had their furniture taken by bailiffs, bilingual tax demands were finally issued. Lewis took the Beasley case as a model for future action, but significantly added "this cannot be done reasonably except in those districts where Welsh-speakers are a substantial proportion of the population". He proposed to make it impossible for the business of local and central government to continue without using Welsh. "It is a policy for a movement", he said, "in the areas where Welsh is a spoken language in daily use". It would be "nothing less than a revolution". After-effects Gwyn Alf Williams said there were contrary effects. There was enthusiastic uptake of the cause of the language in the middle class, both English- and Welsh-speaking. But he saw the across-the-board implementation of language policies as causing the increasingly English-speaking industrial working-class (contemptuously dismissed by Lewis) to feel disenfranchised and excluded. He went on to blame this reaction for the "No" vote in the 1979 Welsh devolution referendum, in which the vote split very much on language lines. In 1976, Clive Betts pointed out that the language movement was dissipating its efforts by ignoring Lewis's insistence that action should be restricted to Welsh-speaking areas—to the Bro Gymraeg, and called for a restricted Quebec-style policy in the Bro, as Lewis had suggested. Notes External links Text of the lecture Welsh literature Welsh language History of Wales Sociolinguistics