of social trust is positively correlated with economic development. Even though the original concept of 'high trust' and 'low trust' societies may not necessarily hold, it has been widely accepted and demonstrated that social trust benefits the economy and that a low level of trust inhibits economic growth. The absence of trust restricts growth in employment, wages and profits, thus reducing the overall welfare of society. Theoretical economical modelling demonstrates that the optimum level of trust that a rational economic agent should exhibit in transactions is equal to the trustworthiness of the other party. Such a level of trust leads to an efficient market. Trusting less leads to the loss of economic opportunities, while trusting more leads to unnecessary vulnerabilities and potential exploitation. Economics is also interested in quantifying trust, usually in monetary terms. The level of correlation between an increase in profit margin or a decrease in transactional costs can be used as indicators of the economic value of trust. Economic 'trust games' are popularly used to empirically quantify trust in relationships under laboratory conditions. There are several games and game-like scenarios related to trust that have been tried, with certain preferences to those that allow the estimation of confidence in monetary terms. Games of trust are designed in a way such that the Nash equilibrium differs from Pareto optimum so that no player alone can maximize his own utility by altering his selfish strategy without cooperation. Cooperating partners can also benefit. The classical version of the game of trust has been described as an abstracted investment game, using the scenario of an investor and a broker. The investor can invest a fraction of his money, and broker can return only part of his gains. If both players follow their economical best interest, the investor should never invest and the broker will never be able to repay anything. Thus the flow of money flow, its volume and character is attributable entirely to the existence of trust. The game can be played as a once-off, or repeatedly, with the same or different sets of players to distinguish between a general propensity to trust and trust within particular relationships. Several other variants of this game exist. Reversing rules lead to the game of distrust, pre-declarations can be used to establish intentions of players, while alterations to the distribution of gains can be used to manipulate perception of both players. The game