with the supposed Operation Vendetta another deception operation, forces in the south of France. Ironside was implemented entirely via double agents: "Tate", "Bronx" and "Garbo". The Twenty Committee, in charge of anti-espionage and deception operations of British military intelligence, feared the plausibility of the story and so did not promote it too heavily through their agents. Messages sent to their German handlers included elements of uncertainty. That, combined with the fact that Bordeaux was an implausible target (the landing site was far outside the range of fighter cover from the United Kingdom), meant that the Germans took very little notice of the rumours and even went as far as to identify it as a probable deception. However, the Abwehr continued to send questions to their agents related to the landings until early June, and after D-Day, the Germans continued to maintain a state of readiness in the region. Political pressure One recurring theme for Bodyguard was the use of political deception. Bevan had concerns over the impact that physical and wireless deception could have. In early 1944, he proposed a wholly political ploy, Operation Graffham, as a way to bolster elements of Bodyguard. Ronald Wingate extended those ideas to create the larger Operation Royal Flush a few months later. Despite not gaining much traction with the targeted governments, Graffham still influenced the thinking of German commanders and pushed them towards accepting other aspects of Bodyguard. Royal Flush was, however, less successful, with a report by the Abwehr identifying the targeted countries as "outspoken deception centres". It was the last political overture attempted as part of Bodyguard. Operation Graffham Graffham's political target was Sweden, and its main aim was to support the goals of Fortitude North. It was intended to imply that the Allies were building political ties with Sweden in preparation for an upcoming invasion of Norway. The operation involved meetings between several British and Swedish officials as well as the purchase of Norwegian securities and the use of the Double-Cross System to spread false rumours. Sweden maintained a neutral stance during the war, and if its government believed in an imminent Allied invasion of Norway, that would filter through to German intelligence. Planning for the operation began in February 1944. Bevan was concerned that Fortitude North was not sufficient in creating a threat against Norway and so he proposed Graffham as an additional measure. In contrast to the other