Science thrives on the conviction that man does not have final knowledge about anything, and that any doctrine, no matter what its credentials, should be subject to inquiry and correction.
L. W. Beck; Philosophic Inquiry; 1952; p352
It can even be shown that all theories, including the best, have the same probability, namely zero.
Karl Popper; (1902-1994);Conjectures & Refutations; 1965; p192
There seems to be in all this a thoroughgoing epistemological relativism that makes the obtaining of truth impossible; and if scientific procedure cannot obtain truth, it can offer no absolute arguments against theism nor can it say truthfully that “the scientific method is the sole gateway to the whole region of knowledge.”
There is no science to which final appeal can be made; there are only scientists and their various theories. … No scientific or observational proof can be given for the uniformity of nature, and much less can experience demonstrate that “the scientific method is the sole gateway to the whole region of knowledge.” On the contrary, a plausible analysis showed that science was incapable of arriving at any truth whatever.
Gordon Clark; (1902-1985); A Christian View of Men and Things; 1952; p216, 227
The hope of finding objective,
infallible laws and standards has faded.
The age of Reason is gone.
Morris Kline; (1908-1992); Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty; 1980; p7
Nature’s laws are man’s creation, we, not God, are the lawgivers of the universe. A law of nature is man’s description and not God’s prescription.
Morris Kline; (1908-1992); Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty; 1980; p98
Laws of science are not laws at all … Laws of science state tendencies we have recently observed in our corner of the universe.
Bart Kosko; (1960-); Fuzzy Thinking; 1993; p8
… there is not a single law of nature which we know to be valid; the laws of nature are hypotheses which we assert tentatively.
Hans Hahn; (1879-1934);
Logic, Mathematics and Knowledge of Nature; 1933
Scientific theories are perpetually changing.
Karl Popper; (1902-1994); The Logic of Scientific Discovery; 1959/1968; p71
A theory is accepted … because it can explain all facts already observed … an infinite number of theories can meet this requirement.
J. H. Randall; (1899-1980); Philosophy: An Introduction; 1942/1957; p137
The principles of dynamics appeared to us first as experimental truths, but we have been compelled to use them as definitions. It is by definition that force is equal to the product of the mass and the acceleration; this is a principle which is henceforth beyond the reach of any future experiment. Thus it is by definition that action and reaction are equal and opposite.
Henri Poincaré; (1854-1912); Science and Hypothesis; 1905/1952; p104
If we examine the history of science … we find that in each period a given theory is entertained by science as true. Shortly afterward, the theory is found inadequate, and is replaced by a new theory … These theories … cannot all be true. … A true theory would not be replaceable, for what is true remains true– unless of course what we are explaining no longer remains the same. Thus the theories of science are guesses, which are changed after the scientific fashions of the day, but none are faithful accounts of reality.
J. H. Randall; (1899-1980); Philosophy: An Introduction; p98
Science is not a system of certain, or well-established statements; nor is it a system which steadily advances towards a state of finality. Our science is not knowledge (episteme); it can never claim to have attained truth, or even a substitute for it, such as probability; we do not know, we can only guess.
The old scientific ideal of episteme– of absolutely certain, demonstrable knowledge– has proven to be an idol. The demand for scientific objectivity makes it inevitable that every scientific statement must remain tentative for ever.
Karl Popper; (1902-1994); Logic of Scientific Discovery; p278, 280
When we call theories ‘true’ we do not mean that they are exempt from improvement. We mean that they are accepted on the best available evidence. It is possible to eliminate the word ‘true’ in speaking of scientific theories, and speak only of the ‘best-evidenced’ theories. … The quest for certification can never be satisfactorily completed, because it is a quest for an infallible guarantee.
J. H. Randall; (1899-1980); Philosophy: An Introduction; p100
Our experience with the Newtonian theory, probably the most successful scientific theory ever constructed, may suggest that we look twice at the foundations before building the Kingdom of Heaven on the ever receding shores of the expanding universe, as some have attempted to do. The extrapolators seem to believe that although scientific theories cannot save themselves, they can save others.
Eric Temple Bell; (1883-1960); The Search for Truth; 1935/1946; p195
… scientific philosophy … does not claim to possess an absolute truth, the existence of which it denies for empirical knowledge.
Hans Reichenbach; (1891-1953); The Rise of Scientific Philosophy; 1951; p325
… we can never have perfectly clean-cut knowledge of anything.
It is a general consequence of the approximate character of all measurement that no empirical science can ever make exact statements.
P. W. Bridgman; (1882-1961); The Logic of Modern Physics; 1927/1951; p33, 34
… nowhere has anyone ever seen a body continue moving in a straight line with uniform velocity. Nor has anyone ever seen a body at rest remain at rest. Indeed, we do not even know what the words ‘at rest’ mean.
Billy E. Goetz; (1904-1986); President of MIT 1958; Usefulness of the Impossible; 1956; p190
To the superficial observer scientific truth is unassailable, the logic of science is infallible … Mathematical truths are derived from a few self-evident propositions, by a chain of flawless reasonings; they are imposed not only on us, but on Nature itself. By them the creator is fettered, as it were, and His choice is limited to a relatively small number of solutions. A few experiments, therefore, will be sufficient to enable us to determine what choice He has made. … This, to the minds of most people, and to students who are getting their first ideas of physics, is the origin of certainty in science.
Henri Poincaré; (1854-1912); Science and Hypothesis; 1905/1952; pxxi
The particular law that the scientist announces to the world is not a discovery forced on him by so-called facts; it is rather a choice from among an infinity of laws all of which enjoy the same experimental basis. … The scientist wants mathematical accuracy; and when he cannot discover it, he makes it. … however useful scientific laws are, they cannot be true.
Gordon Clark; (1902-1985); A Christian View of Men & Things; 1952/1981; p209
It is quite safe to say that no significant experiment can be completed without measuring a line. … the length of a line … is most difficult to ascertain.
Gordon Clark; (1902-1985); A Christian View of Men & Things; 1952/1981; p205,206
There is an impossibility of making measurements which is due to the limitation of our technical means … In addition, there is a logical impossibility of measuring … It is logically impossible to determine whether the standard meter in Paris is really a meter … the meter cannot be defined in absolute terms.
… all our measurements will still contain some degree of inexactness which a progressive technique will gradually reduce but never overcome.
Hans Reichenbach; (1891-1953); Philosophy of Space & Time; 1927/1958; p28, 29
The method of the physical sciences is based upon the induction which leads us to expect the recurrence of a phenomena when the circumstances which give rise to it are repeated. If all the circumstances could be simultaneously reproduced, this principle could be fearlessly applied; but this never happens; some of the circumstances will always be missing.
Henri Poincaré; (1854-1912); Science and Hypothesis; 1905/1952; pxxvi
… it is doubtful whether sensations can be trusted to tell us the truth about anything more than the obvious and barren fact that they are experienced.
E. S. Brightman; (1884-1953); An Introduction to Philosophy; 1925/1951; p55
… science is extremely useful, though by its own requirements it must be false.
Gordon Clark; (1902-1985); A Christian View of Men & Things; 1952/1981; p210
It is often said the experiments should be made without preconceived ideas. That is impossible. Not only would it make every experiment fruitless, but even if we wished to do so, it could not be done.
Henri Poincaré; (1854-1912); Science and Hypothesis; 1905/1952; p143
Everything which the bodily sense touches and which is called sensible is constantly changing. … what does not remain stable cannot be perceived, for that is perceived which is grasped by knowledge, but that cannot be grasped which changes without ceasing. Therefore truth in any genuine sense is not something to be expected from the bodily senses.
… in our present state none of our bodily senses has any contact with the incorruptible and immutable, unless, of course, something such be divinely revealed to it.
If, therefore, there are false images [mistaken judgments] of sensible objects, and if they cannot be distinguished by the senses themselves, and if nothing can be perceived except what is distinguished from the false, then there is no criterion for truth resident in the senses.
