was similar to the WW, with the notable exception of having an inside-forward (as opposed to centre-forward) deployed as a midfield schemer alongside the two wing-halves. This formation was commonplace during the 1950s and early 1960s. One of the best exponents of the system was the Tottenham Hotspur's double-winning side of 1961, which deployed a midfield of Danny Blanchflower, John White and Dave Mackay. Porto won the 2005–06 Primeira Liga using this unusual formation under manager Co Adriaanse. 4–2–4 The 4–2–4 formation attempts to combine a strong attack with a strong defence, and was conceived as a reaction to the WM's stiffness. It could also be considered a further development of the WW. The 4–2–4 was the first formation to be described using numbers. While the initial developments leading to the 4–2–4 were devised by Márton Bukovi, the credit for creating the 4–2–4 lies with two people: Flávio Costa, the Brazilian national coach in the early 1950s, as well as another Hungarian, Béla Guttman. These tactics seemed to be developed independently, with the Brazilians discussing these ideas while the Hungarians seemed to be putting them into motion. The fully developed 4–2–4 was only "perfected" in Brazil, however, in the late 1950s. Costa published his ideas, the "diagonal system", in the Brazilian newspaper O Cruzeiro, using schematics and, for the first time, the formation description by numbers. The "diagonal system" was another precursor of the 4–2–4 and was created to spur improvisation in players. Guttmann himself moved to Brazil later in the 1950s to help develop these tactical ideas using the experience of Hungarian coaches. The 4–2–4 formation made use of the players' increasing levels of skill and fitness, aiming to effectively use six defenders and six forwards, with the midfielders performing both tasks. The fourth defender increased the number of defensive players but mostly allowed them to be closer together, thus enabling effective cooperation among them, the point being that a stronger defence would allow an even stronger attack. The relatively empty midfield relied on defenders that should now be able not only to steal the ball, but also hold it, pass it or even run with it and start an attack. So this formation required that all players, including defenders, are somehow skilful and with initiative, making it a perfect fit for the Brazilian players' minds. The 4–2–4 needed a high level of tactical awareness, as having only two