it could be taken seriously, Van Overstraeten altered the warning that the Belgian Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant-General Édouard van den Bergen had drafted and which was about to be sent to all Belgian Army commanders on 13 January; whereas it had stated that an attack on the next morning was 'probable', it now said an attack was 'quasi-certain'. Van den Bergen, who had secretly promised Gamelin to bring Belgium in on the allied side, then decided to broadcast (on a popular current affairs radio programme) that night at about 22:30, an immediate recall to their units of all the 80,000 Belgian soldiers on leave. "Phase D", as it was known, would ensure that their forces would be at full strength at the moment of the German attack. This dramatic gesture was made without reference to Leopold III of Belgium or Van Overstraeten and without knowing the decision that had been taken to keep Germany in the dark about whether Belgium was in possession of its attack plans.<ref>Van den Bergen's note to the Minister of Defence, dated 21 January 1940, in CDH, Carton A Farde 2 C111</ref> Then, again without reference to the King or Van Overstraeten, Van den Bergen ordered the barriers to be moved aside on the southern border with France so that French and British troops could march in swiftly when they were called in, in response to the German attack. If the Germans had indeed attacked on 14 January, Van den Bergen would probably have been congratulated for his energetic decision-making. As it was, he fell into disgrace for acting without the King's permission, as Leopold III was the Supreme Commander of all the Belgian armed forces. Van den Bergen was rebuked so harshly by Van Overstraeten that the Belgian Chief of Staff's reputation never recovered; at the end of January he resigned. One of Van Overstraeten's complaints about Van den Bergen's actions was that he had given the Germans reason to believe that the Dutch had their attack plans. Dutch reaction Although Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands and her government were alarmed by the Belgian warning, Dutch supreme commander Izaak H. Reijnders was sceptical of the information. When the Belgian military attaché in The Hague, Lieutenant-Colonel Pierre Diepenrijckx, handed him a personal memorandum from Van Overstraeten on 12 January, he responded "Do you believe in these messages yourself? I don't believe in them at