Maru, the converted liner, urged on by Admiral Kabayama Sukenori despite its lack of offensive armament, had been hit by four 12-inch (305 mm) shells and was left sailing virtually out of control as a result. Analysis As it was the first fleet encounter since Lissa in 1866, the battle was studied for its tactical lessons not only by the Japanese Navy General Staff, but by naval staffs around the globe. The lessons to a degree were unclear, since the two fleet encounters seemed to be contradictory and cancelled each other out. At Lissa, the Austrians had used the ram in a bows-on frontal attack, in a line abreast formation, whereas the Yalu had been won by broadside naval gunfire delivered from a line ahead formation. What also remained unresolved by the encounter was the debate between the proponents of the big gun and advocates of armor. Although the Canet guns of the Sankeikan-class cruisers had malfunctioned and thus the heaviest Japanese shells had not hit the two Chinese battleships, no other shells had penetrated their armor belts deeper than 4 inches. However, there were some conclusions that could be drawn from the course and outcome of the battle. The first was that the line ahead was the best formation which preserved the greatest flexibility and simplicity of movement, minimized tactical confusion and also maximized broadside fire. The case against the line abreast formation was not yet absolutely certain, but the wedge formation adopted purposely or accidentally by the Chinese could only have been effective in the hands of a commander whose ship captains had mastered fleet movements, which Ding's subordinates had not. Secondly, the one common denominator between Lissa and the Yalu appeared to be that the victor had fought in separated squadrons. This arrangement provided tactical flexibility and consequently widened the options for maneuver during the chaos of battle. Due to the Chinese Navy's weak preparations for the battle, faulty ammunition, and a lack of communication and discipline, which was the cause of at least one account of fragging, the Japanese forces were able to operate under very desirable conditions. Their victory in the battle established naval supremacy, demonstrated the weakness of the Chinese military, and by extension, the strength of their own. The New York Times would liken the battle to Waterloo. Aftermath The remnants of the Beiyang Fleet retired into Lüshunkou for repairs, but were withdrawn