that "we will have to account every single rape and killing when back in (West) Pakistan. God never spares the Tyrant." The Government of East Pakistan appointed Niazi as commander of the Eastern Command, and Major-General Rao Farman Ali as their military adviser for the East Pakistan Rifles and Pakistan Marines. In October 1971, he created and deployed two ad hoc divisions to strengthen the defence of the East from further infiltration. In November 1971, General Abdul Hamid Khan, the Chief of Staff, warned him of an imminent Indian attack on the East and advised him to redeploy the Eastern Command on a tactical and political base ground but this was not implemented due to shortage of time. In a public message, Niazi was praised by Abdul Hamid Khan saying: "The whole nation is proud of you and you have their full support". No further orders or clarification was issued in regards to the orders as Niazi had been caught unawares when the Indian Army planned to launch a full assault on East Pakistan. On 3 December 1971, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) launched Operation Chengiz Khan, the pre-emptive PAF air-strikes on Indian Air Force bases that officially led to start of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the third war with India. According to Krishna Chandra Sagar, Niazi was surprisingly not aware of the attack and had no prior knowledge of the attack. Credibility of this claim is given by Niazi's press secretary and public relations officer, then-Major Siddique Salik, who wrote in Witness to Surrender, that Niazi's chief of staff Brigadier Baqir Siddiqi reportedly scolded him of not notifying Niazi and his staff of an aerial attack on India. Surrendering of Eastern Command When Indian Army soldiers crossed the borders and charged towards Dhaka, General Niazi panicked when he came to realise the real nature of the Indian strategy and became frantically nervous when the Indian Army successfully penetrated the defence of the East. Niazi's military staff further regretted not heeding the intelligence warnings issued 20 years earlier in the 1952 Cable 1971 report compiled by Major K. M. Arif, the military intelligence official on Niazi's staff. According to the testimonies provided by Major-General Farman Ali in the War Enquiry Commission, Niazi's morale collapsed as early as 7 December and he cried frantically over the progress report presented to Governor Abdul Motaleb. Niazi ultimately blamed Lieutenant-General Tikka Khan for