votes are cast: A is preferred to C by 70 votes to 30 votes. (Locked) B is preferred to A by 42 votes to 28 votes. (Locked) B is preferred to C by 42 votes to 30 votes. (Locked) B is the Condorcet winner and therefore the Ranked pairs winner. Suppose the 28 A voters specify second choice C (they are burying B). The votes are now: A is preferred to C by 70 votes to 30 votes. (Locked) C is preferred to B by 58 votes to 42 votes. (Locked) B is preferred to A by 42 votes to 28 votes. (Cycle) There is no Condorcet winner and A is the Ranked pairs winner. By giving a second preference to candidate C the 28 A voters have caused their first choice to win. Note that, should the C voters decide to bury A in response, B will beat A by 72, restoring B to victory. Similar examples can be constructed for any Condorcet-compliant method, as the Condorcet and later-no-help criteria are incompatible. Commentary Woodall writes about Later-no-help, "... under STV [single transferable vote] the later preferences on a ballot are not even considered until the fates of all candidates of earlier preference have been decided. Thus a voter can be certain that adding extra preferences to his or her preference listing can neither help nor harm any candidate already listed. Supporters of STV usually regard this as a very important property, although not everyone agrees; the property has been described (by Michael Dummett, in a letter to Robert Newland) as 'quite unreasonable', and (by an anonymous referee) as 'unpalatable.'" See also Later-no-harm criterion References Further reading Tony Anderson Solgard and Paul Landskroener, Bench and Bar of Minnesota, Vol 59, No 9, October 2002. Brown v. Smallwood, 1915 Electoral system criteria