a US-defined intelligence discipline until 1986. CIA took on a more distinct MASINT responsibility in 1987. The National Security Archive commented, "In 1987, Deputy Director for Science and Technology Evan Hineman established ... a new Office for Special Projects. concerned not with satellites, but with emplaced sensors – sensors that could be placed in a fixed location to collect signals intelligence or measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) about a specific target. Such sensors had been used to monitor Chinese missile tests, Soviet laser activity, military movements, and foreign nuclear programs. The office was established to bring together scientists from the DS&T's Office of SIGINT Operations, who designed such systems, with operators from the Directorate of Operations, who were responsible for transporting the devices to their clandestine locations and installing them. Issues in improving counterproliferation intelligence Ashton B. Carter, co-director of the Preventive Defense Project, Harvard & Stanford Universities commented, "since 9/11 we have overhauled counterterrorism, and intelligence has focused in response, but we have not overhauled counterproliferation. We have a war on terrorism, but we are not yet at war on WMD." In his testimony to the Iraq Intelligence Commission, Carter that an intelligence agency attempting to work in counterproliferation needs to understand and learn from past failures in detecting programs that do not assist in preserving the peace. Carter cited three major issues: Framing the work of this Commission in the context of our overall effort to counter WMD ( ... mostly nuclear and biological weapons, the others being less threatening). Recommendations for improving WMD intelligence. These recommendations are drawn in part from discussions the Preventive Defense Project has hosted with senior intelligence community leaders and other knowledgeable people over the past year on a not-for-attribution basis. the relationship between the specific problem of WMD intelligence and the overall issue of intelligence community reform. Further, he recommended overhauling of counterproliferation intelligence into a set of missions that need intelligence support, and the roster of customers that demand that intelligence. There is a constant conflict between the perceptions of policymakers and analysts, in all areas analysis, applies here. Carter recommends organizing counterproliferation according to the "8 D's" first introduced in DOD as part of the Counterproliferation Initiative: dissuasion diplomacy disarmament denial defusing deterrence defense destruction. The ideas counterproliferation intelligence, across all the 8 D's is a key frame for the work of this Commission. There is no such thing as