of the village, to Quadrangle Support Trench. Parties of the 50th Brigade attacked westwards up Strip Trench and Wood Support Trench, against German defenders who fought hand-to-hand, at great cost to both sides, before the objective was captured. Touch was gained with the 38th (Welsh) Division in the wood and the 23rd Division in the village, before the 21st Division took over early on 11 July; the 17th (Northern) Division had lost since 1 July. Aftermath Analysis In a 1925 Army Quarterly article based on German sources, G. C. Wynne wrote that German historians praised the defenders of Contalmaison, IR 183 being described as at the peak of its efficiency. The regiment still contained many pre-war trained officers and NCOs leading young troops who had spent the winter in training. Three British divisions had attacked nine battalions from IR 183, RIR 122 and IR Lehr. The British infantry were described as energetic but lacking in tactical skill and unable to exploit success. The German defeat was ascribed to the power of the British artillery, which overwhelmed the outnumbered German guns. The British artillery was accurate, benefiting from air supremacy quickly to engage targets, while the German guns had no help from artillery-observation aircraft. The historian of RIR 122 had written that the determined defence forced the British into resorting to masses of infantry, who suffered mass casualties; the British artillery expended a vast quantity of shells and lost much time in capturing only an intermediate defensive position held by a small force. In 2005, Prior and Wilson wrote that Rawlinson had not sufficiently co-ordinated the Fourth Army corps to ensure attacks at the same times, with adequate artillery support, against realistic objectives. From the 23rd Division attacked Contalmaison eight times and the 17th (Northern) Division on the right attacked eleven times but never simultaneously; artillery co-operation with a neighbouring corps was arranged only once. The British divisions lost about each; in III Corps, divisions also failed to co-ordinate, the 19th (Western) and 34th divisions attacking La Boisselle on the left, only once managing to attack at the same time as the 23rd Division. An officer wrote that there had not been enough reconnaissance, attacks were disjointed, liaison between flanking units was neglected, too many small attacks were made by bombing up trenches instead of fewer, better supported, simultaneous attacks over the top and that the artillery was too often out