warships spotted smoke from unknown vessels heading from the south-west. Fleet composition The Japanese Combined Fleet consisted of two formations. A flying squadron, composed of the four fast cruisers , , , and , was under the command of Tsuboi Kōzō. The main fleet consisted of the cruisers (flagship), , , , the ironclads , and , under the command of Admiral Itō Sukeyuki. There were also two dispatch vessels, the converted liner under the command of Swedish-born merchant navy Captain John Wilson, and the gunboat . The Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Kabayama Sukenori was on a tour of inspection and aboard Saikyō Maru. Admiral Ding Ruchang attempted to form his fleet into a southward-facing line abreast with the strongest ships (Dingyuan, Zhenyuan) in the center. The newer , Guangjia, , , Laiyuan, Jingyuen, and the obsolete and , were lined from left to right. The four-ship group led by , having escorted a convoy upriver, had to catch up, and only joined action around 14:30, in time to chase off Saikyō Maru. The Beiyang Fleet had completed escorting a convoy to the mouth of the Yalu River, and was returning to its base at Lüshunkou when it was engaged by the Japanese navy. On paper, the Beiyang Fleet had the superior ships, included two ironclad battleships, and , for which the Japanese had no counterparts. The Beiyang Fleet could also call on the assistance of numerous military advisers, including Prussian Army Major Constantin von Hanneken, recently from Korea, who was appointed as the naval adviser to Admiral Ding Ruchang. W. F. Tyler, a sub-lieutenant in the Royal Navy Reserve and an Imperial Maritime Customs officer, was appointed as von Hanneken's assistant. Philo McGiffin, formerly an ensign in the U.S. Navy and an instructor at the Weihaiwei naval academy, was appointed to as an adviser or co-commander. However, examination reveals the truth about China's seemingly advantageous position, as most of their warships were over-age and obsolescent; the ships were also not maintained properly and indiscipline was common among their crews. The greater armor of major Chinese warships and the greater weight of broadside they could fire were more than offset by the number of quick-firing guns on most first-line Japanese warships, which gave the Japanese the edge in any sustained exchange of salvos. The worst feature of both Chinese battleships was actually their main armament; each was armed with