administration used techniques such as talks and games to determine the nature of the war and the temperament of the Soviet Union. Concerned by the growing number of nuclear weapons possessed by the nuclear armed nations, Reagan became ever more interested in finding a way to rid the world of nuclear threat. This dislike for nuclear weapons, however, extends all the way back to the start of his first term in which, upon the briefing of his different available nuclear strategies he was rendered sick, the meeting having to be rescheduled. 1983 proved to be a very tense year for the Reagan administration as things became unstable with the Soviets while Reagan continued to seek out ways to bring about peace whether or not the solution involved nuclear war. In June 1983, Reagan's Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, his chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, John William Vessey Jr., as well as dozens of high-ranking military personnel participated in a classified war game known as Proud Prophet which worked in real-time at the National War College. It was not the first of its kind, but did prove to be one of the most beneficial in determining the efficacy of America's nuclear strategy. In this game, they utilized each of America's nuclear strike tactics which included: Launch on warning: this was cut out almost immediately for fears of turning nuclear codes over to a computer which simply relied on a radar Horizontal escalation: this involved attacking Soviet outposts to encourage a response and counterattack that would diminish the number of nuclear weapons. It was dismissed because the Soviets did not seem to care if they lost their satellite territories. Early use: this was shown to be pointless because as the American team threatened the Soviet team, hoping the Soviets felt threatened and surrendered, instead felt threatened and responded with massive nuclear response Tit-for-Tat: this proved irresponsible as the two sides volleyed nuclear weapons back and forth until MAD was achieved In each of these instances, tested repeatedly and with different factors that would affect outcomes, the results were grim. Outcomes of the least deadly strategy resulted in a base level of half a billion deaths and more to come in the aftermath of a nuclear fallout contaminated and annihilated the northern hemisphere. In response to this information, the Reagan Administration changed their rhetoric and strategies changed, insisting on a permanent