Tank Armies. To launch an attack from the front of Dubno, Shepetovka, Lyubar in a southerly direction with the task of smashing the German grouping in the area of Kremenets, Starokonstantinov, Tarnopol and seizing Berestechko, Brody, Tarnopol, Proskurov, Khmilniki areas. In the future, to advance in the general direction on Chortkov, in order to cut off the southern group of German forces the withdrawal paths westward in the area north of the Dniester river." In the final form, the plan of the operation saw the main attack to be launched by the forces of the 13th, 60th, 1st Guards Combined-Arms Armies, 3rd Guards and 4th Tank Armies from the front of Torgovitsa, Shepetivka, Lyubar to the south in the general direction on Brody, Ternopil, Chortkiv, Khmelnytskyi. Secondary attacks were to be delivered by the 18th and 38th armies towards the Khmilnyk, Zhmerynka and Vinnytsia areas. During the preparation of the operation, large re-grouping of the troops was carried out. Throughout the February 1944, the 1st Ukrainian Front participated in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky Operation. Therefore, a significant number of front-line troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front by mid-February were on its left wing. The new operation required the creation of a strong strike force closer to the right wing. It was necessary to transfer the 3rd Guards Tank Army and a significant number of artillery, tank, engineering units from the Berdychiv area to the Shumsk region, to regroup the 60th and 1st Guards armies almost completely into their new lines, and also to move the 18th and 38th armies to the right wing as well. Meanwhile, the 4th Tank Army had to advance 350 kilometers from the area west of Kiev. The huge transfer of forces 200–350 km westwards, through the deep spring mud or rasputitsa, as well as destroyed landscape, was extremely challenging. By the beginning of the operation, it was not possible to create the necessary fuel reserves. On the eve of the attack, fuel stocks for tank units dropped alarmingly to less than 3 day's supply. Despite this, Zhukov and the front command decided to launch the operation, as the mudslide intensified more and more, and every day of respite gave the Germans time to recover. It was taken into account that the additional amount of fuel would go to the troops on the 3rd or 4th day of the operation. However, the fuel and ammunition shortages would be