to carry out frequent headcounts and direct distribution of food. UNBRO also distributed food in two of the Khmer Rouge camps to the south of Aranyaprathet (Nong Prue and Tap Prik) although initially it was not permitted to carry out headcounts. The Central sector also included NW82, a subcamp located at Nong Samet housing 800 Vietnamese land refugees assisted by ICRC. • 70,000 Cambodians in the Northern and Southern sectors. The eight camps in the Northern sector (Ban Baranae, O'Bok, Naeng Mut, Chong Chom, Ban Charat, Samrong Kiat, Paet Urn and Nam Yuen) totalled 28,000 people. The three Southern sector camps comprising 42,000 aid recipients were Sok Sann, Borai and Ta Luan. • 65,000 Thai border residents living in villages affected by conflict also received UNBRO food aid through the Affected Thai Village Program. Following the 1984-1985 Vietnamese dry-season offensive the number of refugee camps administered by UNBRO was reduced from 21 to 11 as the refugee population was consolidated into larger camps such as Site Two. Administration The organization was initially run with WFP; in 1988 UNDP took over the administration of UNBRO from WFP. In 1991 the UN Secretary General decided that UNHCR would replace UNDP as the administrative agency. The UNHCR Representative in Thailand had the title of Director of UNBRO, but the UNBRO Deputy Director, whose sole responsibility was UNBRO, administered the day-to-day operations. UNBRO was phased out in December 2001. Legacy UNBRO staff provided humanitarian aid under difficult and dangerous conditions in what was frequently an active war zone. In early 1983, Director Winston Prattley described the situation for donors in New York: "The Khmer civilian administration and leadership...has rapidly given way to military or paramilitary leadership, whose visible and active presence has transformed most major settlements into armed camps. Weapons and military equipment are in plain evidence and are brandished amongst the UNBRO and voluntary agency personnel as they attempt to provide relief assistance. As a consequence, the control and direction of food distribution and provision of medical services has become less efficient, more precarious and often dangerous. UNBRO officials have been abused and held at gun-point. During the offensive, UNBRO and voluntary agency personnel have been subject to grave personal risk as a consequence of artillery bombardment and other military action..." Critics concluded that UNBRO served a purpose beyond humanitarianism—namely as a vehicle to deliver support to anti-Vietnamese factions operating out of the