consistently assert that p-zombies are metaphysically impossible but that inverted qualia (such as inverted spectra) or absent qualia (partial zombiehood) are metaphysically possible. Premises regarding inverted qualia or partial zombiehood can substitute premises regarding p-zombies to produce variations of the zombie argument. The metaphysical possibility of a physically indistinguishable world with either inverted qualia or partial zombiehood would imply that physical truths do not metaphysically necessitate phenomenal truths. To formulate the general form of the zombies argument, take the sentence 'P' to be true if and only if the conjunct of all microphysical truths of our world obtain, take the sentence 'Q' to be true if some phenomenal truth, that obtains in the actual world, obtains. The general argument goes as follows. It is conceivable that P is true and Q is not true. If it is conceivable that P is true and Q is not true then it is metaphysically possible that P is true and Q not true. If it is metaphysically possible that P is true and Q is not true then physicalism is false. Therefore, physicalism is false. Q can be false in a possible world if any of the following obtains: (1) there exists at least one invert relative to the actual world (2) there is at least one absent quale relative to the actual world (3) all actually conscious beings are p-zombies (all actual qualia are absent qualia). Another way to construe the zombie hypothesis is epistemically – as a problem of causal explanation, rather than as a problem of logical or metaphysical possibility. The "explanatory gap" – also called the "hard problem of consciousness" – is the claim that (to date) no one has provided a convincing causal explanation of how and why we are conscious. It is a manifestation of the very same gap that (to date) no one has provided a convincing causal explanation of how and why we are not zombies. The philosophical zombie argument can also be seen through the counterfeit bill example brought forth by Amy Kind. Amy Kind’s example centers around the idea that you have to imagine a counterfeit 20 dollar bill was made to be exactly like an authentic 20 dollar bill. This is logically possible. And yet the counterfeit bill would not really have the same value. Like the critique against Descartes conceivability argument, are people really logically conceiving of zombies when they say