In general, existing hazard controls, risk assessment methodologies, and regulations developed for traditional genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are considered to be sufficient for synthetic organisms. "Extrinsic" biocontainment methods in a laboratory context include physical containment through biosafety cabinets and gloveboxes, as well as personal protective equipment. In an agricultural context they include isolation distances and pollen barriers, similar to methods for biocontainment of GMOs. Synthetic organisms may offer increased hazard control because they can be engineered with "intrinsic" biocontainment methods that limit their growth in an uncontained environment, or prevent horizontal gene transfer to natural organisms. Examples of intrinsic biocontainment include auxotrophy, biological kill switches, inability of the organism to replicate or to pass modified or synthetic genes to offspring, and the use of xenobiological organisms using alternative biochemistry, for example using artificial xeno nucleic acids (XNA) instead of DNA. Regarding auxotrophy, bacteria and yeast can be engineered to be unable to produce histidine, an important amino acid for all life. Such organisms can thus only be grown on histidine-rich media in laboratory conditions, nullifying fears that they could spread into undesirable areas. Biosecurity and bioterrorism Some ethical issues relate to biosecurity, where biosynthetic technologies could be deliberately used to cause harm to society and/or the environment. Since synthetic biology raises ethical issues and biosecurity issues, humanity must consider and plan on how to deal with potentially harmful creations, and what kinds of ethical measures could possibly be employed to deter nefarious biosynthetic technologies. With the exception of regulating synthetic biology and biotechnology companies, however, the issues are not seen as new because they were raised during the earlier recombinant DNA and genetically modified organism (GMO) debates and extensive regulations of genetic engineering and pathogen research are already in place in many jurisdictions. Additionally, the development of synthetic biology tools has made it easier for individuals with less education, training, and access to equipment to modify and use pathogenic organisms as bioweapons. This increases the threat of bioterrorism, especially as terrorist groups become aware of the significant social, economic, and political disruption caused by pandemics like COVID-19. As new techniques are developed in the field of synthetic biology, the risk of bioterrorism is likely to continue to grow. As Juan Zarate, who served as Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism from 2005 to 2009, noted that ""the severity and extreme disruption of a novel coronavirus will likely spur the