in the labor markets, Bill Clinton's administration signaled the desirability of yen appreciation against the dollar: "I would like to see a stronger yen.” Also, in February 1993, then-Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen reiterated the position when he was asked if he'd like to see a weaker dollar. These comments were to influence the USDJPY so as to protect against Japanese export-growth at the expense of the U.S. current account position. Afterwards, the dollar slumped against the yen, moving the yen to the 100 level against the dollar in the 1993 summer. Inception In response to the ailing dollar, on 25 April the G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors released a statement from their meeting in Washington, D.C. calling for the orderly appreciation of the dollar:“The ministers and governors expressed concerns about recent developments in exchange markets. They agreed that recent movements have gone beyond the levels justified by underlying economic conditions in the major countries. They also agreed that orderly reversal of those movements is desirable, would provide a better basis for the continued expansion of international trade and investment, and would contribute to our common objectives of sustained non-inflationary growth. They further agreed to strengthen their efforts in reducing internal and external imbalances and to continue to cooperate closely in exchange markets.”Replacing Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen early in December 1994, Robert E. Rubin responded to the dollar’s depreciation with: “A strong dollar is in our national interest.” Thus, in 1995, Rubin re-set U.S. dollar policy, stating, in paraphrase: The strong-dollar policy is a U.S. government policy based on the assumption that a strong exchange rate of the dollar is both in the U.S. national interest and in the interest of the rest of the world. Rubin further emphasized that it “wouldn’t be used as a tool for trade." In essence, the strong dollar policy was seen as a way to assure investors that Washington would not intervene in exchange markets to debase the currency, a de-weaponization of the foreign exchange market, as Marc Chandler says. Robert Rubin’s motivation for introducing the strong dollar policy revolved around his desire to keep U.S. bond yields low, and to avoid criticism from trade partners that America was deliberately devaluing its currency to boost exports. Initially, the rhetoric helped the dollar rise by thirty percent between 1995 and 2002, but some assert that this had more to do with U.S. monetary tightening