the business executive, the Group Board of twenty people, a series of regional boards and numerous area committees. This could be likened to English local, county and national government, where society members stood for election and if successful were expected to represent members at all levels of the society, simultaneously, with positions held in on co-op committees corresponding to departments (the businesses boards), the cabinet (the national Board), devolved nations and regions (Regional Boards), counties and parish councils (Area Committees), plus doing press events and engaging with neighbourhoods and communities such as a highly paid professional member a national government might face: quite a task for volunteer laypeople. The Group Board was made up of fifteen "lay" member directors elected from regional boards, another five which came from the "independent societies" and, though there was the option to appoint up to three "independent professional non-executive directors" (IPNEDs) to the Group Board at any one time, only one was ever appointed. All Group Board members (excluding IPNEDs) were appointed by competitive regional election – in contrast, most building societies and PLCs have a nominations committee consisting of members of the executive which picks potential board members and puts them up for uncontested elections. A series of regional boards, consisting of twelve to fifteen people elected from area committees, were responsible for holding the Group Board to account and for block-voting at the Annual General Meeting. There were 48 area committees which were responsible for representing member interests and promoting membership within their constituency. Out of the millions of members that the Group had, only area committee members were able to vote in the elections for the regional boards and "lay" director seats on the Group Board and the votes were weighted depending on the value of sales within individual areas. One of the justifications for this complex governance arrangement was that it took a number of years to reach regional board level, which helped to minimise the influence of single-issue campaigners and carpet-baggers. In the 1990s it was these issues, notably the failed take-over by Andrew Regan in 1997, which caused significant problems for the, then, CRS and CWS. The Myners Review noted that "the primary source of power within the Group [was] firmly entrenched at the level of the Regional Boards", replicating the roles of the predecessor regional societies in voting a century before, and the review concluded that it