the United States and Great Britain agreed to substantially increase the imports to 2.0 billion dollars and the export to 2.01 billion dollars. The overriding requirement of the plan has been to provide the level of industry necessary to make the area self-supporting. Therefore the annual production of billet steel was fixed at 10.7 million tons in 1947 instead of 5.8 million tons in 1946. The reconstruction of Western Europe created economies capable of a quick catch-up. The following influence of the Marshall Plan triggered Postwar Europe’s “supergrowth”. Brown recommended, that the other European nations qualifying for the Marshall-Plan should engage likewise in a diligent search for vital and important sectors of their economy, that were being blocked by shortages that produce vicious cycles that effects not only their economy, but that of all Europe. Emphasis should be given to minor crucial shortages like the conveyor belt shortage in Great Britain and the under-maintained journal boxes in the Ruhr area. References Citations Sources Brown, Lewis H., A Report on Germany. New York: Farrar, Straus and Company, 1947. J. Bradford DeLong; Barry Eichengreen, The Marshall Plan: History’s Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program, University of California at Berkeley, Working Paper No. 91-184, 1991. See also Allied plans for German industry after World War II The President's Economic Mission to Germany and Austria Restatement of Policy on Germany Politics of World War II Aftermath of World War II in Germany Reports of the United States government Economy of West Germany History of diplomacy