effective army from the mass of civilian volunteers. The attacks were not set-piece offensives but mopping-up operations against particular localities to create the conditions for another set-piece attack, which had more success in consequence. Battalions from regiments of nine divisions fought in the area and the 3rd Guard Division suffered many casualties, the Regiment Lehr (the army demonstration battalion) almost being annihilated. J. P. Harris, also in 2009, wrote that the Fourth Army had continued the offensive with the three corps on the right to close up to the second position but was too slow to occupy Mametz Wood before 4 July; Haig toured the corps headquarters urging them forward. Harris criticised the Fourth Army headquarters and the corps headquarters, for inadequately commanding the resulting operations. Corps commanders delegated to divisions, which sometimes delegated to battalion commanders and caused a lack of co-ordination. Attacks were supported by small amounts of artillery and attacks on narrow fronts created untenable salients, vulnerable to crossfire from un-engaged units on the flanks, although German counter-attacks were just as prone to failure. The attacks on Contalmaison and the rest of the Fourth Army front cost the British but in the circumstances of early July, rushed and disjointed attacks might have been better than a delay to organise a deliberate attack, which could take a week allowing the defenders to recover. Harris suggested that from the British lacked aggression. The attacks from added to German problems and closing up to the second position was a considerable, if costly, victory. The Germans found themselves in a meat grinder, when the British artillery was rapidly increasing in effectiveness, much assisted by RFC artillery-observation aircraft. German counter-attacks were even worse prepared than British equivalents and most were repulsed. The policy of resolute defence and counter-attack exposed many German units to British firepower and by 10 July, the Germans had suffered Casualties On 1 July, the 34th Division suffered the largest number of casualties of the British divisions engaged, suffering The 15th Royal Scots suffered and the 16th Royal The Grimsby Chums lost and the 11th Suffolks had In 1921, the 34th Division historian, J. Shakespear using records compiled just after the division was relieved, write that in three days, the 101st Brigade had suffered the 102nd Brigade and the 103rd Brigade incurred From 30 June – 3 July, the 21st Division had The 23rd Division had to 10 July,