standards were implemented in Japan in 1897, in the Philippines in 1903, and in Mexico in 1905 when the previous yen or peso of 24.26 g silver was redefined to approximately 0.75 g gold or half a U.S. dollar (ratio 32.3). Japan gained the needed gold reserves after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. For Japan, moving to gold was considered vital for gaining access to Western capital markets. "Rules of the Game" In the 1920s John Maynard Keynes retrospectively developed the phrase "rules of the game" to describe how central banks would ideally implement a gold standard during the prewar classical era, assuming international trade flows followed the ideal price–specie flow mechanism. Violations of the "rules" actually observed during the classical gold standard era from 1873 to 1914, however, reveal how much more powerful national central banks actually are in influencing price levels and specie flows, compared to the "self-correcting" flows predicted by the price-specie flow mechanism. Keynes premised the "rules of the game" on best practices of central banks to implement the pre-1914 international gold standard, namely: To substitute gold with fiat currency in circulation, so that gold reserves may be centralized To actually allow a prudently-determined ratio of gold reserves to fiat currency of less than 100%, with the difference made up by other loans and invested assets, such reserve ratio amounts consistent with fractional reserve banking practices To exchange circulating currency for gold or other foreign currencies at a fixed gold price, and to freely permit gold imports and exports Central banks were actually allowed modest margins in exchange rates to reflect gold delivery costs while still adhering to the gold standard. To illustrate this point, France may ideally allow the pound sterling (worth 25.22 francs based on ratios of their gold content) to trade between so-called gold points of 25.02F to 25.42F (plus or minus an assumed 0.20F/£ in gold delivery costs). France prevents sterling from climbing above 25.42F by delivering gold worth 25.22F or £1 (spending 0.20F for delivery), and from falling below 25.02F by the reverse process of ordering £1 in gold worth 25.22F in France (and again, minus 0.20F in costs). Finally, central banks were authorized to suspend the gold standard in times of war until it could be restored again as the contingency subsides. Central banks were also expected to maintain the gold standard on the ideal assumption of international trade operating