Province, was later declared the "national energy capital" due to its having at the time around half of Argentina's reserves of oil and natural gas. This discovery allowed YPF output to rise by 50% between 1965 and 1968 to 95 million barrels, its share of the nation's oil output growing from two-thirds to three-fourths. New oil field rental contracts were signed following a 1967 policy change enacted by President Juan Carlos Onganía which had the goal of achieving self-sufficiency in oil by 1975. Regaining its monopoly on oil imports in 1971 (which still averaged around 15 million barrels), YPF retained a majority of production (75%), as well as refining and distribution (60%), of petroleum in Argentina. The firm operated 7 refineries and 3,000 service stations by 1977, while production reached 118 million barrels. Decline and privatization Perón's return to Argentina and to the presidency in 1973 was followed by the addition of nearly 20,000 employees (YPF employed 53,000 by 1976). It also coincided with the 1973 oil shock, however, and the US$470 million in added oil import costs combined with larger payrolls to erase profits in 1974, while production declined slightly. The dictatorship installed in a March 1976 coup initially presided over a revitalization and streamlining of YPF. Output increased by 20% and its finances initially improved following a wave of layoffs that returned employment levels to around 35,000 by 1979. The military government was openly hostile to YPF's paramount position in the oil industry, however. The company lost money every year after 1975 and by 1981 was US$4.1 billion in debt. YPF losses resulted, at least in large part, from policy decisions beyond its control. Government policy after 1976 kept oil prices well below inflation, with the consequence that costs increased faster than income. YPF also bore an extremely heavy tax burden, as 68.4% of its revenues were paid as tax to the national and provincial governments, as well as a long list of state agencies that included the National Energy Fund, the National Highway Council, and the Provincial Road Fund. Another serious drain resulted from the failure of other state enterprises such as Argentine Railways and the national airline to pay YPF for their fuel in full and on time. These intergovernmental accounts represented 20% of YPF's sales and were as much as ten years in arrears. The tax policy of the military government followed the same path