyrowitz, Meyrowitz
    <span citation-index="1" class="star-pagination" label="169"> 
     *169
     </span>
    &amp; Schlussel, respondent.
   </attorneys><p data-order="10" data-type="legal" id="Adg">
    I. The Appellate Division was correct in reversing the trial court’s directed verdict and vacating the jury award.
    <em>
     (Sage v Fairchild-Swearingen Corp.,
    </em>
    70 NY2d 579;
    <em>
     Cohen v Hallmark Cards,
    </em>
    45 NY2d 493.) II. The Appellate Division was correct in dismissing all of plaintiff-appellant’s claims based on intentional tort.
    <em>
     (Ingram v Machel &amp; Jr. Auto Repair,
    </em>
    148 AD2d 324, 74 NY2d 792;
    <em>
     Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, Tex.,
    </em>
    87 NY2d 36;
    <em>
     Employers’ Fire Ins. Co. v Cotten,
    </em>
    245 NY 102;
    <em>
     Meese v Miller,
    </em>
    79 AD2d 237;
    <em>
     AMF Inc. v Algo Distribs.,
    </em>
    48 AD2d 352;
    <em>
     Sharrock v Dell Buick-Cadillac,
    </em>
    45 NY2d 152;
    <em>
     Bankers Trust Co. v Dowler &amp; Co.,
    </em>
    47 NY2d 128;
    <em>
     Gain v Eastern Reinforcing Serv.,
    </em>
    193 AD2d 255.) III. Plaintiff-appellant’s claims were properly dismissed based upon plaintiff-appellant’s failure to satisfy the prerequisite of a demand for return of the stored goods and tender of storage charges.
    <em>
     Vigilant Ins. Co. v Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, Tex.,
    </em>
    87 NY2d 36;
    <em>
     Employers’ Fire Ins. Co. v Cotten,
    </em>
    245 NY 102;
    <em>
     Meese v Miller,
    </em>
    79 AD2d 237;
    <em>
     AMF Inc. v Algo Distribs.,
    </em>
    48 AD2d 352;
    <em>
     Solomon v City of New York,
    </em>
    66 NY2d 1026;
    <em>
     Akins v Glens Falls City School Dist.,
    </em>
    53 NY2d 325;
    <em>
     I.C.C. Metals v Municipal Warehouse Co.,
    </em>
    50 NY2d 657;
    <em>
     MacDonnell v Buffalo Loan, Trust &amp; Safe Deposit Co.,
    </em>
    193 NY 92;
    <em>
     Johnson v Gumer,
    </em>
    94 AD2d 955;
    <em>
     Schwartz v Capital Liquidators,
    </em>
    984 F2d 53.)
   </p>
<attorneys data-order="4" data-type="attorneys" id="b233-12">POINTS OF COUNSEL</attorneys> <attorneys data-order="5" data-type="attorneys" id="b233-13"><em>William Joseph Apuzzo, </em>New York City, and <em>David D. Chase </em>for appellants.</attorneys> <p data-order="6" data-type="legal" id="AKY">I. Appellant was not required to demand return of his goods. <em>(Proctor &amp; Gamble Distrib. Co. v Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp., </em>16 NY2d 344; <em>MacDonnell v Buffalo Loan, Trust &amp; Safe Deposit Co., </em>193 NY 92; <em>Todd v Haeger, </em>120 NY 645; <em>Viner v New York, Alexandria, Georgetown &amp; Washington S.S. Co., </em>50 NY 23; <em>Colgate v Pennsylvania Co., </em>102 NY 120; <em>Pierpoint v Hoyt, </em>260 NY 26; <em>Bradley v Roe, </em>282 NY 525; <em>Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, Tex., </em>87 NY2d 36; <em>Sporn v MCA Records, </em>58 NY2d 482; <em>Gillet v Roberts, </em>57 NY 28.) II. Respondent’s sale was not commercially reasonable as a matter of law. <em>(Maddox v City of New York, </em>108 AD2d 42, 66 NY2d 270; <em>Martin v Herzog, </em>228 NY 164; <em>Brown v Shyne, </em>242 NY 176; <em>Van Gaasbeck v Webatuck Cent. School Dist. No. 1, </em>21 NY2d 239; <em>Gain v Eastern Reinforcing Serv., </em>193 AD2d 255; <em>Shepard Co. v Taylor Publ. Co., </em>234 NY 465; <em>Todd v Haeger, </em>120 NY 645; <em>Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v Herald Sq. Fabrics Corp., </em>81 AD2d 168; <em>Bankers Trust Co. v Dowler &amp; Co., </em>47 NY2d 128; <em>Mercantile Fin. Corp. </em><page-number citation-index="1" label="168">*168</page-number><em>v Miller, </em>292 F Supp 797.) III. Respondents’ notice of sale failed to advise appellant of his right to bring a UCC 7-211 proceeding rendering respondents liable for violation of the Due Process Clause of the New York State Constitution. <em>(Sharrock v Dell Buick-Cadillac, </em>45 NY2d 152; <em>Wynehamer v People, </em>13 NY 378; <em>Fuentes v Shevin, </em>407 US 67; <em>Svendsen v Smith’s Moving &amp; Trucking Co., </em>76 AD2d 504.) IV. If anything, respondents’ deliberate unwillingness