report cited the weak cooperation between the artillery and the infantry. The report also mentioned the poorly coordinated action of the armored units, driving to the minefields, which were uncleared by the sapper units. The commissar made serious charges against the commanders of the units and claimed in his report that they were very drunk while attempting to command the attacks. 30–31 July On 30 July the battle continued in similar fashion. Soviet artillery increased the intensity of its fire to 30,000 shells, the German artillery answered with 10,000 rounds of its own. The subsequent attack by Soviet heavy tanks broke through the defenses of the 2nd Battalion, De Ruyter consisting of 35–45 capable men running between their heavy machine guns. Simultaneously, Soviet platoons were climbing up the Grenadier Hill under intensive German bombardment. Eventually the attack was repelled by German hand grenades. The Soviets attacked the II. Battalion, 3rd Estonian which, in close combat, destroyed 12 tanks and repelled this latest assault. Units of the Soviet 8th Army advanced in the forests of the southern section of the front. On 31 July the Soviet command changed the direction of its preparatory artillery fire, this time aiming it behind the hill and cutting off the German defenders from the main army group. The gradual decrease in the number of shells fired by the Soviet artillery (9,000 rounds on 30 July) was evidence of the weakening of the Soviet attacks. Soviet infantry started climbing up the Grenadier Hill. The Estonian units against them ran out of ammunition. The remnants of the I. Battalion, 3rd Estonian resisted the Soviet attacks on the southern flank. That time the political commissar of the 2nd Shock Army admitted the failure to break through the defense. He explained it by stating the artillery fire was running late. The report presented the false assertion that the Germans had captured the Grenadier Hill only on 30 July. Soviet reinforcements in August Receiving the order from Stalin to break through to Tallinn at all costs, Govorov made Fedyuninsky responsible for reaching Rakvere no later than 7 August. During the first days of August, the 2nd Shock Army received the 110th and 124th Rifle Corps as reinforcements, raising the number of troops to over 20,000 again. The 8th Army received similar additions to their forces with the 112th and 117th Corps ordered to join the attacks. Soviet tank forces were