hegemon would begin to undermine the institution when it is not in their interests. With the decline of a hegemon, the system descends into instability. The classical liberal interpretation It is motivated by 'enlightened self-interest'; the hegemon takes on the costs because it is good for all actors, thereby creating stability in the system, which is also in the interests of all actors. The neoliberal interpretation Neoliberals argue that the hegemon wishes to maintain its dominant position without paying enforcement costs, so it creates a system in which it can credibly limit the returns to power (loser doesn't lose all) and credibly commit to neither dominate nor abandon them. This is done through institutions, which are sticky, (hard to change, more convenient to continue using than to revamp.) These institutions favor the hegemon, but provide protection and a stable world order for the rest of the world. The more open this world-order, the less likely that there will be a challenger. With the decline of the hegemon, institutions don't automatically die, because they were constructed in a way that benefited all stakeholders; instead, they take on a life of their own (see regime theory). Criticism Keohane's 1984 book After Hegemony used insights from the new institutional economics to argue that the international system could remain stable in the absence of a hegemon, thus rebutting hegemonic stability theory. Keohane showed that international cooperation could be sustained through repeated interactions, transparency, and monitoring. These factors could reduce transaction costs and provide information about other states (for example, whether the states are cheating or contributing). Duncan Snidal argues that international cooperation is sustainable even after hegemony because smaller states derive sufficient benefits to be willing to contribute towards international institutions. Using insights from historical institutionalism, John Ikenberry argues that the international institutions set up by the United States are sustainable due to feedback effects, whereby it is costly for actors to set up alternative institutions. Ikenberry also argues that hegemonic stability theory fails to account for regime types, which is essential to understanding why democratic hegemons such as the United States created institutions during periods in which they were hegemons, whereas non-democratic hegemons in previous eras did not set up institutional orders when given the opportunity. Consistent with hegemonic stability theory, Ikenberry argues that the ability to create institutions is partly due to power preponderance. Dominic Tierney argues that hegemonic stability theorists are