in the HCC and the danger of structural collapse. The Phillips Petroleum Company requested, and the FAA approved and implemented, a one-mile no-fly zone around the plant to prevent engine vibration and/or helicopter rotor downwash from dislodging any of the wreckage. The U.S. Coast Guard and Port of Houston fire boats evacuated to safety over 100 trapped people across the Houston Ship Channel. OSHA preserved evidence for evaluation regarding the cause of the catastrophe. List of casualties Phillips Petroleum Company employees Fatally wounded, listed by name, age, city of residence within Texas, and official date of death (following recovery and identification of remains or eventual death from injuries) Stephen Donald Huff, 21, 25 October 1989 Ruben Quilantan Alamillo, 35, Houston, 25 October 1989 James Edward Allen, 38, Pasadena, 2 November 1989 Albert Eloy Arce, 34, Deer Park, 7 November 1989 (listed as Eloy Albert Arce) James Henry Campbell, Jr., 30, Baytown, 26 October 1989 Eloy Gonzales, 36, Houston, 1 November 1989 Mark Lloyd Greeson, 30, Pasadena, 28 October 1989 Delbert Lynn Haskell, 43, Deer Park, 29 October 1989 Scotty Dale Hawkins, 32, Houston, 28 October 1989 James Deowens Hubbard, 45, Houston, 25 October 1989 (listed as James Hubbard, Jr.) Richard Leos, 30, La Porte, 29 October 1989 James Arthur Nichols, 40, Baytown, 27 October 1989 Jesse Thomas Northrup, 43, Brookshire, 28 October 1989 Mary Kathryn O'Connor, 34, Houston, 29 October 1989 Gerald Galen Pipher, 39, Deer Park, 30 October 1989 Cipriano Rodriguez, Jr., 42, Pasadena, 27 October 1989 Jesse Oscar Trevino, 33, Pearland, 30 October 1989 Lino Ralph Trujillo, 39, Pasadena, 29 October 1989 Nathan Gene Warner, 30, Deer Park, 24 October 1989 Fish Engineering employees Fatally wounded and official dates of death Juan Manuel Garcia, 30 October 1989 Jose Lara Gonzalez, 23 October 1989 William Scott Martin, 25 October 1989 John Medrano, 30 October 1989 (listed as Juan Trejo-Medrano) A granite memorial at near 924 Jefferson Road, Pasadena, Texas was dedicated on the first anniversary of the disaster, and was declared by company officials to be open to the general public at all times. OSHA findings OSHA's major findings included: Lack of process hazard analysis Inadequate standard operating procedures (SOPs) Non-fail-safe block valve Inadequate maintenance permitting system Inadequate lockout/tagout procedures Lack of combustible gas detection and alarm system Presence of ignition sources Inadequate ventilation systems for nearby buildings Fire protection system not maintained in an adequate state of readiness.