may take the worst-case approach to which one is most vulnerable. The "other side" may be trying to confuse you The analysts are to form hypotheses but should also be prepared to reexamine them repeatedly in light of new information instead of searching for evidence buttressing their favored theory. They must remember that the enemy may be deliberately deceiving them with information that seems plausible to the enemy. Donald Bacon observed that "the most successful deception stories were apparently as reasonable as the truth. Allied strategic deception, as well as Soviet deception in support of the operations at Stalingrad, Kursk, and the 1944 summer offensive, all exploited German leadership's preexisting beliefs and were, therefore, incredibly effective." Theories that Hitler thought to be implausible were not accepted. Western deception staffs alternated "ambiguous" and "misleading" deceptions; the former intended simply to confuse analysts and the latter to make one false alternative especially likely. Of all modern militaries, the Russians treat strategic deception (or, in their word, maskirovka, which goes beyond the English phrase to include deception, operational security and concealment) as an integral part of all planning. The highest levels of command are involved. Bacon wrote further: The counterattack by the Steppe Front stunned the Germans. The opponent may try to overload one's analytical capabilities as a gambit for those preparing the intelligence budget and for agencies whoss fast track to promotion is in data collection; one's own side may produce so much raw data that the analyst is overwhelmed, even without enemy assistance. See also London Controlling Section References Intelligence analysis Military intelligence