the southwest. Somerville's decision to refuel at Port T – rather than on Ceylon – on 2 April allowed the Eastern Fleet to avoid Nagumo a few days later, and likely saved the Eastern Fleet from destruction. The failure of the Japanese fleet to appear on 1–2 April led Somerville to mistakenly believe that the entirety, rather than a part, of Allied intelligence concerning Operation C was flawed. As a result he detached Cornwall, Dorsetshire, and Hermes, which were subsequently lost after being sent into areas overflown by Japanese aerial reconnaissance. Andrew Boyd notes: The disquieted Admiralty broadly agreed. Somerville faced challenges not experienced by the RN in the Atlantic or Mediterranean. Japanese air superiority made it difficult to scout, close, and attack during the day. Radar-enabled night attack was the only viable offensive option. This was a high-risk strategy. A combination of careful positioning, luck, and Japanese errors nearly produced the preconditions for a strike on the night of 5 April; the enemy was within – 1-hour flight range in an Albacore – but accurate information on the enemy's vector was missing. Even then, it required experienced air crews to find their targets at night, using radar with a range of just and new tactics. References Notes Articles Books Uses recently translated Japanese sources. Further Reading Crusz, Noel, The Cocos Islands Mutiny, Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 2001. External links Order of battle WW2DB.com: Raids into Indian Ocean Royal Air Force History: Battle for Ceylon Conflicts in 1942 Indian Ocean operations of World War II Military of British Ceylon Naval battles of World War II involving Japan 1942 in Japan World War II raids Naval battles of World War II involving Canada Military history of Ceylon in World War II Naval battles and operations of World War II involving the United Kingdom March 1942 events April 1942 events