final Allied advances of March 1945 – together with Hitler's insistent orders to stand and fight to the last – had left the bulk of surviving German forces in isolated pockets and occupied territories, mostly outside the boundaries of pre-Nazi Germany. Dönitz attempted to form a government at Flensburg on the Danish border, and was joined there on 2 May 1945 by the "Oberkommando der Wehrmacht" (OKW) (English: "Upper Command of the Armed Forces") under Wilhelm Keitel, which had previously relocated, first to Krampnitz near Potsdam, and then to Rheinsberg, during the Battle of Berlin. But, although Dönitz sought to present his government as 'unpolitical', there was no repudiation of Nazism, the Nazi Party was not banned, leading Nazis were not detained, and the symbols of Nazism remained in place. Both the Soviets and the Americans remained adamant in not recognising Dönitz or the Flensburg Government as capable of representing the German state. At Hitler's death German armies remained in the Atlantic pockets of La Rochelle, St Nazaire, Lorient, Dunkirk and the Channel Islands; the Greek islands of Crete, Rhodes and the Dodecanese; southern Norway; Denmark; the northwestern Netherlands; northern Croatia; northern Italy; Austria; Bohemia and Moravia; the Courland peninsula in Latvia; the Hel Peninsula in Poland and in Germany towards Hamburg, facing British and Canadian forces; in Mecklenburg, Pomerania and the besieged city of Breslau, facing Soviet forces; and in southern Bavaria towards Berchtesgaden, facing American and French forces. Surrender document Representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom working through the European Advisory Commission (EAC) throughout 1944 sought to prepare an agreed surrender document to be used in the potential circumstances of Nazi power being overthrown within Germany either by military or civil authorities, and a post-Nazi government then seeking an armistice. By 3 January 1944, the Working Security Committee in the EAC proposed: The committee further suggested that the instrument of surrender be signed by representatives of the German High Command. The considerations behind this recommendation were to prevent the repetition of the so-called stab-in-the-back myth, where extremists in Germany claimed that since the Armistice of 11 November 1918 had been signed only by civilians, the High Command of the Army carried no responsibility for the instrument of defeat or for the defeat itself. Not everyone agreed with the committee's predictions. Ambassador William Strang, 1st Baron Strang, the British representative at the EAC,