The 1995 Ais Gill rail accident occurred near Aisgill, Cumbria, UK, at about 18:55 hrs on 31 January 1995 when a class 156 Super-Sprinter was derailed by a landslide on the Settle-Carlisle Railway line and was subsequently run into by a similar train travelling in the opposite direction. The Guard of the first train was fatally injured in the collision. Events A Class 156 Super-Sprinter formed the 1626 Carlisle to Leeds via Settle service (headcode 2H88). It could only proceed as far as Ribblehead railway station, about 12 miles north of Settle, as the lines from Ribblehead to Settle were blocked by flooding; so it had to return to Carlisle. The driver changed cabs as the train was now heading northbound instead of southbound, and proceeded back over the Ribblehead Viaduct, and on to Aisgill Summit, the highest point on the line at above sea level. It was dark and raining heavily. Near Aisgill Summit itself the train hit a landslide. It derailed across both tracks, and the cabin lights went off. The injured driver managed to radio Crewe Control Room. The conductor escorted passengers into the rear unit, which was across the northbound track. He then returned to see the driver who was still in the cab. Either the conductor or the driver (it is not known which) changed the lights from white to red to warn oncoming trains of the obstruction but no other action was taken. Meanwhile, another Super-Sprinter train forming the 1745 Carlisle to Leeds service (headcode 2H92) had set off from Kirkby Stephen railway station around five miles to the north. About a quarter of a mile before the derailed train, the driver saw its red lights and made an emergency brake application, but there was no chance of stopping before impacting the derailment. The collision killed the conductor of the derailed train, and seriously hurt several passengers: 30 people on the trains suffered some kind of injury. The signalman at Settle Junction signal box was informed of the accident by the conductor of the 2H92 service and the emergency services were then alerted. Inquiry The official inquiry concluded that the conductor of 2H88 failed in his paramount duty to protect his train in the event of an incident by laying down detonators and displaying a red flag one mile from the obstruction. The time between the initial derailment and the subsequent collision was about