The Battle of Cabezón was an engagement early in the Peninsular War on 12 June 1808 between Spain's Army of Castile, based at Valladolid, and detachments of Marshal Bessières' French Army Corps under generals General Lasalle and Merle. Lasalle occupied Valladolid without opposition that same evening. Merle's column consisted of six battalions and two squadrons, while Lasalle's was made up of four battalions and two regiments of chasseurs. Cuesta's forces consisted of four cannon and 4,000 or 5,000 volunteers, who had not been more than a fortnight under arms, plus 300 cavalry, his only veteran troops. Battle The battle took place at the bridge of Cabezon, where the main road from Burgos to Valladolid crosses the river Pisuerga. Lasalle had scouted the Spanish position. He ordered General Sabatier to attack them, while Merle cut them off from retreating to Valladolid. They stood the enemy's fire about 30 minutes, then began to flee, leaving behind 1000 dead and 4000 muskets. Cuesta, with the remains of his army, retreated to Leon. Oman (1902): A History of the Peninsula War, Vol. I News had arrived that the captain-general, Cuesta, was collecting a force at Valladolid, which threatened to cut the road between Burgos and Madrid. To deal with him Bessières told off Merle, and another small column of four battalions and two regiments of chasseurs under his brilliant cavalry-brigadier, Lasalle, one of the best of Napoleon’s younger generals. After sacking Torquemada (where some peasants attempted an ineffectual resistance) and ransoming the rich cathedral town of Palencia, Lasalle got in touch with the forces of Cuesta at the bridge of Cabezon, where the main road from Burgos to Valladolid crosses the river Pisuerga. On the eleventh of June Merle joined him: on the twelfth their united forces, 9,000 strong, fell upon the levies of the Captain-general. Throughout the two years during which he held high command in the field, Gregorio de la Cuesta consistently displayed an arrogance and an incapacity far exceeding that of any other Spanish general. Considering the state of his embryo ‘army of Castile,’ it was insane for him to think of offering battle. He had but four cannon; his only veteran troops were 300 cavalry, mainly consisting of the squadrons which had accompanied Ferdinand VII as escort on his unhappy journey to Bayonne. His infantry was composed of 4,000 or 5,000 volunteers of the Valladolid district, who had not been