other states) to allow him to achieve his foreign policy goals without going to war. In addition, Taylor argued that most of the 'contingencies' that Hitler listed as the prerequisite for war, such as an outbreak of civil war in France or the Spanish Civil War that led to a war between Italy and France in the Mediterranean, did not occur. Trevor-Roper countered that criticism by arguing that Hitler expressed an intention to go to war sooner rather than later and that it was Hitler's intentions in foreign policy in late 1937, as opposed to his precise plans later in history, that really mattered. Intentionalist and structuralist arguments It is often used by intentionalist historians such as Gerhard Weinberg, Andreas Hillgruber and Richard Overy to prove that Hitler planned to start a general European war, which became the Second World War, as part of a longtime master plan. However, functionalist historians such as Timothy Mason, Hans Mommsen and Ian Kershaw argue that the document shows no such plans, but the memorandum was an improvised ad hoc response by Hitler to the growing crisis in the German economy in the late 1930s. References Sources Overy, Richard. "Misjudging Hitler: A. J. P. Taylor and the Third Reich", 1999. Taylor, A. J. P. The Origins of the Second World War, Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1965. Trevor-Roper, Hugh "A. J. P. Taylor, Hitler and the War", Encounter, Volume 17, July 1961. External links The full text of the Memorandum, in English Adolf Hitler Foreign relations of Nazi Germany History of the foreign relations of the United Kingdom Memoranda Munich Agreement World War II documents 1937 in Germany 1937 documents