"Congress has virtually plenary power in immigration matters and is not bound by otherwise applicable equal protection requirements". If state law governs, the court held that "the Colorado state law which rejects a purported marriage between persons of the same sex does not violate the due process or the equal protection clause of the federal constitution", on the basis that the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 34 L.E.2d 65, 93 S Ct 37 (1972), "is of paramount importance because a state court judgment prohibiting two people of the same sex from marrying each other was appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court on various constitutional grounds, including due process and equal protection. The High Court dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal question. Such a dismissal is an important adjudication on the merits." The court rejected the counterargument "that some persons are allowed to marry and their union is given full recognition and constitutional protection even though the above stated justification—procreation—is not possible" because "if the classification of the group who may validly marry is overinclusive, it does not affect the validity of the classification". Appeal On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's opinion on alternative grounds on February 25, 1982. They decided that it was unnecessary for them to determine if the Adams-Sullivan union qualified as a marriage under Colorado law. They noted that it was clear that "Congress did not intend the mere validity of a marriage under state law to be controlling" and that "even though two persons contract a marriage valid under state law and are recognized as spouses by that state, they are not necessarily spouses for purposes of section 201(b)." They held that "[t]he term marriage ordinarily contemplates a relationship between a man and a woman" (internal quotations and citations omitted) and that "[t]he term spouse commonly refers to one of the parties in a marital relationship so defined. Congress has not indicated an intent to enlarge the ordinary meaning of those words. In the absence of such a congressional directive, it would be inappropriate for us to expand the meaning of the term spouse for immigration purposes" (internal quotations and citations omitted) and that "Congress intended that only partners in heterosexual marriages be considered spouses under section 201(b)." In reviewing the constitutionality of the law, they rejected the plaintiffs' claim