of touch with the front line, no artillery liaison officers being provided and that misleading reports were made by observers in balloons. Contalmaison was attacked from the wrong direction and headquarters were too distant to command. Despite the difficulties, several elaborately fortified positions had been captured in twelve days, of ground being captured from 2 to 13 July, compared to the taken on 1 July. The defenders had been reduced to a state of disorganisation and the French and British attacks after 2 July had occurred in the area where the first position had been overrun, with many casualties inflicted the defenders. Much of the German artillery had been destroyed by counter-battery bombardments and the German defence was compromised by the German commanders demanding an unyielding defence and counter-attacks against every loss of territory. Reserves were thrown into the defensive battle piecemeal, rather than being held back for organised counter-attacks or making tactical withdrawals to conserve manpower. The strain imposed by the Entente attacks after 1 July led Below to issue an order of the day (2nd Army Order I a 575 secret) on 3 July, forbidding voluntary withdrawals, after Falkenhayn had sacked the 2nd Army Chief of Staff, and General (XVII Corps), after Pannewitz had been allowed to withdraw to the third position south of the Somme; Grünert was replaced by Colonel Fritz von Loßberg. The Germans were equally capable of matching British ineptitude. In 2006, Jack Sheldon wrote that the limited attacks after 1 July were inescapable, given the commitments made to the French but this led to the British attacking on ground that was easier for the Germans to defend. In 2009, William Philpott wrote that many attacks had been made against skilful opponents in well-fortified positions, the attacks often being tactically crude, poorly co-ordinated and with inadequate artillery support. The inexperience of the New Army divisions was manifest but despite the tenacity of the German defenders, the positions were captured, often thanks to the capacity of battalion and brigade commanders to intervene at crucial moments. The 38th (Welsh), 17th (Northern) and 23rd divisions had been expended to capture Mametz Wood and Contalmaison, for more than and the sacking of the commanders of the 38th (Welsh) and 17th (Northern) divisions. The inexperience of corps and divisional commanders was exposed but the army hierarchy was efficient enough to remedy their worst failings, beginning the process of creating an