of the effort in an effort to revitalise the campaign, but due to the demands of the Eastern Front, Greim departed in December 1941. In the 46 months following July 1940, German aircraft sank 1,228, 104 tons of merchant shipping and damaged 1,953, 862 tons. Another 60, 866 tons were sunk or damaged by mines in 1942 and 1943. The failure to properly cooperate with the navy against shipping was a grave strategic error which prevented the achievement of greater results. Göring's intransigence was large factor in reducing the air effort. In May 1942, Fliegerführer Atlantik had only 40 aircraft and IX. Fliegerkorps, under Sperrle's command at Soissons, 90. The U-boat arm continued to press for greater air protection in the Bay of Biscay. In 1942, anti-shipping operations near the British coast proved too expensive, and the demands of the Mediterranean Theatre and Eastern Front diverted some of the precious Focke-Wulf Fw 200s. These aircraft would not return for Atlantic operations until the summer, 1943. For a brief period in March 1943—before the German defeat in Black May—Sperrle intended to increase his command to 22 groups (equivalent to seven Geschwader, or wings) for Atlantic operations. Ulrich Kessler, commanding Fliegerführer Atlantik, estimated that with Sperrle's proposed bomber forces, he could sink 500,000 tons of shipping per month. Kessler did not receive adequate support, despite the optimisim of their meeting. On 5 June, Sperrle informed the naval command that the rescue of sunk U-boat crews was to take precedence over aerial reconnaissance of convoys. Making matters worse, the Luftwaffe did nothing effective to counter RAF Coastal Command's Bay of Biscay offensive against U-boat transit routes. From the Allied perspective, the Atlantic campaign became nothing more than a "skirmish" by the autumn, 1943. The situation reached a climax in 1944. Kessler joined Karl Dönitz in outlining the hopeless military situation facing his Atlantic command. Göring was sensitive to criticism of the Luftwaffe in front of Hitler, and hastily removed him from command on 7 February 1944. The command was disbanded officially three weeks later. The remnants were subsumed into X. Fliegerkorps. From 19 February to April 1944, there was a virtual absence of Luftwaffe reconnaissance over the Atlantic. Atlantic operations continued until 13 August 1944, when the headquarters of II. Fliegerkorps evacuated their Atlantic base at Mont-de-Marsan, despite contrary order's from Sperrle's staff once the German Western Front began to collapse. Circus offensives,