were only welded on the outside. On June 30, 1995, the Seoul District Prosecutors' Office, in collaboration with the Korean Society of Civil Engineers (), would release the conclusions of their investigation in a white paper. The white paper concluded that the primary cause of the collapse was the poor welding by Dong Ah Construction and manufacturing defects in the pins connecting the vertical trusses of the bridge. Radiographic testing carried out following the collapse found that 110 out of the 111 connections in the bridge were filled with defects and that welds often only penetrated 2 to 8mm when the beams were 18mm thick. At the time, due to the lack of domestic technical skills in steel plate welding, the Dong Ah Corporation hired a Zainichi Korean to manage the Bupyeo Steel factory (). However, when his insistence on inspecting the welds led to delays, he would be fired. The white paper would further conclude that the Seoul Metropolitan Government and the Dongbu Corporation had failed to maintain the bridge, and even visual inspections and basic repairs had not been carried out. Despite being designed for loads no heavier than 36.3 tons, the bridge regularly carried loads greater than 47.3 tons, resulting in the creation of fatigue cracks in the structure of the bridge. At the time, only four bridges in Seoul were built to withstand loads greater than 42 tons. In addition, frequent use of inexperienced subcontractors to push down costs, the lack of any system supervising whether construction was completed in accordance with plans, management of the construction by people with little technical experience, and rampant corruption were all listed as exacerbating factors in the collapse. The bridge was poorly maintained due to limited fiscal resources and connecting pins used in the bridge were heavily rusted. While the white paper found no flaws in the proposed design of the bridge, as a result of poor construction and maintenance, the investigation concluded that "the risk of collapse was 100% and the collapse of the Seongsu Bridge was inevitable." The original white paper was criticized for publishing the names, genders, resident registration numbers, addresses, and occupations of the victims, omitting only the personal information of the minors and the eleven police officers. In addition, the exact compensation received by each of the deceased victims' families was released. Legal proceedings Immediately following the collapse, prosecutors launched a criminal investigation into