bombarded Pozières and Courcelette and the French bombarded Waterlot Farm, Guillemont and Ginchy. Strict economy of ammunition was necessary, with heavy guns limited to per day. British and French aircraft prevented German air observation and ammunition was moved forward night and day, over ground so damaged and waterlogged, that it took five or six hours to make a round-trip. British–French plans Rawlinson submitted a plan to Haig on 3 April for an attack on a front of , to a depth of , between Maricourt and Serre. The plan contained the alternatives of an advance by stages or one rush and whether to attack after a hurricane bombardment or a methodical bombardment. Rawlinson wanted to advance and capture the German front position from Mametz to Serre and then after a pause, advance another from Fricourt to Serre, which included the German second position from Pozières to Grandcourt. Haig called the plan a proposal for a frontal advance of equal strength along all the front. Haig directed Rawlinson to consider advancing beyond the first position, near Montauban on the right and at Miraumont and Serre on the left but offered no extra forces to achieve this. Haig suggested that with the ample artillery ammunition available, capturing the Montauban spur would be easier on the first day and that and the tactical benefit of possession of the Montauban and Serre–Miraumont spurs would reduce the danger from German counter-attacks. After consultations between Joffre, General Ferdinand Foch and Haig, Rawlinson was instructed to plan for an advance of on a front, taking the German first position and advancing midway to the second position on the right at Montauban, taking the first position in the centre and the second position from Pozières to Grandcourt. An extra corps was allotted to the Fourth Army but the different concepts of step by step advances or a quicker advance to force German withdrawals on the flanks, was not resolved. Further problems arose when the French contribution to the offensive was reduced and in late May, the British began to doubt that the French could participate at all. On 29 May, Haig directed that the aims of the offensive would be to wear down the German army and reach positions favourable for an offensive in 1917. The British–French attacks on 1 July had succeeded on the southern half of the front but north of the Albert–Bapaume road the British