Constitutional colorblindness is an aspect of United States Supreme Court case evaluation that began with Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896. Prior to this (and for several years afterwards), the Supreme Court considered skin color as a determining factor in many landmark cases. Constitutional colorblindness holds that skin color or race is virtually never a legitimate ground for legal or political distinctions, and thus, any law that is "color-conscious" is presumptively unconstitutional regardless of whether its intent is to subordinate a group, or remedy racial discrimination. The concept, therefore, has been brought to bear both against vestiges of Jim Crow oppression, as well as remedial efforts aimed at overcoming such discrimination, such as affirmative action. Color Blindness The theory behind racial color blindness is that a person should have unlimited opportunities regardless of race. There is a big contemporary debate surrounding affirmative action; some believe that it is beneficial because a person's social class should be considered instead of their race. Others criticize color blindness because,“There are concerns that majority groups use color-blindness as a means of avoiding the discussion of racism and discrimination." This might diminish the hardships that minorities face in the public eye. Another thought that emerges from this concept is that, "color-blindness operates under the assumption that we are living in a world that is "post-race", where race no longer matters." Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) The Plessy v. Ferguson case is an example of how the Supreme Court was not colorblind in their decision which upheld the "separate but equal" doctrine that allowed segregation. While reviewing the case, the Supreme Court looked solely at the race of Plessy and decided that the railroad had every right to arrest him. The Supreme Court would then approve all laws that enforced racial segregation. Justice Harlan was the only person on the case who dissented and responded that the '"arbitrary separation of citizens on the basis of race"' was equivalent to imposing a '''badge of servitude"' on African Americans. He contended that the real intent of the law was not to provide equal accommodations but to compel African Americans to keep to themselves. This was intolerable because "our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." In his dissent, Justice Harlan wrote, "The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements,