continue to show promise. New Brunswick participated in the development of the Pan-Canadian SMR Roadmap (November 2018), and is also collaborating with the provinces of Ontario and Saskatchewan pertaining to the development of deployment of Small Modular Reactor technologies as part of the Interprovincial MOU announced in December 2019. In March 2019, a consortium involving NB Power, the Government of New Brunswick, ARC Nuclear, and Moltex Energy announced plans to develop small modular reactors at the Point Lepreau site. This was furthered when, in December 2019, the governments of New Brunswick, Ontario, and Saskatchewan announced a collaboration deal on the development of small modular reactors. Operations The Point Lepreau Nuclear Generating Station achieved record levels of availability with a 10-year average of 93.11% and generated over 5,000 GWh/year of energy on a sustained basis for its first decade of operations. However, numerous problems started to surface in the mid to late 1990s, due to poor maintenance and low investment. In mid-January 1997, a leak near the reactor core forced a third shutdown in 2 years. The 75-day stoppage was caused by a cracked feeder pipe. The human error cost C$40 million in repairs and C$450,000/day to purchase replacement power from Quebec. Electrical Output The graph represents the annual electricity generation at the site (A and B combined) in TWh. As of the end of 2021, the total lifetime output of the facility was 158.04 TWh. Incidents In 1990, assistant plant operator Daniel George Maston was charged after he took heavy water from the moderator system and added it to a cafeteria drink dispenser. Eight employees drank some of the contaminated water. In 1995, a plywood cover was left in the boiler after completion of a maintenance outage. When the heat transport pumps were restarted, the cover was sucked into the heat transport system where it caused catastrophic damage to one of the pumps. The cause of the incident was lack of control of temporary modifications, poor work management, lack of foreign material exclusion (FME) measures, and human error. There was no public safety significance to the event, since the reactor had been shut down long enough that decay heat power was below the level that required coolant flow. However, the breach of the pressure boundary at the damaged pump created a radiation hazard for workers, and debris in feeders, fuel channels and potentially other Heat Transport and Auxiliaries pipework could