external factors of the external environment. "The Great Recession" of the late 2000s is an example of systematic risk. Overall project risks are determined using PESTLE, VUCA, etc. PMI PMBOK(R) Guide defines individual project risk as "an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, has a positive or negative effect on one or more project objectives," whereas overall project risk is defined as "the effect of uncertainty on the project as a whole … more than the sum of individual risks within a project, since it includes all sources of project uncertainty … represents the exposure of stakeholders to the implications of variations in project outcome, both positive and negative." Systemic risk and insurance In February 2010, international insurance economics think tank, The Geneva Association, published a 110-page analysis of the role of insurers in systemic risk. In the report, the differing roles of insurers and banks in the global financial system and their impact on the crisis are examined (See also CEA report, "Why Insurers Differ from Banks"). A key conclusion of the analysis is that the core activities of insurers and reinsurers do not pose systemic risks due to the specific features of the industry: Insurance is funded by up-front premia, giving insurers strong operating cash-flow without the requirement for wholesale funding; Insurance policies are generally long-term, with controlled outflows, enabling insurers to act as stabilisers to the financial system; During the hard test of the financial crisis, insurers maintained relatively steady capacity, business volumes and prices. Applying the most commonly cited definition of systemic risk, that of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), to the core activities of insurers and reinsurers, the report concludes that none are systemically relevant for at least one of the following reasons: Their limited size means that there would not be disruptive effects on financial markets; An insurance insolvency develops slowly and can often be absorbed by, for example, capital raising, or, in a worst case, an orderly wind down; The features of the interrelationships of insurance activities mean that contagion risk would be limited. The report underlines that supervisors and policymakers should focus on activities rather than financial institutions when introducing new regulation and that upcoming insurance regulatory regimes, such as Solvency II in the European Union, already adequately address insurance activities. However, during the financial crisis, a small number of quasi-banking activities conducted by insurers either caused failure or triggered