been allowed to travel in the brake vans, "a practice that should be sternly prohibited" Carriage doors should not have been locked: "a wrong thing" Given the weight of the train and the gradients on the line, both brake vans should have been at the rear of the train It should not have been so big: Findings of the inquest The inquest was completed on Friday 21 June 1889, and made findings of culpable negligence against six of those involved; those at Dundalk responsible for selection of the engine, the driver and both guards on the train, and Mr Elliott who had taken charge. As a result, three of the accused were committed for trial for manslaughter on the following Monday. One guard had been injured in the crash and was presumably still in hospital; the Dundalk personnel were not charged, the 'practical trial' showing that the engine supplied should not have been defeated by Armagh bank if correctly handled having been carried out on Saturday 22 June. The jury are not reported to have made any findings against more senior management of the Great Northern Railway of Ireland. Elliott was tried in Dublin in August, when the jury reported they were unable to agree; on re-trial in October he was acquitted. The cases against the other defendants were then dropped. Recommendation and consequent legislation Recommendation triggering legislation The key recommendation was in fact couched as a finding: Regulatory background For many years the Railway Inspectorate of the Board of Trade had been advocating three vital safety measures (among others) to often reluctant railway managements: lock interlocking of points and signals, so that conflicting signal indications are prevented block A space-interval or absolute block system of signalling, where one train is not allowed to enter a physical section until the preceding one had left it brake Continuous brakes, to put at the command of the engine driver adequate braking power; this requirement being increased as the technology made it reasonable to 'automatic' (in modern parlance 'fail-safe') continuous brakes which had to be 'held off' by vacuum or compressed air and would be applied automatically if that supply was lost (e.g. if a train were divided). The Board of Trade had got as far and as fast as it could by persuasion, but an inspector commented in 1880 after the Wennington Junction rail crash: Questions in Parliament In the aftermath of