The Prophet Muhammad did not call for the deaths of contemporaries who left Islam (Mohamed Ghilan)—for example, apostates like "Hishâm and 'Ayyash", or converts to Christianity, such as "Ubaydallah ibn Jahsh"—and since what The Prophet did is by definition part of the Sunnah of Islam, this indicates "that one who changes her/his religion should not be killed" (Tariq Ramadan); another reason not to use the hadith(s) stating “whoever changes his religion kill him” as the basis for law is that it is not among the class of hadith eligible to be used as the basis for "legal rulings binding upon all Muslims for all times" (Muhammad al-Shawkani (1759–1834 CE)); as their authenticity is not certain (Wael Hallaq); the hadith are in a category relying "on only one authority (khadar al-ahad) and were not widely known amongst the Companions of the Prophet," and so ought not abrogate Quranic verses of tolerance (Peters and Vries describing argument of Islamic Modernists); The hadith(s) "calling for apostates to be killed are actually referring to "what can be considered in modern terms political treason", not change in personal belief (Mohamed Ghilan), (Adil Salahi); punishment of collective conspiracy and treason against the government (Enayatullah Subhani); (Mahmud Shaltut); and in fact, translating the Islamic term ridda as simply "apostasy" — a standard practice — is really an error, as ridda should be defined as "the public act of political secession from the Muslim community" (Jonathan Brown); The punishment or lack for apostasy should reflect the circumstances of the Muslim community which is very different now then when the death penalty was established; Unlike some other sharia laws, those on how to deal with apostates from Islam are not set in stone but should be adjusted according to circumstances based on what best serves the interests of society. In the past, the death penalty for leaving Islam "protected the integrity of the Muslim community", but today this goal is no longer met by punishing apostasy (Jonathan Brown); the "premise and reasoning underlying the sunna rule of death penalty for apostasy were valid in the historical context" where 'disbelief is equated with high treason' because citizenship was 'based on belief in Islam', but doesn't apply today (Abdullahi An-Na'im, et al.); the prescription of death penalty for apostasy found in hadith was aimed at prevention of aggression against Muslims and sedition against the state (Mahmud Shaltut); it's a man-made rule