World Bank loans, but the World Bank required an phased elimination of fertilizer subsidies. A complete withdrawal of subsidies prevented 75% of smallholders buying fertilizer in 1988–89, so temporary subsidies were provided up to 1994–95. The partial privatisation left ADMARC with limited funds to supply fertilizer and seed to smallholders, and the closure of many of its depots hindered distribution. An increase in maize producer prices in 1988 did not compensate farmers who had previously grown hybrid maize for their lost subsidies, so many reverted to growing local maize without fertilizer. ADMARC's weakness led to increased consumer prices, reduced food security and a food crisis in 1991–92. After the World Bank inspired partial privatisation in 1987, ADMARC was short of funds to provide services. Despite market liberalisation, few private traders emerged, and maize markets were disrupted and Malawi became increasingly dependent on imported maize. The World Bank criticised the losses it made on imported maize, and in 1996, it required the creation of an agency independent of government influence to control grain imports. ADMARC kept control over domestic grain and started selling the domestic reserves to meet its debts. ADMARC continued selling its reserves in 2000, and in 2001 despite a poor harvest. The failure to prevent food shortages caused deaths from hunger and related diseases, mainly in 2002. The World Bank disliked ADMARC being under political control and proposed that it should only keep its core agricultural marketing operations and only provide marketing services in those outlying areas of the country with limited private sector competition: these reforms were implemented from 2006 on. The private sector lacked the capacity to provide competitive marketing services. It was unable to store enough of grain to meet food needs in the lean season, unwilling to buy maize from smallholders in remote rural areas and without the capacity to import sufficient maize during national shortfalls to maintain prices. As Malawian maize markets did not act competitively, state intervention through ADMARC was needed, and it remained as a residual buyer and seller. At the peak of liberalisation in 2002–03, there were only 180 ADMARC outlets. By 2009–10, the number of ADMARC-operated markets had grown to 788, and in 2010–11 the figure rose to 904. It remains under the control of politicians, and this has led to claims of corruption and the public perception that ADMARC does not act in the best interests of those