a threatening situation. Spousal rape In many common law jurisdictions, a couple who married were deemed to have given "implied consent" to have sex with each other, a doctrine which barred prosecution of a spouse for rape. This doctrine is now considered obsolete in Western countries. In the United States, however, some state legislatures offer leniency to perpetrators of spousal rape. These laws typically require the use of physical violence from the perpetrator in order to be considered a felony. Reasons given relate to evidence and the potential for malicious prosecution. In the 1984 Virginia Supreme Court case Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, it states that "[A] wife can unilaterally revoke her implied consent to marital sex where ... *292 she has made manifest her intent to terminate the marital relationship by living separate and apart from her husband; refraining from voluntary sexual intercourse with her husband; and, in light of all the circumstances, conducting herself in a manner that establishes a de facto end to the marriage." This allows the spouse to commit what would be considered rape outside of marriage, inside the confines of the marriage as long as the de facto end of the marriage has not occurred. The Virginia Supreme Court upheld the ruling in 1984 Kizer v. Commonwealth. Idaho State legislature states, "No person shall be convicted of rape for any act or acts with that person's spouse..." unless the perpetrator used physical violence. Similar to Idaho, South Carolina State legislature only considers spousal sexual battery as a felony if "accomplished through use of aggravated force." Oklahoma State Law, being one of the more extreme examples, excludes spousal rape from their definition of rape by claiming, "Rape is an act of sexual intercourse involving vaginal or anal penetration accomplished with a male or female who is not the spouse of the perpetrator..." Commonwealth v. Chretien in Massachusetts in 1981 stated that, "There was no unfairness in subjecting a defendant to criminal prosecution for rape of his wife under G. L. c. 265, Section 22, as amended by St. 1974, c. 474, Section 1, which this court construes to eliminate the common law spousal exclusion, where the rape occurred after the wife had obtained a judgment of divorce nisi and was therefore unlawful even under the common law." They concluded that the husband could be convicted of rape only because the wife had already ordered divorce papers. Some