Florida, Mobile, and Pensacola in 1812 (2007), states, "[i]t is now reasonably clear that the actions of Mathews and McKee in Florida and on the Gulf Coast between 1810 and 1812 departed far more from the policies of the [Madison] administration than they fairly reflected them," and additionally deems the Patriot War, "an embarrassing and shameful moment in the history of early American foreign policy." However, James G. Cusick, in The Other War of 1812 (2007), states, "[i]n truth, the administration's displeasure over an attack on East Florida rested on its timing and in the unfortunate publicity it received, not on the results." G. Melvin Herndon draws a similar conclusion. In George Mathews, Frontier Patriot (1969), he states, "[i]t is generally agreed that Mathews was the victim of a vacillating administration whose dictates he had served faithfully according to his own lights. He succeeded too well; and, under pressure from several sources, President Madison and Secretary Monroe deemed it necessary to sacrifice Mathews to quell the criticism of their Florida policy. Similarly, Frank Owsley, in Filibusters and Expansionists: Jeffersonian Manifest Destiny, 1800-1821 states, "Mathews probably interpreted Madison's wishes accurately, and very likely had oral instructions from the government assuring him that his understanding of the orders was absolutely correct." Paul Kruse, in A Secret Agent in East Florida: General George Mathews and the Patriot War (1952) observes that whatever Mathews' instructions, a letter from Mathews to Monroe, "written more than seven months before the invasion was actually attempted, fully disclosed General Mathews' revolutionary designs upon East Florida. Not to have checked the plan on such a notice made the government a party to them." Stephen F. Knott, in Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations and the American Presidency (1996) states: "I believe Mathews' admission that he could not achieve the seizure of East Florida without additional overt American military support pushed the administration over the edge. Months of silent acquiescence by the Madison White House came to an end." Physical appearance Rembert Patrick describes his appearance during an 1811 meeting with James Madison as thus: In one hand he held his old three-cornered cocked hat; he had on worn knee breeches, high-topped boots, and a shirt with little ruffles at the bosom and wrists. A sword, the symbol of his military valor, dangled at his side. He was short, thick-set, with stout muscular legs; he stood straight with his head thrown