by violent clashes and a security crisis, instigated by anti-independence militia. Australia then led a United Nations backed International Force for East Timor to end the violence and order was restored. While the intervention was ultimately successful, Australian-Indonesian relations would take several years to recover. US involvement For US President Gerald Ford and his administration, East Timor was a place of little significance, overshadowed by US–Indonesian relations. The fall of Saigon in mid-1975 had been a devastating setback for the United States, leaving Indonesia as the most important ally in the region. Ford consequently reasoned that the US national interest had to be on the side of Indonesia. As Ford later stated: "in the scope of things, Indonesia wasn't too much on my radar", and "We needed allies after Vietnam". As early as December 1974—a year before the invasion—the Indonesian defense attaché in Washington sounded out US views about an Indonesian takeover of East Timor. The Americans were tight-lipped, and in March 1975 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger approved a "policy of silence" vis-à-vis Indonesia, a policy that had been recommended by the Ambassador to Indonesia, David Newsom. The administration worried about the potential impact on US–Indonesian relations in the event that a forced incorporation of East Timor was met with a major Congressional reaction. On 8 October 1975, Assistant Secretary of State Philip Habib told meeting participants that "It looks like the Indonesians have begun the attack on Timor." Kissinger's response to Habib was, "I'm assuming you're really going to keep your mouth shut on this subject." On the day before the invasion, Ford and Kissinger met with Indonesian president Suharto. Documents released by the National Security Archive in 2001 revealed that they gave a green light for the invasion. In response to Suharto saying, "We want your understanding if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action [in East Timor]," Ford replied, "We will understand and will not press you on the issue. We understand the problem you have and the intentions you have." Kissinger agreed, although he had fears that the use of US-made arms in the invasion would be exposed to public scrutiny, and Kissinger urged Suharto to wait until Ford had returned from his far eastern trip, because "we would be able to influence the reaction in America if whatever happens happens after we return. This way there would be less chance of