competence, and trial preparations began again. In June 2005, as trial began, Edwards asked to represent himself and asked for a continuance in the trial. The judge denied the request for a continuance, and Edwards therefore proceeded to trial with counsel. He was convicted of criminal recklessness and theft, but the jury could not reach a verdict as to the attempted murder and battery charges. Before the second trial on the attempted murder and battery charges, Edwards again asked to represent himself. The judge denied that request, pointing to the lengthy record of Edwards's mental illness. Edwards proceeded to trial with appointed counsel, and was convicted of the attempted murder and battery charges. Appeals Edwards appealed to the Indiana Court of Appeals, arguing that his right to represent himself at trial was violated. The court agreed with Edwards and ordered a new trial. The State then appealed to the Indiana Supreme Court, which also agreed with Edwards. It reasoned that Faretta and Moran required the state to allow Edwards to represent himself at trial. The State of Indiana asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review the decision, and it agreed to do so. Opinion of the Court As Justice Breyer noted in his majority opinion for the Court, the Court's competency and self-representation cases "frame the question presented, but they do not answer it." A defendant who has a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings and who can rationally assist trial counsel is competent to stand trial. And a defendant who voluntarily and intelligently elects to stand trial without counsel—something he can only do if he is competent to stand trial to begin with—may do so. Even so, the right of self-representation is not absolute, and standby counsel may be appointed to assist the pro se defendant in matters of procedure and courtroom decorum. The Court came closest to answering the question presented by this case when it held that the standard for competency to stand trial and competency to plead guilty are the same, because the decision not to stand trial is "no more complicated than the sum total of decisions that a [represented] defendant may be called upon to make during the course of a trial." The crucial difference in Edwards, was that the pro se defendant was asking to proceed to trial without counsel. The difference, in other words, is the difference between the ability to