mobilization of an army was considered an act of war in 1914.
mobilization of an army was considered what in 1914?
act of war
section::::mobilization in world war i.





























intricate plans for mobilization contributed greatly to the beginning of world war i, since in 1914, under the laws and customs of warfare then observed (not to mention the desire to avoid compromising national security), general mobilization of one nation's military forces was invariably considered an act of war by that country's likely enemies.
mobilization
this activity did not go unnoticed, and soon reports had reached oslo, leading to a midnight session of the norwegian cabinet. at this meeting, the cabinet issued orders for the mobilization of four of the six field brigades of the norwegian army. the members of the cabinet failed to understand that the partial mobilization they had ordered would, according to the regulations in place, be carried out in secret and without public declaration. troops would be issued their mobilization orders by post. the only member of the cabinet with in-depth knowledge of the mobilization system, defence minister birger ljungberg, failed to explain the procedure to his colleagues. he would later be heavily criticized for this oversight, which led to unnecessary delays in the norwegian mobilization. prior to the cabinet meeting, ljungberg had dismissed repeated demands for a total and immediate mobilization, made by the chief of the general staff, rasmus hatledal. hatledal had approached ljungberg on 5, 6 and 8 april, asking the defence minister to request the cabinet to issue orders for mobilization. the issue had been discussed in the evening of 8 april, after the commanding general, kristian laake, had joined the calls for a mobilization. at that time the mobilization had been limited to two field battalions in østfold, further delaying the larger-scale call-up of troops. when laake's call for mobilization was finally accepted at some time between 03:30 to 04:00 on 9 april, the commanding general assumed, like defence minister ljungberg, that the cabinet knew that they were issuing a partial and silent mobilization. the poor communication between the norwegian armed forces and the civilian authorities caused much confusion in the early days of the german invasion.
norwegian campaign