Half Battery of Major Imre Ivánka. At the northern end of the position stood the Tolna Volunteer Mobile National Guard Battalion and two companies of the 9th (Nicholas) Hussar Regiment. Two Hussar companies were on outpost at Pátka. The 3rd Battalion of the 48th (Ernest) Infantry Regiment probably formed the reserve. The Hungarian center was located on the vine-growing hills between Pákozd and Sukoró. It was commanded by Major General Franz Holtsche. The postal road from Székesfehérvár to Buda passed through this section, and on both sides of this road, an infantry attack was hampered by the wet, marshy terrain. According to the Hungarian war diary, written after the battle: this terrain gave the Hungarian army the advantage of being able to use its batteries in all directions without any change of position, completely dominating the area, and in the case of an [enemy] deployment between the hills which lie in front and those which were held [by the Hungarians], the stream running through the valley made a decisive advance of the enemy possible only by the main road. The enemy could deploy his cavalry only here. Móga placed more than half of his artillery here: 28 guns. A Honvéd battalion, a volunteer battalion and 2 line infantry battalions made here the infantry, and 4 companies of hussars made the cavalry. Historian József Bánlaky (Breit) the 12,000 paces of overstretch, and the huge gap between the completely isolated right flank and the center almost invited the enemy to attempt a breakthrough there. The left wing was deployed on the southern shore of Lake Velence, near Gárdony and Agárd, on both sides of the road to Pest in front of Sukoró. This wing, leaning on the lake Velence, was commanded by Colonel Mihály Répásy. In and around Agárd was stationing a unit of almost 4000 soldiers under the lead of Colonel Mór Perczel, in order to prevent an eventual encircling movement by the enemy. This section was also crossed by a road, and the terrain was similar to that on the northern shore. As both sides of the road leading to there were wet and swampy, the enemy attack could hardly have expected success from this direction: no wonder the Croatian army did not attack from this direction. Móga here meant active defense in case of need, as indicated by the fact that in addition to the 6 cannons and one