underwater sonar to assist with the operation. Thirteen Coast Guard vessels helped search the shores of Long Island and provided salvage efforts. Rescue workers and volunteers scoured of beaches, collecting debris that washed ashore. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) investigated the accident. The DC-7 was not required to be equipped with a flight recorder, which would have automatically recorded the pilots' every control input. Thus, the CAB was forced to rely on witness testimony, radio recordings, and a best guess based on experience. Nevertheless, the CAB determined that the evasive maneuvers taken by the pilot of Flight 663 to avoid the oncoming Pan Am jet caused spatial disorientation. The disorientation, coupled with the extreme maneuver, made it impossible for the pilot to recover from the roll in the few seconds before the DC-7 crashed into the Atlantic Ocean. The CAB also determined that Captain Carson had neither the time nor adequate information to assess Flight 663's position relative to Pan Am 212 and, given the illusion of a collision course, he had acted appropriately in initiating evasive maneuvers. The CAB made no recommendations in the final accident report. Although early news reports reported the near miss of Flights 663 and 212, the FAA denied that there was ever any danger of a collision. See also Aviation safety ADC Airlines Flight 86 List of accidents and incidents involving commercial aircraft Near miss (safety) References 1965 in New York (state) Accidents and incidents involving the Douglas DC-7 Airliner accidents and incidents in New York City Aviation accidents and incidents in the United States in 1965 663 February 1965 events in the United States Hempstead, New York