had just over 250 combat aircraft, but half of these were destroyed inside the first few days of combat. Commonwealth Between the wars, the British military strategy in the Far East was undermined by a lack of attention and funding. In 1937, Major-General William Dobbie, General Officer Commanding (GOC) Malaya (1935–39), looked at Malaya's defences and reported that during the monsoon season, from October to March, landings could be made by an enemy on the east coast and bases could be established in Siam (Thailand). He predicted that landings could be made at Songkhla and Pattani in Siam, and Kota Bharu in Malaya. He recommended large reinforcements to be sent immediately. His predictions turned out to be correct, but his recommendations were ignored. The British government's plans relied primarily on the stationing of a strong fleet at the Singapore Naval Base in the event of any enemy hostility, in order to defend both Britain's Far Eastern possessions and the route to Australia. A strong naval presence was also thought to act as a deterrent against possible aggressors. By 1940, however, the army commander in Malaya, Lieutenant-General Lionel Bond, conceded that a successful defence of Singapore demanded the defence of the whole peninsula, and that the naval base alone would not be sufficient to deter a Japanese invasion. Military planners concluded that the desired Malayan air force strength would be 300–500 aircraft, but this was never reached because of the higher priorities in the allocation of men and material for Britain and the Middle East. The defence strategy for Malaya rested on two basic assumptions: first, that there would be sufficient early warning of an attack to allow for reinforcement of British troops, and second, that American help was at hand in case of attack. By late 1941, after Lieutenant-General Arthur E. Percival had taken over as GOC Malaya, it became clear that neither of these assumptions had any real substance. In addition, Churchill and Roosevelt had agreed that in the event of war breaking out in South East Asia, priority would be given to finishing the war in Europe. The east, until that time, would be a secondary priority. Containment was considered the primary strategy in the east. Intelligence operations Planning for this offensive was undertaken by the Japanese Military Affairs Bureau's Unit 82 based in Taiwan. Intelligence on Malaya was gathered through a network of agents which included Japanese