in the defunct SADC Tribunal and as occurs in the ECJ and East African Court of Justice. Instead, judges are appointed by the Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission (RJLSC), an independent 11 person body created expressly for the purpose to decide judicial admission. While member states do vote in the selection of the president of the Court, political distance is maintained since it is the RJLSC alone which is responsible for selecting the nominees to the post of president for the member states to vote upon. Member states cannot substitute any nominee and must await a fresh selection by the RJLSC in the event that they fail to approve an appointment for president. Even appointment to the RJLSC itself is done by relatively independent jurists, including the deans of the law school at the University of the West Indies and other law schools in the contracting states (jointly responsible for two nominations), as well as the Organisation of the Commonwealth Caribbean Bar Association and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States Bar Association (also jointly responsible for two nominations). The RJLSC does not consider potential judges by recommendations from contracting member states, but by a prospective judge's individual application. Only the RJLSC is responsible for initiating proceedings for the removal of a judge (due to inability to perform or misbehaviour) and for recommending an increase in the number of judicial positions in the court. Judges of the Court (including the president) may only be removed (by the RJLSC in the case of other judges or heads of government in the case of the president) by an affirmation of a tribunal specifically established for this purpose. While normal judges of the CCJ have life tenure until the age of 72, the president of the Court may only serve for one, non-renewable 7-year term. As a result, all judges of the CCJ (unlike judges in the ECJ or the defunct SADC Tribunal) are free to make decisions without having to consider judicial term renewal. This put a check on the potential for political influence on the CCJ through the president of the Court (who also serves as chairman of the RJLSC), who is appointed by the super majority vote of three-quarters of the contracting states upon the recommendation of the RJLSC as once voted in the president of the Court would not potentially be beholden to the governments of the contracting states