Conference; the latter factor may not even have been considered by RN strategists. British assessment of Japanese intentions In July, the Japanese moved into southern Indochina. In response, the British reassessed Japanese intentions from August to early September, which came to a number of conclusions. The Japanese were waiting for the outcome of the German invasion of the Soviet Union before deciding on a northern or southern expansion strategy, but were concentrating resources in anticipation of the former. Malaya was vulnerable due to the Japanese encroachment in Indochina, but was not immediately threatened due to the northern option and the monsoon season, which would prevent amphibious landings on Malaya until February 1942. The assessment was fatally flawed. It underestimated economic factors driving Japanese toward the southern strategy. It also failed to appreciate that the Gulf of Thailand was reasonably sheltered against the monsoon. As a result, air reinforcement to Malaya was deferred; aircraft went to the Middle East, and to the Soviet Union as aid. Overall, Japan seemed at such a disadvantage that increased military deterrence might still prevent war or delay its onset. Selecting Prince of Wales In late August, Prime Minister Winston Churchill discussed Far East reinforcement with Admiral Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord. Churchill proposed augmenting phase 1 with a . The United States declared its intent to deploy modern battleships to the Atlantic at the Atlantic Conference in early August; this would make a King George V-class ship available. Pound favoured keeping the King George Vs in Britain. Pound proposed basing the Nelsons, the battlecruiser , and an aircraft carrier at Singapore. This would be for deterrent value in peacetime, to be withdrawn to Ceylon on the onset of war; the British believed a wartime fleet at Singapore had to be competitive with a major portion of the IJN. Interestingly, Pound did not envision an aircraft carrier in the Far East until spring 1942. In meetings on 17 and 20 October, the British Defence Committee formally discussed Far East naval reinforcement in response to the fall of the moderate Konoe government on 16 October. In agreement with August-September assessment of Japanese intentions, Churchill and his cabinet favoured the deployment of a modern battleship for deterrent effect. The RN, as part of its offensive strategy, planned to send the Nelson and Revenge-class battleships to Singapore, but the Nelsons could not deploy. was damaged in the Mediterranean