Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), was a case in which the US Supreme Court ruled that an implied cause of action existed for an individual whose Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizures had been violated by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The victim of such a deprivation could sue for the violation of the Fourth Amendment itself despite the lack of any federal statute authorizing such a suit. The existence of a remedy for the violation was implied by the importance of the right violated. The case has been subsequently interpreted to create a cause of action against the federal government similar to the one in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the states. Background Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) agents searched the Brooklyn home of the plaintiff, Webster Bivens, and arrested him without a warrant. Drug charges were filed but were later dismissed by a US commissioner (now called magistrate judge). Bivens filed a lawsuit alleging the violation of his Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable search and seizure. The government claimed that the violation allowed for only a state law claim for invasion of privacy and that the Fourth Amendment provides no cause of action but only a rebuttable defense for the FBN agents. The district court agreed and dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for Bivens's failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on that secondary issue of whether a plaintiff can bring a claim in federal court based solely on an alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Bivens was represented pro bono by Stephen A. Grant. Decision The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, laid down a rule that it will infer a private right of action for monetary damages where no other federal remedy is provided for the vindication of a constitutional right, based on the principle that "for every wrong, there is a remedy". The court reasoned based upon a presumption that where there is a violation of a right, the plaintiff can recover whatever he could recover under any civil action, unless Congress has expressly curtailed that right of recovery, or there exist some "special factors counseling hesitation". Concurrence Justice Harlan voted with the majority to reverse the lower court but also wrote a separate concurring