purpose. We sent them, being ourselves far away, not seeing either our own or the enemy, and therefore not conforming to reality. Instead of punishment, we reward such leaders, because as far as the leaders were far away, the same, but still more, the higher leaders kept even more distant. People ceased to be people, but turned into pawns. We went to the fight in a state of some kind of oblivion and stunnedness, ”wrote the representative of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Infantry General Fyodor Palitzin, in his diary. Failures in the Russian system of command and control of troops and the organization of hostilities occurred at other levels. Thus, serious shortcomings in reconnaissance led to the absence of any analysis of the enemy's plans and actions. With a general superiority in forces, almost every Central Powers's operation in 1915 was "unexpected" for the command from the front to the regimental level. Passion for undercover intelligence in the highest headquarters did not justify itself, and tactical intelligence was still based on little reliable testimony of prisoners, in the absence of which the command up to the army, inclusive, was simply “blind”. The separation of artillery from infantry with subordination to the inspectors of the corps and ammunition supply units (park brigades and divisions) created difficulties in the operational replenishment of ammunition and shells in the combat units. At the same time, huge stockpiles of ammunition were created in the fortresses, which were then delivered to the enemy during the retreat or destroyed due to the impossibility of evacuation. Special units were not created for the construction of fortifications in the rear of the troops. Most often, such work was hastily carried out by militia squads and the mobilized local population, sometimes including women, and then brought to the necessary defensive state by the combat units retreating on them, already exhausted by battles and night marches. The country’s geographic expanses and a large population again became the salvation of the Russia from complete military defeat, however, by the end of the 1915 campaign, it became obvious that without a radical restructuring of the war strategy, methods of managing military potential, victory becomes unattainable, and new defeats can cause another collapse of transport ( as in the case of mass exodus and the hasty "evacuation" of the western provinces), supplies, public administration and, as a result, the aggravation of the struggle for power