335 single-engine aircraft to all causes—18.1 percent of the available strength reported on 1 July. There was also a noticeable decline in the quality of pilot training. On the German side, there was a call to unify German fighter forces and hold them back from the coast and keep them out of Allied fighter escort range. Regardless of the logic, Sperrle opposed the idea to preserve his command. Sperrle was sensitive to a centralised command for fighter forces and resisted. On 14 September 1943, the Luftflotte 3 area of operations covered most of France, with the exception of some regions in Alsace-Lorraine; Luxembourg, western and southern Belgium were his responsibility. Sperrle's headquarters remained in Paris. The largest organisation attached to Sperrle's command was 3. Jagd Division (3rd Fighter Division) based at Metz, under the control of Werner Junck. Sperrle had retained the Luftgaue in southern Germany and his air fleet was given control of the 5. Jagd Division. On 15 September 1943 to improve Sperrle's organisation the II. Jagdkorps was formed with the 5th and 4. Jagd Division. The improvement in command and control made little difference in the battle with the USAAF for neither division received the reinforcements it needed. From November 1942 – August 1943, the OKL missed a last chance to build a reserve to contest air superiority in the coming battles. The unwillingness of German air leaders to trade space for time forced the Luftwaffe into a battle of attrition that it could not win. At the end of 1943, the German air defences won temporary successes against the USAAF Eighth Air Force—the Schweinfurt–Regensburg mission and Second Raid on Schweinfurt were defensive victories won at an exorbitant cost and with Sperrle's peripheral involvement. In February 1944, Big Week targeted German and French–based targets. The German fighter force was bled white over the following two months. Before June 1944, Luftflotte 3 remained weak and contained few ground-attack aircraft; nearly all were based on the Eastern Front. Sperrle's fighter pilots were required to attack the landing forces. Reinforcements came from Luftflotte Reich, but none of the pilots had been trained for ground-attack operations. A major effect of the combined offensive on Sperrle's air fleet was the diversion and reinforcement of Luftflotte Reich at the expense of Luftflotte 3. By June 1944, the number of fighter aircraft available in the west numbered 170. Sperrle's air fleet had, at most,