Judiciary bill. It distributed more than 15 million letters condemning the plan. They targeted specific constituencies: farm organization, editors of agricultural publications, and individual farmers. They also distributed material to 161,000 lawyers, 121,000 doctors, 68,000 business leaders, and 137,000 clergymen. Pamphleteering, press releases and trenchantly worded radio editorials condemning the bill also formed part of the onslaught in the public arena. House action Traditionally, legislation proposed by the administration first goes before the House of Representatives. However, Roosevelt failed to consult Congressional leaders before announcing the bill, which stopped cold any chance of passing the bill in the House. House Judiciary Committee chairman Hatton W. Sumners believed the bill to be unconstitutional and refused to endorse it, actively chopping it up within his committee in order to block the legislation's chief effect of Supreme Court expansion. Finding such stiff opposition within the House, the administration arranged for the bill to be taken up in the Senate. Congressional Republicans deftly decided to remain silent on the matter, denying congressional Democrats the opportunity to use them as a unifying force. Republicans then watched from the sidelines as the Democratic party split itself in the ensuing Senate fight. Senate hearings The administration began making its case for the bill before the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 10, 1937. Attorney General Cummings' testimony was grounded on four basic complaints: the reckless use of injunctions by the courts to pre-empt the operation of New Deal legislation; aged and infirm judges who declined to retire; crowded dockets at all levels of the federal court system; and the need for a reform which would infuse "new blood" in the federal court system. Administration advisor Robert H. Jackson testified next, attacking the Supreme Court's alleged misuse of judicial review and the ideological perspective of the majority. Further administration witnesses were grilled by the committee, so much so that after two weeks less than half the administration's witnesses had been called. Exasperated by the stall tactics they were meeting on the committee, administration officials decided to call no further witnesses; it later proved to be a tactical blunder, allowing the opposition to indefinitely drag-on the committee hearings. Further setbacks for the administration occurred in the failure of farm and labor interests to align with the administration. However, once the bill's opposition had gained the floor, it pressed its upper hand, continuing hearings as long as public sentiment against the