Carrier Division 2 would have passed right in front of it at 21:00 at range of about . The damaged Albacore landed at 17:45, less than a half-hour before sunset, and the crew was debriefed. There were two resulting revisions to the 16:00 sighting, which were transmitted to Somerville at 18:00 and 18:17 respectively, and differed significantly from the other and the original report. The final revision correctly identified the two carriers of Carrier Division 2 – which Somerville likely realized to be only part of the enemy force – but also claimed they were heading toward the northwest at a position or the original sighting. The course heading conflicted with the first revision, which suggested a course toward the southeast. Late on 5 April, FECB decrypted a JN 25B message containing Nagumo's planned movement on 6 April, but this did not aid Somerville as the transmission to the fleet was garbled. Somerville declined to launch a strike based on poor information, and opted to head northwest in pursuit. One radar-equipped aircraft was launched to search a northern arc out to . Later, aircraft were sent to search the easterly arc. By this time it was too late to reestablish contact with the Japanese. For the Japanese, too, there was a lost opportunity to find the British before night fell. Nagumo did not order a search for the British carriers at the appearance of British carrier-based aircraft. Search aircraft might require homing signals from the carriers to return, homing signals which the enemy could use to locate the Japanese. The Japanese continued southeast at 20 knots completely unaware of the presence of Force A. Carrier Division 2 rejoined the main body's track at 18:00, and caught up at 22:00 due east of Force A. The Japanese circled wide to the south and then east in preparation for striking Trincomalee. The Japanese suspected the presence of British carriers, and on the morning of 6 April they launched a much denser westward air search, but found nothing. Further searches on route to Trincomalee were equally unsuccessful as the British carriers were by that time far to the west. By 6 April, British SIGINT indicated the Japanese force contained four carriers and three battleships, a force Somerville clearly realized as beyond the Eastern Fleet's capability to engage without undue risk. The declining serviceability of his fighter force also reinforced his caution. Even so,