Faretta required the trial judge to inform Edwards about the dangers and disadvantages of representing himself, and Scalia believed that Edwards had taken that warning to heart. For Scalia, ultimately the right of self-representation rests on the right to present one's own case to the jury, however foolhardy an endeavor that might be. Scalia also rejected the "dignity" premise that supported the Court's decision. "While there is little doubt that preserving individual dignity (to which the Court refers) is paramount," he wrote, "there is equally little doubt that the loss of dignity the right [of self-representation] is designed to prevent is not the defendant's making a fool of himself by presenting an amateurish or even incoherent defense. Rather, the dignity at issue is the supreme human dignity of being master of one's fate rather than a ward of the State—the dignity of individual choice." Scalia necessarily overlooks the possibility that a mental illness could impair a person's ability to rationally make a dignified individual choice whether or not to have representation and as to the proper defense while at the same time not impair his ability to understand the nature of the proceedings of which he is at the center and rationally assist his representation, as required under Dusky. Godinez had found that the competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving one's right to counsel was the same as the standard for standing trial; therefore in Scalia's view if Edwards had the right to waive his defense completely he surely had the lesser right to mount a (presumably inferior) pro se defense. Finally, consistent with his originalist theory, Scalia sought to quell doubts regarding the authenticity of the right of self-representation. "The right is not explicitly set forth in the text of the Sixth Amendment, and some Members of this Court [including Justice Breyer] have expressed skepticism about Faretta'''s holding." But, Scalia pointed out, the Sixth Amendment gave the defendant personally, and not his lawyer, the right to call witnesses on his behalf, the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses against him, and to have counsel assist him (assuming he so wishes). If the defendant is bound by counsel's decisions not to call certain witnesses or not to cross-examine others, he must have the right to represent himself in order to give substance to those other rights the Sixth Amendment protects. "Otherwise, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed