Justice White relied on Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (permitting officers to conduct frisk of individual upon reasonable, articulable suspicion that person was armed and dangerous), and Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (permitting protective pat-down of motor vehicle for officer safety). Utilizing the balancing test set forth in those opinions (need for officer security v. nature of intrusion), Justice White reasoned that the "arresting officers are permitted in such circumstances to take reasonable steps to ensure their safety after, and while making, the arrest." According to Justice White, "[t]hat interest [officer safety] is sufficient to outweigh the intrusion such procedures may entail." Justice White set forth a two-part holding: As an incident to the arrest officers may, as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched. This portion of the holding has recently been called into question. If an officer wishes to conduct a sweep of the premises, there must be articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene. Justice White distinguished the case of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), which held that in the absence of a search warrant, justifiable searches incident to a lawful arrest could not extend beyond the arrestee's person and the area from within which the arrestee might have obtained a weapon. First, Justice White explained that the search in Chimel was a full-blown search of the entire house. Moreover, the search was conducted for the purpose of finding evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made. In contrast, the officers in Buie were not looking for contraband. Second, Justice White explained that the possible threat was different. "The justification for the search incident to arrest considered in Chimel was the threat posed by the arrestee, not the safety threat posed by the house, or more properly by unseen third parties in the house." The type of search authorized by the court in Buie is far removed from the top-to-bottom search involved in Chimel. It is not automatically permitted, and is only properly conducted only when justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the house