judge who was not a male, by way of an edict, and which others say was because of the levity and temerity of the other sex. Nor could they admit the testimony of women in a court of Jewish law where the death-penalty hinged over the accused. The harshness of the death penalty indicated the seriousness of the crime. Jewish philosophers argue that the whole point of corporal punishment was to serve as a reminder to the community of the severe nature of certain acts. This is why, in Jewish law, the death penalty is more of a principle than a practice. The numerous references to a death penalty in the Torah underscore the severity of the sin, rather than the expectation of death. This is bolstered by the standards of proof required for application of the death penalty, which were extremely stringent. The Mishnah outlines the views of several prominent first-century CE rabbis on the subject: "A Sanhedrin that puts a man to death once in seven years is called a murderous one. Rabbi Eliezer ben Azariah said, 'Or even once in 70 years.' Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiba said, 'If we had been in the Sanhedrin, no death sentence would ever have been passed'; Rabban Simeon ben Gamaliel said, 'If so, they would have multiplied murderers in Israel.'" The Talmud notes that "forty years before the destruction of the [Second] Temple, capital punishment ceased in Israel." This date is traditionally put at 28 CE, a time that corresponds with the 18th year of Tiberius' reign. At this time, the Sanhedrin required the approbation of the Roman procurator of Judea before they could punish any malefactor by death. Other sources, such as Josephus, disagree. The issue is highly debated because of the relevancy to the New Testament trial of Jesus. Ancient rabbis did not like the idea of capital punishment, and interpreted the texts in a way that made the death penalty virtually non-existent. Legal proceedings involving capital punishment were to be handled with extreme caution. In all cases of capital punishment in Jewish law, the judges are required to open their deliberations by pointing out the good qualities of the litigant and to bring up arguments why he should be acquitted. Only later did they hear the incriminating evidence. It was almost impossible to inflict the death penalty because the standards of proof were so high. As a