defensive battle, in which emphasis was given to fortification, the co-operation of infantry and artillery and the necessity for maintaining communications using every means possible, to overcome the chaos of battle. British infantry had learnt much since the Battle of Loos (25 September – 14 October 1915) and attacked vigorously, which was assumed to be due to the confidence of the infantry in the overwhelming power of their artillery. British tactical leadership was found lacking and men tended to surrender if surrounded. Units were assembled close together and suffered many casualties to German artillery but the British showed skill in rapid consolidation of captured ground and tenacity in defence, small parties with automatic weapons being most difficult to overcome. German infantry remained confident of their superiority but British medium and heavy artillery outnumbered German guns and the quality of British ammunition had improved. German infantry and artillery positions were subjected to methodical bombardment, villages just behind the front line and ground affording natural cover were continuously bombarded and artillery registration and aim were assisted by organised aerial observation, aircraft also frequently being used to bomb villages at night. British frontal attacks by cavalry against infantry and had suffered "heavy losses", reflecting badly on the tactical knowledge of British higher commanders. Ill-prepared German attacks almost always failed and care needed to be taken to understand the difference between hasty counter-attacks () soon after the loss of ground with troops on the spot and organised counter-attacks () ordered by commanders further back, which needed more troops from reserve and deliberate preparation because of the inevitable delays in movement, communication and the preparation of artillery-support. A worked best with fresh troops, advancing behind a creeping barrage, lifting according to a timetable. Attacks into woods needed a different formation than advances by skirmish lines in open country, one line being followed by small columns. Flame-throwers had been ineffective because of the difficulty of carrying such heavy equipment through obstructions and the lack of view and should be reserved for defined objectives which had been studied beforehand. Casualties The Fourth Army suffered the 9th (Scottish) Division, the 3rd Division, the 7th Division and the 21st Division. BIR 16 had on 14 July, of the it suffered on the Somme that month. In July, the British suffered casualties on the Somme, the French (a combined total of and the German 2nd Army suffered of Allied casualties.