sent overseas as a unit—several had done during the Crimean War, serving as colonial garrisons—but the Militia as a whole was effectively little more than a collection of independent units and not a serviceable home defence force. The second element of the auxiliary forces was the Yeomanry, 38 regiments of volunteer cavalry which had historically been used as a form of internal security police, deployed to suppress local riots and provide a show of force to support the authorities. Recruits to the force were usually personally wealthy, providing their own horses and uniforms, and units were often heavily bankrolled by their senior officers. Training requirements were low, with an annual eight-day camp. The regiments were liable to be called out for defence against an invasion or an insurrection, and were not prepared for effective mobilisation; the units possessed no transport resources, or even a designated quartermaster. The third arm was the Volunteers, mainly drawn from small businessmen, artisans, and professionals; they were predominantly urban middle-class units, training at weekends and with no annual camp. There were 213 rifle corps and 66 corps of artillery, though the latter were mostly coastal artillery or static "position batteries" equipped with unwieldy 40-pounder guns, and they did not constitute an organised field force. There were some engineer and medical units, but no service corps. The status of the volunteer units was further complicated by their origins as private societies; they received some central funding, but were mostly supported by local subscriptions and the generosity of their commanders. Effects of the South African War The reforms had ensured that a sizable force of regular troops was based in the United Kingdom for service as an expeditionary force, over and above the troops already stationed overseas. However, once the decision was taken to send a corps-size field force to fight in the South African War, the system began to show a strain. Three divisions were earmarked for deployment in October 1899, and 25,000 men were mobilised from the reserve to reinforce them; however, regulations of the time held that men under twenty should not be sent overseas, so the reservists had to replace underage or otherwise ineffective soldiers as well as filling the existing gaps. In some units, this meant reservists made up over 50% of the battalion strength; throughout the force, 36.5% of men were listed as unfit for foreign service. When the force sailed,