to Weihaiwei to avoid a second encounter with the Japanese fleet during the Battle of Lüshunkou. The Japanese did not pursue the retreating ships, as Dingyuan and Zhenyuan were only slightly damaged, and the Japanese had no way of knowing that the battleships suffered from a lack of ammunition. What remained of the Beiyang Fleet was finally destroyed during a combined Japanese land and naval attack at Weihaiwei. The defeat of the Beiyang Fleet at the Battle of Yalu River was a major propaganda victory for Japan, with many major European newspapers, including the London Times, Le Temps and Sankt-Peterburgskie Vedomosti, providing front-page coverage and crediting the Japanese victory to its rapid assimilation of western methods and technology. Many credited the prompt action of foreign advisers in the Beiyang Fleet (most notably McGiffin) from keeping the fleet from total annihilation, and for keeping even the most heavily damaged Chinese ships fighting until the very end of the engagement. Some contemporary military analysts, notably U.S. Secretary of the Navy Hilary A. Herbert, called the battle 'nearly a draw' – although the Chinese had lost several warships, the Japanese had suffered considerable damage, and if the Chinese ammunition had been of higher quality, the outcome might have been different. In addition to Herbert, several other American officials published analyses of the battle, including Alfred Thayer Mahan and William F. Halsey Sr. However, other factors were responsible for the Chinese defeat such as that most of the Chinese ships were over-age, obsolescent and ill-maintained. Additionally undisciplined crews and deficient naval tactics were also at fault. Mark Peattie and Davids Evans state the principal factors in the Japanese victory was their superiority in firepower, particularly an overwhelming advantage in quick-firing guns which proved to be devastating in the hands of well-trained and disciplined gun crews. At the time fire control systems were in their infancy with significant advances still some years away, neither side achieved more than a fraction of hits out of the total number of rounds fired. A contemporary European diplomat also concurs, observing that Japan's naval "victories were due to the skill and daring of her sailors, and not to the ships which they manned". The Chinese government, after initially denying that its fleet had been defeated, put the blame for the Chinese defeat on Viceroy Li Hongzhang and Admiral Ding Ruchang, both of whom were demoted and stripped of honors.