This is radically different than assessments made before about the methodology of Soviet attacks and how the casualties were sustained versus Germans in general. Lets look at this in detail. First reason for this discovery may be in that the Soviet regimental, company, and personal documents of soldiers are not usually examined, and the small unit losses would be extrapolated from divisional level, at best. Most quality authors would be doing small unit combat loss assessments from statistical analysis of Krivosheev's work on Soviet combat losses, which is a very large data set Front, STAVKA and above level. Extrapolations from large data sets led them to the conclusion that the attacks themselves were a lot bloodier than they actually were due to losses sustained from bombings and artillery bombardments, or many other scenarios which caused legitimate Soviet divisional level losses, for example. Another reason still, is the fact that same Soviet units would be attacking over the span of days, resulting in accumulation of losses over time, and not sustaining it in a single attack. In other words, tip of the Soviet spear may of been being blunted at a slower rate, while casualties around the would be attained by other means as well. Soviet small unit attack methodologies may of not been as ignorant or casualty producing as originally thought. Back to the operational level. On the part of the Germans, opinions were divided: von Bock believed that the battle was over, and after rest and replenishment, the troops of Army Group Center could continue their successful offensive against Moscow. However, Hitler was preoccupied with the stubborn defense of the Soviet Southwestern Front near Kiev and the increasing resistance of the Soviet troops of Zhukov and Timoshenko in the Moscow direction. On the other hand, Guderian's victory at Roslavl, on the right flank of Army Group Center, opened up the possibility of an attack to the south and a gigantic encirclement of Soviet troops near Kiev. Gradually OKH leaned towards Hitler's opinion. However, neither Bock nor Hitler planned an immediate offensive directly on Moscow, and the need to constantly repel Soviet strikes exhausted the troops. Von Bock wrote: "I was now forced to commit all of my combat-capable divisions from the army group’s reserve into combat…. We needed every man forward… In spite of huge losses… the enemy attacked daily in several sectors so that, up to this time,