Lastly, playing the 2005 UEFA Cup Final at their home ground, on 18 May, Sporting lost 1–3 against Russian side CSKA Moscow, after being 1–0 up at halftime. Domestically, Sporting had back-to-back wins in the Portuguese Cup in 2007 and 2008 (led by coach Paulo Bento). The club almost reached another European final in 2012, but were dropped out of the competition by Athletic Bilbao, in the semi-finals of the 2011–12 Europa League. Sporting also reached, for the first time, the knockout phase of UEFA Champions League, in the 2008–09 season, but were roundly defeated by FC Bayern Munich, with an aggregate loss of 12–1. This is widely regarded as one of the lowest points in the history of the club. Finances and 2013 election After years of financial mismanagement, Sporting had amassed debts exceeding €276 million by 2011. The results on the pitch were also negative, with Sporting finishing seventh in the 2012–13 Primeira Liga, their lowest ever finish. Managerial changes occurred within months or weeks apart: from November 2009 to May 2013, nine managers were contracted, with none of them lasting an entire season. In 2013, after pressure from club members, president Godinho Lopes resigned, and shortly afterwards, Bruno de Carvalho was elected president in a snap election. Carvalho's intentions were to renegotiate the club's debt payment schedule with the banks involved – who by now have pardoned Sporting in millions of euros – and to return success to the football team, while threatening to take Godinho Lopes to court. Carvalho's election brought Angolan investors to the club, most notably Álvaro Sobrinho, through Holdimo, which holds 20 million shares of Sporting's SAD. On 5 June 2015, it was released an audit that analyzed the management of Sporting in the past 20 years: it concluded that in 1994 the club had €55 million worth of real estate assets and an almost nonexistent debt; by 2013, real estate assets were almost nonexistent, and the club had amassed a €331 million debt. Their new stadium (completed in 2003) cost 74% more than what was expected when its construction started (€184 million against the planned €106 million), while their training facility cost 24% more, and the costs of Alvalade XXI neighbourhood, a real estate complex located around the stadium, overshooted in 60%; such complex was almost entirely sold in the following years, many estates of which were sold below market prices. From