the war or supported the war effort. After the Second World War, the low academic standard of military education, especially in historical analysis, led to a view that professionally trained historians should write official histories, applying their academic training to explain why as well as describe what. Since many of the academics had participated in the war, they could be expected to have experience of military service and knowledge of the war to inform their writing. A contemporary view is that official history should incorporate the three points of view, containing the detailed description needed for works of military instruction but also to be suitable for a general readership and to show how participants tried to solve problems, drawing lessons from their successes and failures. None of the points of view to be served by the production of official history is immune to error, because work by a military historian might be fraudulent for personal or political reasons, distorting the record. Populist history can dilute the story to the point of worthlessness and civilian academics can be prone to select facts and interpretations according to ideals, ideology and preconceived ideas. Military histories written as textbooks might be thought to have a basis in truth, necessary to teach useful lessons to students. The British Report of the Committee on the Lessons of the Great War (Kirk Report, 1931) drew on the published volumes of the British official history and the conclusions were incorporated into a new edition of Field Service Regulations. That operations might be conducted in Iraq and Iran, led to official history volumes being produced against the objections of the Foreign Office. Military histories concentrated on the doings of national contingents, with only rare references to those of allied and opposing armies, since they had their own histories. Comparative analysis can be absent and national bias from ulterior motives, like mythologising and apologetics can also be found. The Australian Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918 edited by Charles Bean contains exaggerations of the significance of the Australian contribution, the prowess of Australian soldiers and disparagement of soldiers from Britain and its allies. Australian failures and casualties are sometimes blamed on British higher commanders, when high-ranking Australian officers could justly be criticised. The post-war Royal Air Force (RAF) was at risk of abolition and to justify its existence needed a function that could not be replicated by