on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack received testimony on the intelligence failure. It amassed 25,000 pages of documents, 40 volumes, and included nine reports and investigations, eight of which had been previously completed. These reports included criticism of Marshall for delay in sending General Walter Short, the Army commander in Hawaii, important information obtained from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages. The report also criticized Marshall's lack of knowledge of the readiness of the Hawaiian Command during November and December 1941. Marshall also advised President Roosevelt to move part of the United States Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Ocean to assist Neutrality Patrols, and that the defenses at Oahu made a Japanese attack on the island impossible. These recommendations were dismissed by the President, but could have been catastrophic if they had not been. Ten days after the attack, Lt. General Short and Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander of the United States Pacific Fleet at Naval Station Pearl Harbor, were both relieved of their duties. The final report of the Joint Committee did not single out or fault Marshall. While the report was critical of the overall situation, the committee noted that subordinates had failed to pass on important information to their superiors, including to Marshall. A secret review of the Army's role, which resulted in the Clausen Report, was authorized by Secretary Henry Stimson. The report was critical of Short and also of Colonel Rufus S. Bratton of the Military Intelligence Division (G-2), who investigator Henry Clausen concluded arrived at the War Department later on the morning of December 7, 1941, than he initially claimed during testimony, and invented a story about a warning to affected army commanders about the imminent Pearl Harbor Attack being delayed because he had been unable to get in touch with Marshall, an allegation which "nearly destroyed" Marshall. Post war: China In December 1945, President Harry Truman dispatched Marshall to the Republic of China, where he had served in the 1920s. His new mission was to prevent a resumption of the Chinese Civil War by brokering a coalition government between America's Kuomintang allies under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communist Party of Mao Zedong. Marshall had no leverage over the Communists, but threatened to withdraw American aid essential to the Nationalists. Both sides rejected his proposals and he returned to the United States in January 1947. As Secretary of State, Marshall disagreed with