Najibullah was receptive to the prior, but the Soviet Union did not manage to come to this agreement with the United States. From statements made by Secretary of State George Shultz, the Soviet leadership came under the impression that the US would cease military shipments to the mujahideen immediately after Soviet withdrawal, with the condition that the USSR "front-loaded" its withdrawal (i.e. withdrew the majority of its troops in the beginning of the process, thereby complicating redeployment). This was conveyed to the Najibullah government, managing to convince him that the Soviet-American diplomatic effort would benefit the Kabul government. This impression made by Shultz was false – though mixed signals were sent by various US officials at and around time of the summit, Reagan could not agree to stop arms shipments immediately . In late 1987, when this US commitment was conveyed to the Soviet Union, negotiations came to a halt, but proceeded tentatively as the White House and Department of State continued to make contradictory statements on the issue. The issue dissipated when the Department of State suggested that an immediate cessation of US military aid could occur if the Soviets did the same (prior, the US had agreed to an asymmetric cessation of aid, whereby the USSR would be allowed to continue supporting Kabul). On February 8, 1988, the Soviet leadership announced a conditional date for the beginning of the military withdrawal (which the United States had insisted on for years) in an attempt to encourage the US to compromise on ceasing military shipments. This announcement failed to change the American position on shipments, and simultaneously decreased Soviet bargaining power at the negotiations. Nevertheless, Gorbachev decided that it was desirable to withdraw within the framework of an international agreement, however flawed, rather than to proceed independently. "We weren't thinking only of Afghanistan," recalled Vadim Zagladin. "There were many processes taking place at that time. The INF agreement on missiles in Europe was particularly important, and all of these things were interconnected." This factor complicated convincing Najibullah to agree to the Geneva Accords, but he was eventually placated by Soviet promises to dramatically expand aid and assistance measures post-withdrawal. Although the USA was not bound under the Geneva Accords to cease its military aid, Pakistan (through which this aid flowed) was obligated to prevent cross-border armament flows to Afghanistan (Kalinovsky 149). On April 14, 1988 the Geneva Accords were signed