the war. The result of the von Seeckt reforms was the new tactical doctrine manual H. Dv.487, Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen ("Command and Battle of the Combined Arms"), now generally known as das Fug, published as Part 1 in 1921 and Part 2 in 1923. An important introduction in the post-World War I reforms was the introduction of Auftragstaktik, which can be translated as "Mission Command" (U.K. forces definition) or "Mission-Type Orders, or Directive Control" (United States forces) and mission-type tactics (Federal German Army). The principle is that the senior commander states his intention (the mission) to his subordinate commanders. He informs them of the mission, the available means and the timeframe within which the mission has to be accomplished. He then places mission planning and execution in the hands of his subordinates and holds himself available to offer helpful advice and suggestions, but only if requested. For to work, it is necessary that a subordinate leader, or even a common soldier, has to fully understand the commander’s intent, also to the next higher level of command, and the purpose of the mission. If he does not understand, then he has the obligation to ask. In 1925, von Seeckt noted The principal thing now is to increase the responsibilities of the individual soldier, particularly his independence of action, with the profitable result of increasing the capability of the individual. Influence The influence of das Fug and on the Reichswehr and later the Heer, was wide-ranging. The delegation of command responsibility throughout the army, as necessary for the accomplishment of a mission and, if required, down to the individual soldier. The removal of social barriers between officers and men where the command relationship is based upon mutual respect, trust and confidence, as described in Truppenführung sections 7 and 12. The preparation for the introduction of aircraft, armored units and combined-arms units some years before the first armored division was formed in the Heer. The concept that the conduct of operations cannot be defined or laid down in field manuals, or other regulations which inhibit a commanders’ flexibility. Truppenführung in this sense was not a set of rules but rather a set of intellectual tools which could be consulted at any time and which would provide intellectual stimulus in any given situation. The unpredictable and chaotic nature of warfare is specifically referred to in the following sections of the manual