counterpart having the property of possibly winning the election. For: But properties don't work the same way as objects, our attitudes towards them can be different, because we have different descriptions – they are still the same properties. That lesson is taught by the paradox of analysis. CT is inadequate if it can't translate all modal sentences or intuitions. Fred Feldman mentioned two sentences (Feldman 1971): (1) I could have been quite unlike what I in fact am. (2) I could have been more like what you in fact are than like what I in fact am. At the same time, you could have been more like what I in fact am than what you in fact are. See also Identity (philosophy) Many-worlds interpretation Notes References Balashov, Yuri, 2007, "Defining endurance", Philosophical studies, 133:143-149. Carnap, Rudolf, 1967, The Logical Structure of the World, trans. Rolf A. George, Berkeley: University of California Press. Della Rocca, Michael, 2002, "Essentialism versus Essentialism", in Gendler and Hawthorne 2002. Feldman, Fred, 1971 "Counterparts", Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971), pp. 406–409. Fine, Kit, 1982, "Acts, Events and Things.", in W. Leinfellner, E. Kraemer, and J. Schank (eds.) Proceedings of the 6th International Wittgenstein Symposium, pp. 97–105, Wien: Hälder Pichler-Tempsky. Gendler, Tamar Szabó and Hawthorne, John, 2002, Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gibbard, Alan, 1975, "Contingent Identity", Journal of Philosophical Logic 4, pp. 197–221 or in Rea 1997. Hawley, Kathrine, 2001, How Things Persist, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Kripke, Saul, 1971, "Identity and Necessity", in Milton K. Munitz, Identity and Individuation, pp. 135–64, New York: New York University Press. Kripke, Saul, 1980, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Lewis, David, 1968, "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic", Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), pp 113–26. Lewis, David, 1971, "Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies", Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971), pp 203–11 and in Philosophical Papers I. Lewis, David, 1983, "Survival and Identity", in Amelie O. Rorty [ed.] The Identities of Persons (1976; University of California Press.) and in Philosophical Papers I, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lewis, David, 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Blackwell. Lewis, David, 1993, "Many, But Almost One", in Keith Campbell, John Bacon and Lloyd Reinhart eds., Ontology, Causality and Mind:Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. Lowe, E. J., 2002, A Survey of Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mackie, Penelope, 2006, How Things Might Have Been – Individuals, Kinds and