with the leader choosing a quantity first. The follower observes the decision of the leader and chooses his quantity. There are some further constraints upon the sustaining of a Stackelberg equilibrium. The leader must know ex ante that the follower observes his action. The follower must have no means of committing to a future non-Stackelberg follower action and the leader must know this. Indeed, if the 'follower' could commit to a Stackelberg leader action and the 'leader' knew this, the leader's best response would be to play a Stackelberg follower action. More generally, in a Stackelberg game one player moves before the other player, which can provide either a first-mover advantage or a first-mover disadvantage, depending on the specific assumptions that are made in the game. Other well-known games are the Bertrand game and the Cournot game. The Nash equilibrium plays an important role in solving the Stackelberg game and other games. See also Stackelberg competition. Publications Grundlagen einer reinen Kostentheorie (Foundations of Pure Cost Theory), Vienna, 1932 Marktform und Gleichgewicht (Market Structure and Equilibrium),2011, Translated by Bazin, Damien, Hill, Rowland, Urch, Lynn Vienna, 1934 Website for the book Grundlagen der theoretischen Volkswirtschaftslehre (Foundations of Theoretical Economics), Bern, 1948 The Theory of the Market Economy, London, 1952 Foundations of a Pure Cost Theory, 2014, Translated by Bazin, Damien, Hill, Rowland, Urch, Lynn Website for the book References 1905 births 1946 deaths Baltic-German people Barons of Germany Russian emigrants to Germany SS non-commissioned officers University of Cologne alumni Academic staff of the Humboldt University of Berlin Academic staff of the University of Bonn 20th-century German economists Heinrich Freiherr von