In general, such simulations focused on steady-state system behavior, not subsystem transient behavior. These two failures caused a renewed interest in "dynamic" simulation. Only "static" (that is, steady-state) simulation had been done previously. General Electric, the manufacturer of the turbine-generators, refused to repair or replace subsequent damage—after all it had already replaced two failed turbine-generators due to reasons which were then unknown, and were subsequently proved not to be its fault—so new operational procedures were implemented to prevent subsequent failures. These procedures were successful, and there were no more turbine-generator failures. But, these new procedures would not address what later happened, due to other causes, including improper operation of the steam generator's "reheat" system, which is a usual, and necessary part of a "compound" turbine-generator system (a high-pressure 3600 rpm turbine section compounded with a lower-pressure 1800 rpm turbine section, both of which were supplied by the same steam generator, but using separate reheat "loops"). 1985 pipe failure disaster At 3:25 pm on June 9, 1985, a hot reheat line, carrying steam at , burst open. The reheat line circulates exhaust steam from the high pressure turbine back through the boiler stack, where it is reheated before entering the low pressure turbine. A steam cloud blew down a door leading to the control room of the station, fatally scalding six workers: Michael Bowman, John Dolan, Ernest Hernandez, Terry Leroy, Danny Norman, and Howard Turner. Ten others were injured. A preliminary report cited a faulty weld as the immediate cause. Approximately 35 employees were on-site at the time; of those, 20 were in the control room. The station was out of service for six months while all the steam piping was replaced. A report on the accident was completed in May 1991, but was not released until Christmas Day because of Edison's objections that it would compromise civil suits. Although several factors contributed to the pipe's failure, the report said Edison's actions—or lack of actions—were "primary and critical factors in causing the accident": Edison knowingly operated the system at temperatures above design specification for long periods of time, and operators were unable to control the temperatures within the system as a result of a "design flaw." Even so, the pipe, part of a steam reheat system, was not routinely maintained or inspected, though the pipe shifted and distorted because of exposure to abnormal stresses, the report said. Edison's management made high