group's scout bombers on June 4, 1942, he made the critical tactical decision that led to the sinking of two of Japan's fleet carriers, and . When McClusky could not find the Japanese carriers where he expected them, and with his air group's fuel running dangerously low, he began a box search and on the second leg spotted the steaming north at flank speed. Arashi had stayed behind to attack the submarine , which had been harassing the Japanese fleet. Surmising that Arashi must be following the main fleet, McClusky ordered a change in course in the same direction as Arashi. This led him directly to the enemy carriers. McClusky gave the order to attack, which resulted in confusion, with both squadrons of 31 aircraft diving on the closer carrier, Kaga. Doctrine called for McClusky's forward squadron to attack the more distant carrier, Akagi, and the squadron behind his to attack Kaga. Two simultaneous carrier attacks would have made it harder for Japanese Zeros to respond. Lieutenant Richard Best, who commanded the other squadron and was considered to be its best pilot, noticed the error and pulled out with two wingmen to attack Akagi, with Best scoring a direct hit amidships and a wingman a near miss which disabled the rudder and rendered Akagi immobile. The other 28 dive bombers, some of which nearly collided with each other, scored at least four hits on Kaga, leaving it a burning wreck. As he pulled out of his dive, McClusky's plane was pounced on by two Zeros, which put 52 holes in his plane and a bullet through his shoulder. After his gunner shot down one of the Zeros, McClusky was able to land his plane safely on Enterprise even with partially shot-up controls. The confused attack order was later explained as a radio error due to multiple people speaking at the same time. McClusky had been a fighter pilot prior to becoming Air Group Commander and was very familiar with dive bombing doctrine, as was Best. McClusky's decision to lead his squadron in attacking the closer Kaga was in keeping with doctrine that stated it was the commander on the scene that could make the decision as to what target to bomb. Within minutes, three of the four Japanese carriers had been turned into burning hulks, with the Sōryū being hit by Yorktown's dive bombers. The remaining carrier of the Japanese