precedents of the various courts as well as the precedents of appellate courts with jurisdiction over them. Addressing uniformity and diversity in tax law decisions As a general matter, reviewers of the issues of decision uniformity and court diversity take the position that identical sets of facts in a tax case should result in identical court decisions. Reviewers vary on how to achieve that, however. One approach to greater uniformity was taken in the 1943 tax case of Dobson v. Commissioner when the Supreme Court effectively ruled that great deference by all other federal courts was due to Tax Court interpretations of tax law. Congress, suspicious of an "enforcement bias" on the part of the Tax Court, responded five years later with an act establishing a de novo standard of review for the circuit courts in tax cases, which had the effect of overriding the Supreme Court decision in Dobson. That left the Tax Court with a decision on whether to defer to circuit court decisions in deciding new cases, knowing that its interpretations might be accepted by some circuit courts and overturned in others. Initially, the Tax Court decided to maintain its own consistency rather than use the circuit court precedents when they differed. This approach was abandoned in 1970 in Golsen v. Commissioner when the Tax Court decided that it would follow the precedent of the court to which a case could be appealed. A national court of tax appeals A longstanding proposal to address the issue of the lack of uniformity in court interpretations of federal tax law has been to create a national court of tax appeals. Indeed, a federal court of tax appeals appears to be the favored view of many academics who address the subject and some tax attorneys. Under the approaches advocated, tax litigation could begin in the courts of original jurisdiction, as is currently the case, but the appeals would have to be made to a single, specialized court of tax appeals which would develop great expertise on tax law as well as reconcile divergent interpretations from the lower courts so that one consistent set of interpretations would prevail. The perceived advantage of this approach is, as Professor Shores argues, "income realized by a resident of California ought to be taxed in the same way as income realized by a resident of Maine." Shores sees such consistency not only as sound policy,