yet a state. At the end of the chapter Nozick points out some of the problems of defining what a state is, but he says: The protective agencies so far do not make any such announcement. Furthermore, it does not offer the same degree of protection to all its clients (who may purchase different degrees of coverage) and the individuals who do not purchase the service (the "independents") do not get any protection at all, (spillover effects aside). This goes against our experience with states, where even tourists typically receive protection. Therefore, the dominant protective agency lacks a monopoly on the use of force and fails to protect all people inside its territory. Moral constraints and the state Nozick arrives at the night-watchman state of classical liberalism theory by showing that there are non-redistributive reasons for the apparently redistributive procedure of making its clients pay for the protection of others. He defines what he calls an ultraminimal state, which would not have this seemingly redistributive feature but would be the only one allowed to enforce rights. Proponents of this ultraminimal state do not defend it on the grounds of trying to minimize the total of (weighted) violations of rights (what he calls utilitarianism of rights.) That idea would mean, for example, that someone could punish another person they know to be innocent in order to calm down a mob that would otherwise violate even more rights. This is not the philosophy behind the ultraminimal state. Instead, its proponents hold its members' rights are a side-constraint on what can be done to them. This side-constraint view reflects the underlying Kantian principle that individuals are ends and not merely means, so the rights of one individual cannot be violated to avoid violations of the rights of other people. Which principle should we choose, then? Nozick will not try to prove which one is better. Instead, he gives some reasons to prefer the Kantian view and later points to problems with classic utilitarianism. The first reason he gives in favor of the Kantian principle is that the analogy between the individual case (in which we choose to sacrifice now for a greater benefit later) and the social case (in which we sacrifice the interests of one individual for the greater social good) is incorrect: A second reason focuses on the non-aggression principle. Are we prepared to dismiss this principle? That is, can we