(including dirt) about individuals and organizations of interests and the pressure on them; 2) the creation of conditions under which independent mass media cannot operate; 3) taking control over elections to ensure the victories of pro-Kremlin candidates; 4) the establishment of civil society organizations which are ostensibly independent but actually are under the full control of the Kremlin; 5) the discredit the opposition and the creation of the informational and political barrier around Putin (good things happen thanks to Putin personally but bad officials are responsible for bad things and not Putin; Putin doesn't respond to opposition's charge and doesn't participate in debates – others do that for him). According to Vasily Gatov, the analyst of Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism at the University of Southern California, the realizations of the provisions of «Revision number Six» means building the state where democratic institutions exist nominally but in reality these institutions are fully controlled by Presidential Administration and secret police. He characterized such regime as «counterintelligence state» (one of the kinds of guided democracy). On 7 May 2016, the newspaper Kommersant had published an article by Ilya Barabanov and Gleb Cherkasov containing an analysis of the implementation of provisions of «Revision number Six». They concluded that, although the authors of «Revision number Six» had not taken into account some things (for example, authors of the aforementioned document denied the need for creation of pro-Kremlin political party, which actually was established subsequently), by and large, the provisions of «Revision number Six» were conducted. Authoritarian bureaucratic state Russian politician Boris Nemtsov and commentator Kara-Murza define Putinism in Russia as "a one party system, censorship, a puppet parliament, ending of an independent judiciary, firm centralization of power and finances, and hypertrophied role of special services and bureaucracy, in particular in relation to business". Russia's nascent middle class showed few signs of political activism under the regime as Masha Lipman reported: "As with the majority overall, those in the middle-income group have accepted the paternalism of Vladimir Putin's government and remained apolitical and apathetic". In December 2007, the Russian sociologist Igor Eidman (VCIOM) categorized the Putin regime as "the power of bureaucratic oligarchy" which had "the traits of extreme right-wing dictatorship — the dominance of state-monopoly capital in the economy, silovoki structures in governance, clericalism and statism in ideology". In August 2008, The Economist wrote about the virtual demise of both Russian and Soviet