Esporte Clube. However, the club's management rescheduled the trip to the next day. The plane departed from Salgado Filho International Airport in Porto Alegre at 17:18 Brazilian Standard Time (BRT) (20:18 UTC). It climbed to flight level (FL) 340 (). At 18:54 BRT (21:54 UTC), the flight made its landing at Congonhas-São Paulo Regional Airport. Crash Flight 3054 was cleared to land at Congonhas's Runway 35L. Reviews by government officials of the surveillance videos showed that despite the aircraft touching down without incident, it did not slow down normally, veering to the left as it departed the far end at around . The runway is elevated above the surrounding area, and the aircraft's momentum carried it over traffic on the adjacent Avenida Washington Luís, a major thoroughfare, and crushed a four-story TAM Express facility, resulting in a large fire. The TAM Express facility contained offices and a warehouse, and was located adjacent to a Shell gas station. All 187 passengers and crew aboard died and the aircraft was destroyed. The runway had recently been resurfaced, and did not yet have water-channeling grooves cut into it to reduce the danger of hydroplaning. Flight Data Recorder (FDR) information recovered after the crash and released by Brazilian authorities showed that immediately prior to touchdown, both thrust levers were in CL (or "climb") position, with engine power being governed by the flight computer's autothrottle system. Two seconds prior to touchdown, an aural warning, "retard, retard", was issued by the flight's computer system, advising the pilots to retard the thrust lever to the recommended idle lever position. This would disengage the autothrottle, with engine power then governed directly by the thrust levers. At the moment of touchdown, the spoiler lever was in the "ARMED" position. According to the system logic of the A320's flight controls, in order for the spoilers to automatically deploy upon touchdown, not only must the spoiler lever be in the "ARMED" position, but both thrust levers must be at or close to the "idle" position. The FDR transcript shows that immediately after the warning, the flight computer recorded the left thrust lever being retarded to the rear-most position, activating the thrust reverser on the left engine, while the right thrust lever (controlling the engine with the disabled thrust reverser) remained in the CL position. One theory put forth by CENIPA is that the pilots may not have noticed that the right