decided to continue work on it rather than sign with 3DO. According to former Sega CEO Tom Kalinske The 3DO Company was engaged in very serious talks for Sega to become involved with the 3DO. However, it was passed on by Sega due to concerns over cost. Panasonic launched the 3DO with its FZ-1 model in 1993, though Goldstar and Sanyo would later manufacture the 3DO as well. Companies who obtained the hardware license but never actually sold 3DO units include Samsung, Toshiba, and AT&T, who went so far as to build prototype AT&T 3DO units and display them at the January 1994 Consumer Electronics Show. Licensing to independent manufacturers made the system extremely expensive. The manufacturers had to make a profit on the hardware itself, whereas most major game console manufacturers, such as Sega and Sony, sold their systems at a loss, with expectations of making up for the loss with software sales. The 3DO was priced at , far above competing game systems and aimed at high-end users and early adopters. Hawkins has argued that 3DO was launched at , and not "higher myths that are often reported". In a later interview, Hawkins clarified that while the suggested retail price was , not all retailers sold the system at that price. Goldstar, Sanyo, and Panasonic's later models were less expensive to manufacture than the FZ-1 and were sold for considerably lower prices. For example, the Goldstar model launched at . In addition, after six months on the market, the price of the FZ-1 had dropped to , leading some to contend that the 3DO's cost was not as big a factor in its market failure as is usually claimed. Hawkins' belief was that the 3DO system could become a dominant standard in a similar way to that achieved by the VHS video cassette format, with several companies being able to promote the standard effectively against individual competitors with their own technologies, such as Sony and Betamax, in the context of VHS. It was also believed that companies would be able to more effectively compete by being able to leverage a common standard, as opposed to having to attract developers to individual formats, with Hawkins noting that this would be "tough for Atari and Sony". Indeed, Hawkins believed that the failure of NEC to establish its TurboGrafx system, and yet being "much bigger than Sony", illustrated the difficulties faced