the savings and loan business by public accounting firms, security analysts, and the financial community. Organizational structure and supervisory laws, adequate for policing and controlling the business in the protected environment of the 1960s and 1970s, resulted in fatal delays and indecision in the examination/supervision process in the 1980s. Federal and state examination and supervisory staffs insufficient in number, experience, or ability to deal with the new world of savings and loan operations. The inability or unwillingness of the Bank Board and its legal and supervisory staff to deal with problem institutions in a timely manner. Many institutions, which ultimately closed with big losses, were known problem cases for a year or more. Often, it appeared, political considerations delayed necessary supervisory action. Major causes and lessons learned In 2005, former bank regulator William K. Black listed a number of lessons that should have been learned from the S&L Crisis that have not been translated into effective governmental action: Fraud matters, and control frauds pose unique risks. It is important to understand fraud mechanisms. Economists grossly underestimate its prevalence and impact, and prosecutors have difficulties finding it, even without the political pressure from politicians who receive campaign contributions from the banking industry. Control fraud can occur in waves created by poorly designed deregulation that creates a criminogenic environment. Waves of control fraud cause immense damage. Control frauds convert conventional restraints on abuse into aids to fraud. Conflicts of interest matter. Deposit insurance was not essential to S&L control frauds. There are not enough trained investigators in the regulatory agencies to protect against control frauds. Regulatory and presidential leadership is important. Ethics and social forces are restraints on fraud and abuse. Deregulation matters and assets matter. The SEC should have a chief criminologist. Control frauds defeat corporate governance protections and reforms. Stock options increase looting by control frauds. The "reinventing government" movement should deal effectively with control frauds. Failures In 1980, the United States Congress granted all thrifts, including savings and loan associations, the power to make consumer and commercial loans and to issue transaction accounts. Designed to help the thrift industry retain its deposit base and to improve its profitability, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980 allowed thrifts to make consumer loans up to 20 percent of their assets, issue credit cards, accept negotiable order of withdrawal accounts from individuals and nonprofit organizations, and invest up