the internal waterways. The projection of power into the Mediterranean has also returned as a significant role for the Black Sea Fleet with the creation of the Russian Navy's permanent task force in the Mediterranean. Both the Black Sea Fleet and the Caspian Flotilla have supported Russian involvement in the Syrian Civil War with units from the former now routinely deployed into the Mediterranean. The deployment of submarines from the Black Sea Fleet to the Mediterranean has become a routine occurrence (though the need to send them for "maintenance" in the Baltic, so as to comply with terms of the Montreux Convention, lengthens the timeframe of such deployments significantly). In late 2021 it was reported that one of the new Priboy-class helicopter assault ships, the Mitrofan Moskalenko, had been earmarked to enter service with the Black Sea Fleet in the latter 2020s in the role of fleet flagship. If confirmed such a deployment would significantly enhance the fleet's power projection capabilities. Also significant is the build-up of Russian surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile assets in the region. Dmitry Gorenburg of the Centre for Naval Analysis (CNA) has noted that: "Russia's expanded military footprint in Crimea allows it to carry out a range of operations that it was not capable of prior to 2014. The deployment of S-400, Bastion, and Bal missiles allows the Russian military to establish an anti-access/area denial zone (A2/AD) covering almost all of the Black Sea. By using a combination of ground-based and ship-based missiles, backed with strong electronic warfare capabilities, the Russian military can inhibit military movement into the Black Sea and deny freedom of action to an opponent if it does make it into the theater. The long-range sea-, air-, and ground-launched missiles deny access, while shorter-range coastal and air defense systems focus on the area denial mission. The result is several interlocking air defense zones". Ongoing technological upgrades of this already robust SAM network are planned for the 2020s. Others, such as Michael Kofman of CNA, argue that while there is no A2/AD doctrine or term in Russian military strategy, Russian forces nevertheless are organized at an operational and strategic level to deploy a wide range of overlapping defensive and offensive capabilities that extend beyond just one theatre of operations like the Black Sea. The evident American response to the dense shore-based anti-ship and air defence capabilities that Russia has developed in the Black Sea