installed capacity of 233.1 MW, containing 38.85 MW bulb turbines. The generation facility is planned to have 18 Francis turbines with a capacity of 611.11 MW each. In February 2011, Norte Energía signed contracts with: IMPSA worth $450 million to design and install by the fall of 2015 four Francis turbine generation units to provide 2,500 MW of power. Andritz AG to provide three Francis turbines and the six bulb turbines, and the 14 excitation systems for the main power house and additional equipment for the Pimental power house. Alstom worth $682.3 million to provide 7 Francis turbines, and 14 gas insulated substations for the facility. Capacity Walter Coronado Antunes, the former Secretary of the Environment of the state of São Paulo, and ex-President of the state water and sanitation utility Sabesp, has said that the Belo Monte Dam Complex would be one of the least efficient hydro-power projects in the history of Brazil, producing only 10% of its 11,233 MW nameplate capacity between July and October (1,123 MW, and an average of only 4,419 MW throughout the year, or a 39% capacity factor). According to the president of Brazil's Energy Research Company (EPE), 39% is "just a little below" Brazil's average of 55%. Normally, the capacity factor of hydroelectric power plants is between 30% and 80%, while wind power is typically between 20% and 40%. According to a study by Eletrobras, even when at reduced capacities, Belo Monte would still have the capacity to supply the entire state of Para with electricity. Availability Critics claim that the project would only make financial sense if the Brazilian government builds additional dam reservoirs upstream to guarantee a year-round flow of water, thus increasing the availability of generation. Supporters of the project point out that the seasonal minimum flow of the Xingu river occurs at a time when other Brazilian hydro plants are well supplied, so that no additional dams would have to be built. Reportedly, Brazil's National Council for Power Policies approved a resolution, previously sanctioned by then president Lula, that only one hydroelectric dam would be built on the Xingu. With one dam, critics do not see a cost-to-benefit ratio advantage and question the government's decision to construct only one. Additional upstream dams would directly or indirectly affect 25,000 indigenous people in the entire Xingu basin. Of particular note is the Altamira (Babaquara) Dam, which would flood an additional of