staffs and was repeated at meetings between the corps commanders and the Fourth Army commander, General Sir Henry Rawlinson, who on 21 April asked for plans to be submitted by each division within the corps framework. British planning for the battle introduced daily objectives, GHQ and the Fourth Army headquarters setting objectives and leaving to corps and divisional commanders, discretion about the means to achieve them. By June, each corps was liaising with neighbouring corps and divisions, divisions were asked to send in wire-cutting timetables, so that the heavy artillery (under corps command) could refrain from bombarding the same areas, reducing visibility needed to observe the effect of the divisional artillery. In VIII Corps, the plan ran to with including details for infantry companies. Other corps made similar plans but went into less detail than VIII Corps, all conforming to the general instructions contained in the Fourth Army Tactical Notes. Planning in the Third Army for the attack on Gommecourt, showed a similar pattern of discussion and negotiation between divisions, corps and army headquarters. Lieutenant-General Thomas Snow, the VII Corps commander, made representations to the Third Army that Gommecourt was the wrong place for a diversion but was over-ruled, because the staff at GHQ considered the protection of the left flank of VIII Corps from artillery-fire from the north, to be more important. Preparations began on 3 July for an attack on the German second position between Longueval and Bazentin le Petit. Engineers and pioneers cleared roads and tracks, filled in old trenches and brought forward artillery and ammunition; the objective and the German third position were photographed from the air. All of the British infantry commanders wanted to attack at dawn, before German machine-gunners could see easily. A dawn attack needed a secret night assembly on the far side of no man's land, which was wide. Haig and Rawlinson discussed the plan several times, with Haig having severe doubts about the feasibility of a night-assembly and suggested an evening attack on the right flank, where no man's land was narrowest. Rawlinson and the corps commanders insisted on the original plan and eventually Haig gave way. A preliminary bombardment began on 11 July, with artillery-fire on the German positions to be attacked, counter-battery fire and night firing on villages and approaches behind the German front line, particularly Waterlot Farm, Flers, High Wood, Martinpuich, Le Sars and Bapaume. The Reserve Army