 Starting in 1983, Salmon became interested in theory choice in science, and sought to resolve the enduring conflict between the logical empiricist view, whereby theories undergo a logical process of confirmation and comparison, as against the Kuhnian historical perspective, whereby theory choice and comparison are troubled by incommensurability, the inability of scientists to even effectively communicate and compare theories across differing paradigms.Recognizing that Kuhn's 1962 thesis in "Structure of Scientific Revolutions" was largely misunderstood—that Kuhn had not meant that scientific theory change is irrational but merely relative to the scientific community where the change occurs—Salmon believed that Bayesianism, which quantifies decisionmaking via subjective probability or "degree of belief", could help close the seemingly unbridgeable gap between the logical empiricist view versus the Kuhnian historical view of theory choice and change.According to the empiricist view associated with the 18th-century Scottish philosopher David Hume, we do not actually observe causes and effects, but merely experience "constant conjunction" of sensory events, and impute causality between the observations.