that politicians buy the votes of other politicians (or groups of special interest) by promising to vote for their issues. In the authors' opinion such log-rolling is to be expected, but in the traditional political science theory, it is anomalous. Thus their model explains certain things that the previous models of politics could not. Employing the theoretical concepts of game theory and Pareto optimality, Buchanan and Tullock show that symmetry in benefits sharing may be at most a necessary, but never a sufficient condition for the attainment of a Pareto optimal position. The introduction of side payments is the crucial element, which would lead to optimality. In a sense the introduction of side payments creates marketable property rights of the individual political vote (Chapter 12). Table of contents Part I. The Conceptual Framework 1. Introduction 2. The Individualistic Postulate (includes topics such as methodological individualism) 3. Politics and the Economic Nexus 4. Individual Rationality in Social Choice (includes topics such as Rational choice theory and Social choice) Part II. The Realm of Social Choice 5. The Organization of Human Activity 6. A Generalized Economic Theory of Constitutions (includes topics such as Constitutional economics) 7. The Rule of Unanimity (includes topics such as Unanimity) 8. The Costs of Decision-Making Part III. Analyses of Decision-Making Rules 9. The Structure of the Models 10. Simple Majority Voting (includes topics such as Simple Majority Voting) 11. Simple Majority Voting and the Theory of Games (includes topics such as game theory) 12. Majority Rule, Game Theory, and Pareto Optimality (includes topics such as majority rule and Pareto optimality) 13. Pareto Optimality, External Costs, and Income Redistribution (includes topics such as Pareto optimality and income redistribution) 14. The Range and Extent of Collective action (includes topics such as Collective action) 15. Qualified Majority Voting Rules, Representation, and the Interdependence of Constitutional Variables (includes topics such as Qualified Majority Voting and Political representation) 16. The Bicameral Legislature (Bicameralism) 17. The Orthodox Model of Majority Rule (includes topics such as Majority rule) Part IV. The Economics and the Ethics of Democracy 18. Democracy, Ethics, and Economic Efficiency (includes topics such as Democracy, Ethics, and Economic efficiency) 19. Pressure groups, Special interests, and the Constitution (includes topics such as Advocacy group, Lobby group, and the Constitution) 20. The Politics of the Good Society Appendix 1 Marginal Notes on Reading Political Philosophy (Political philosophy) Appendix 2 Theoretical Forerunners References Further