Infantry Division: Major General Charles H. Gerhardt British and Canadian zones Commander, Second Army: Lieutenant General Sir Miles Dempsey Overall, the Second Army contingent consisted of 83,115 men, 61,715 of them British. The nominally British air and naval support units included a large number of personnel from Allied nations, including several RAF squadrons manned almost exclusively by overseas air crew. For example, the Australian contribution to the operation included a regular Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) squadron, nine Article XV squadrons, and hundreds of personnel posted to RAF units and RN warships. The RAF supplied two-thirds of the aircraft involved in the invasion. Gold Beach XXX Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Gerard Bucknall 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division: Major General D.A.H. Graham Juno Beach British I Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General John Crocker 3rd Canadian Division: Major General Rod Keller Sword Beach British I Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General John Crocker 3rd Infantry Division: Major General Tom Rennie 6th Airborne Division: Major General R.N. Gale 79th Armoured Division: Major General Percy Hobart provided specialised armoured vehicles which supported the landings on all beaches in Second Army's sector. Coordination with the French Resistance Through the London-based État-major des Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur (French Forces of the Interior), the British Special Operations Executive orchestrated a campaign of sabotage to be implemented by the French Resistance. The Allies developed four plans for the Resistance to execute on D-Day and the following days: Plan Vert was a 15-day operation to sabotage the rail system. Plan Bleu dealt with destroying electrical facilities. Plan Tortue was a delaying operation aimed at the enemy forces that would potentially reinforce Axis forces at Normandy. Plan Violet dealt with cutting underground telephone and teleprinter cables. The resistance was alerted to carry out these tasks by messages personnels transmitted by the BBC's French service from London. Several hundred of these messages, which might be snippets of poetry, quotations from literature, or random sentences, were regularly transmitted, masking the few that were actually significant. In the weeks preceding the landings, lists of messages and their meanings were distributed to resistance groups. An increase in radio activity on 5 June was correctly interpreted by German intelligence to mean that an invasion was imminent or underway. However, because of the barrage of previous false warnings and misinformation, most units ignored the warning. A 1965 report from the Counter-insurgency Information Analysis Center details the results