possibility of the table turning out to be made of various things, I am speaking loosely. This table itself could not have had an origin different form the one it in fact had, but in a situation qualitatively identical to this one with respect to all evidence I had in advance, the room could have contained a table made of ice in place of this one. Something like counterpart theory is thus applicable to the situation, but it applies only because we are not interested in what might not be true of a table given certain evidence. It is precisely because it is not true that this table might have been made of ice from the Thames that we must turn here to qualitative descriptions and counterparts. To apply these notions to genuine de re modalities, is from the present standpoint, perverse. (Kripke 1980:142.) So to explain how the illusion of necessity is possible, according to Kripke, CT is an alternative. Therefore, CT forms an important part of our theory about the knowledge of modal intuitions. (For doubt about this strategy, see Della Roca, 2002. And for more about the knowledge of modal statements, see Gendler and Hawthorne, 2002.) Arguments against counterpart theory The most famous is Kripke's Humphrey objection. Because a counterpart is never identical to something in another possible world Kripke raised the following objection against CT: Thus if we say "Humphrey might have won the election" (if only he had done such-and-such), we are not talking about something that might have happened to Humphrey but to someone else, a "counterpart". Probably, however, Humphrey could not care less whether someone else, no matter how much resembling him, would have been victorious in another possible world. Thus, Lewis's view seems to me even more bizarre than the usual notions of transworld identification that it replaces. (Kripke 1980:45 note 13.) One way to spell out the meaning of Kripke's claim is by the following imaginary dialogue: (Based on Sider MS) Against: Kripke means that Humphrey himself doesn’t have the property of possibly winning the election, because it is only the counterpart that wins. For: The property of possibly winning the election is the property of the counterpart. Against: But they can't be the same property because Humphrey has different attitudes to them: he cares about he himself having the property of possibly winning the election. He doesn’t care about the