St. Augustine; (354-430); 83 Different Questions; p40, 41
… Christians who put their trust in science as the key to understanding the material universe should be embarrassed by the fact that science never discovers truth. One of the insuperable problems of science is the fallacy of induction; indeed, induction is an insuperable problem for all forms of empiricism. The problem is simply this: Induction, arguing from the particular to the general, is always a fallacy. No matter how many white swans one observes, one never has sufficient reason to say that all swans are white.
John Robbins; (1948-2008); An Introduction to Gordon Clark; Trinity Review; Jul-Aug 1993; p7
All inductive arguments in the last resort reduce themselves to the following form: “If this is true, that is true: now that is true, therefore this is true.” This argument is, of course, formally fallacious. … If I were to advance such an argument, I should certainly be thought foolish, yet it would not be fundamentally different from the arguments upon which all scientific laws are based.
Bertrand Russell; (1872-1970); The Scientific Outlook; 1931/1962; p74
We do not have an infallible ability to distinguish between correct & incorrect perceptions. Aenesidemus, leader of the third skeptical school, drew up “ten tropes”, a general statement of reasons why perception must not be trusted, as follows:
Things present a diverse appearance:
1- to different species of animals
2- to different men
3- to the different senses of one and the same man
4- to the same sense according to the man’s circumstances and physical condition
5- to the same sense according to the distance & perspective.
6- on account of mixture with one another in various degrees
7- on account of their extent
8- perception depends upon the relation of the perceiver to his object, or of things or notions to one another.
9- their strength varies with habituation
10- the beliefs, laws & customs of men are indefinitely variable.
Aenesidemus; Encyc. Brit.; 1964; v1; p197
It is a commonplace that all our knowledge is in some degree liable to error, and that we are fallible even in our most dogmatic moments.
Bertrand Russell; (1872-1970); Theory of Knowledge; 1913/1992; p167
Empiricists usually believed that the empirical basis consisted of absolutely ‘given’ perceptions or observations, of ‘data’, and that science could build on these ‘data’ as if on rock. In opposition, I pointed out that the apparent ‘data’ of experience were always interpretations in the light of theories, and therefore affected by the hypothetical or conjectural character of all theories. … there are never any un-interpreted data experienced by us …
Karl Popper; (1902-1994);Conjectures & Refutations; 1965; p387
Is the sensation which I call blue really the same as that which my neighbor calls blue? Is it possible that a blue object may arouse in him the same sensation that a red object does in me and vice versa?
P. W. Bridgman; (1882-1961); The Logic of Modern Physics; 1927/1951; p30
… empiricism as a theory of knowledge has proved inadequate … all human knowledge is uncertain, inexact & partial. To this doctrine we have not found any limitation whatever.
Bertrand Russell; (1872-1970); Human Knowledge; 1948/1992; p527
Scientific theories are not only equally unprovable, and equally improbable, they are also equally undisprovable.
The recognition that not only the theoretical but all the propositions in science are fallible, means the total collapse of all forms of dogmatic justificationism as theories of scientific rationality.
Imre Lakatos; (1922-1974); Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge; Imre Lakatos; ed.; 1970; p103
Our senses were given to us
for the preservation of our bodies
and not for the acquisition of truth.
From The Search After Truth,
Nicolas Malebranche, 1674
Neither our senses nor our minds are capable of differentiating between truth and error.
We cannot make universal statements because we cannot have universal experiences.
It is impossible to make immutable statements about objects that are in a constant state of change.
The possibility of hitting upon the right theory is zero, because we can find an infinite number of explanations (laws) for every set of experiences.
Empiricism, the measurement of objects and events with man-made tools and using our fallible senses is never without error.
Induction, the basis of all science, is always a fallacy. Arriving at conclusions by observing a very limited number of experiences can Never lead to truth.
Laws are our attempts to describe how we believe nature behaves. They are always erroneous.
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