partnerships; between public entities and private contractors that are able to provide renovation services and operate the project management after the repairs have been completed. Economic theory In contract theory, several authors have studied the pros and cons of bundling the building and operating stages of infrastructure projects. In particular, Oliver Hart (2003) has used the incomplete contracting approach in order to investigate whether incentives to make non-contractible investments are smaller or larger when the different stages of the project are combined under one private contractor. Hart (2003) argues that under bundling incentives to make cost-reducing investments are larger than under unbundling. However, sometimes the incentives to make cost-reducing investments may be excessive because they lead to overly large reductions of quality, so it depends on the details of the project whether bundling or unbundling is optimal. Hart's (2003) work has been extended in many directions. For example, Bennett and Iossa (2006) and Martimort and Pouyet (2008) investigate the interaction of bundling and ownership rights, while Hoppe and Schmitz (2013, 2021) explore the implications of bundling for making innovations. See also Adelaide–Darwin railway Central Texas Turnpike System Confederation Bridge Pay on production Private finance initiative Privatization Project finance Shadow toll References Infrastructure investment Public administration Public finance Public–private partnership