to discover and obey the law supports the trial court’s conversion finding. (Perez <em>v United States, </em>844 F Supp 984; <em>Ingram v Machel &amp; Jr. Auto Repair, </em>148 AD2d 324, 74 NY2d 792; <em>Prudential-Bache Sec. v Golden Larch-Sequoia, </em>118 AD2d 487.) V. The Appellate Division improperly vacated the jury’s damage award. <em>(Vavosa v Stiles, </em>220 AD2d 363; <em>Greenberg v Behlen, </em>220 AD2d 720; <em>Calabrese v County of Ontario, </em>58 AD2d 1008; <em>Marshall v Mastodon, Inc., </em>51 AD2d 21; <em>Thoreson v Penthouse Intl., </em>80 NY2d 490; <em>Adamy v Ziriakus, </em>92 NY2d 396; <em>Forte v Weiner, </em>200 AD2d <em>421; Cohen v Hallmark Cards, </em>45 NY2d 493; <em>Middleton v Whitridge, </em>213 NY 499; <em>Dominguez v Manhattan &amp; Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., </em>46 NY2d 528.)</p> <attorneys data-order="7" data-type="attorneys" id="b234-5"><em>Stuart Halper and Associates, </em>Briarcliif Manor <em>(Stuart Halper </em>and <em>Steven N. Feinman </em>of counsel), for S&amp;F Warehouses, Inc. and another, respondents.</attorneys> <p data-order="8" data-type="legal" id="ATQ">I. Pursuant to UCC 7-204 and 7-210, Schwartz has not incurred any damages. <em>(I.C.C. Metals v Municipal Warehouse Co., </em>50 NY2d 657; <em>Martin v Briggs, </em>235 AD2d 192; <em>General Foods Corp. v Pittston Warehouse Corp., </em>110 AD2d 520; <em>Noworyta v Klippert, </em>122 AD2d 548; <em>Bradford v Muinzer, </em>498 F Supp 1384; <em>Cohen v Hallmark Cards, </em>45 NY2d 493; <em>Brotman v Biegeleisen, </em>192 AD2d 410; <em>Frances G. v Vincent G, </em>133 AD2d 254; <em>Kaminsky v Karmin, </em>187 AD2d 488; <em>O’Gorman v Kaplan, </em>120 Misc 327.) II. Since the trial evidence established that Schwartz’s fabric was worthless, the Appellate Division correctly found that the jury’s verdict on damages was against the weight of the credible evidence. <em>(I.C.C. Metals v Municipal Warehouse Co., </em>50 NY2d 657; <em>Nicastro v Park, </em>113 AD2d 129; <em>Tate v Colabello, </em>58 NY2d 84; <em>Cooke v Meltzer, </em>235 AD2d 517; <em>Fogliani v Salvato, </em>205 AD2d 581; <em>Nordhauser v New York City Health &amp; Hosps. Corp., </em>176 AD2d 787.) III. Schwartz has raised numerous irrelevant arguments and has cited numerous irrelevant cases in his brief, which fail to address the relevant issues of the instant appeal.</p> <attorneys data-order="9" data-type="attorneys" id="b234-6"><em>Simon, Meyrowitz &amp; Meyrowitz, LLP, </em>New York City <em>(Edward S. Feldman </em>of counsel), for Simon, Meyrowitz, Meyrowitz &amp; Schlussel, respondent.</attorneys> <p data-order="10" data-type="legal" id="Adg">I. The Appellate Division was correct in reversing the trial court’s directed verdict and vacating the jury award. <em>(Sage v Fairchild-Swearingen Corp., </em>70 NY2d 579; <em>Cohen v Hallmark Cards, </em>45 NY2d 493.) II. The Appellate Division was correct in dismissing all of plaintiff-appellant’s claims based on intentional tort. <em>(Ingram v Machel &amp; Jr. Auto Repair, </em>148 AD2d 324, 74 NY2d 792; <em>Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, Tex., </em>87 NY2d 36; <em>Employers’ Fire Ins. Co. v Cotten, </em>245 NY 102; <em>Meese v Miller, </em>79 AD2d 237; <em>AMF Inc. v Algo Distribs., </em>48 AD2d 352; <em>Sharrock v Dell Buick-Cadillac, </em>45 NY2d 152; <em>Bankers Trust Co. v Dowler &amp; Co., </em>47 NY2d 128; <em>Gain v Eastern Reinforcing Serv., </em>193 AD2d 255.) III. Plaintiff-appellant’s claims were properly dismissed based upon plaintiff-appellant’s failure to satisfy the prerequisite of a demand for return of the stored goods and tender of storage charges. <em>Vigilant Ins. Co. v Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, Tex., </em>87 NY2d 36; <em>Employers’ Fire Ins. Co. v Cotten, </em>245 NY 102; <em>Meese v Miller, </em>79 AD2d 237; <em>AMF Inc. v Algo Distribs., </em>48 AD2d 352; <em>Solomon v City of New York, </em>66 NY2d 1026; <em>Akins v Glens Falls City School Dist., </em>53 NY2d 325; <em>I.C.C. Metals v Municipal Warehouse Co., </em>50 NY2d 657; <em>MacDonnell v Buffalo Loan, Trust &amp; Safe Deposit Co., </em>193 NY 92; <em>Johnson v Gumer, </em>94 AD2d 955; <em>Schwartz v Capital Liquidators, </em>984 F2d 53.)</p>
New York Court of Appeals
New York Court of Appeals