global media conglomerates, separating corporations from media had become untenable. Therefore, Burger argued, restrictions on speech such as the Massachusetts statute necessitated a great deal of caution. "In short," Burger wrote, "the First Amendment does not 'belong' to any definable category of persons or entities: it belongs to all who exercise its freedoms." Dissents A dissenting opinion by Justice White was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. In the dissent, White disagreed with the Court's opinion that the statute abridges the speech rights of corporations. "By holding that Massachusetts may not prohibit corporate expenditures or contributions made in connection with referendums involving issues having no material connection with the corporate business," White wrote, "the Court not only invalidates a statute which has been on the books in one form or another for many years, but also casts considerable doubt upon the constitutionality of legislation passed by some 31 States restricting corporate political activity." White wrote that the Court had erred in not recognizing that the "state's regulatory interests ... were themselves derived from the First Amendment." Specifically, White claimed that "the state had a first amendment interest in 'assuring that shareholders are not compelled to support and financially further beliefs with which they disagree.'" The only purpose uniting all shareholders, White argued, is to make a profit. Any issue not related to business interests could diverge from the interests of individual shareholders. White also argued that states have the ability to prevent threats from corporate entities to the political process. "The State need not permit its own creation to consume it," White wrote. White noted that the nation had a history of recognizing the need to limit the influence of corporations in the political process, citing United States v. Auto Workers, in which the Court held that the primary purpose of a federal act was "to avoid the deleterious influences on federal elections resulting from the use of money by those who exercise control over large aggregations of capital." Justice Rehnquist, in a separate dissent, sharply criticized the Court's decision. Rehnquist pointed out that, while the issue of whether corporations had the right to voice their opinions on political issues was new to the Court, the constitutional permissibility of restrictions on such speech had been considered and approved by Congress and over thirty states. He argued that this consensus by so many governmental institutionals should not be ignored in the