Equal Opportunities Commission v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] IRLR 327 was an application for judicial review of the new implementation by the government of the Employment Equality (Sex Discrimination) Regulations 2005. It was alleged, and found, that they were incompatible with the Framework Directive, 2000/73/EC. Facts The Equal Opportunities Commission applied for judicial review of the Employment Equality (Sex Discrimination) Regulations 2005 introduced by the defendant secretary of state. The Regulations had made amendments to the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 in order to implement Directive 2002/73. The commission argued that the amendments did not properly implement the Directive because, (1) the new s 4A(1) of the Act impermissibly imported causation into the concept of harassment by the words "on the grounds of her sex"; (2) the new s 4A(1) wrongly required that the unwanted conduct had to be by reason of, or on the ground of, the complainant's sex; (3) the new s 4A(2) inappropriately imported an objective test into the definition of harassment; (4) they had failed to introduce liability on employers for discrimination by third parties; (5) they had impermissibly introduced the requirement for a comparator for the purpose of establishing discrimination on grounds of pregnancy, and that as it was not intended that there would still be a remedy for a woman complaining of discrimination by reference to pregnancy or maternity leave under s 1 of the Act in parallel with the new right under s. 3A of the Act, the new section would offend against the principle of regression because it would reduce the protection previously available; (6) the new s 6A(7) excluded a claim for discrimination during compulsory maternity leave that the complainant had been deprived of a discretionary bonus and s 6A(3) and s 6A(4) placed a substantial limit on discrimination claims that could be made in respect of the additional maternity leave period. Judgment Judge Burton upheld the complaints and granted the application. (1) It was the court's duty to construe statutes and regulations passed by Member States so as to render them compliant with a relevant Directive. However, in the instant case it was not appropriate to do so because of the degree of reading down or transposition that would be required to render the provisions compliant with the Directive, or it was not possible to do so because such extreme application of the requirement to interpret national