avoid punishing hedging (a form of insurance for cashflows) were also proposed. These tended to lead to generally more complex schemes that were not implemented, in part due to lack of standardization of risk reporting under the Basel I framework, which was itself a response to the 1980s financial speculation crises. However, disclosure had not kept pace with practices. Regulators and policy-makers and theorists by the 1990s had to deal with increasingly complex financial engineering and the "avoidance by a change of product mix... market participants would have an incentive to substitute out of financial instruments subject to the tax and into instruments not subject to it. In this fashion, markets would innovate to avoid the tax" as they were doing with the creation of financial derivatives. "The real issue is how to design a tax that takes account of all the methods and margins of substitution that investors have for changing their patterns of activity to avoid the tax. [as] suggested by Pollin et al. (1999)." – Palley, 2000 The global adoption of a small flat rate Automated Payment Transaction tax whose base included all transactions would eliminate evasion and avoidance possibilities since the tax would apply equally at all substitution margins. Advocates including Pollin, Palley, and Baker (2000) emphasized that transaction taxes "have clearly not prevented the efficient functioning of" financial markets in the 20th century. Many theorists raised the issue that hedging and speculation were more of a spectrum than a distinct duality of goals. "Academic studies (e.g. Bodnar et al, 1998) show that companies usually incorporate predictions of future price levels (i.e. a 'view') when executing hedges (a fact which will come as no surprise to most risk management practitioners). If hedging is really just about reducing risk, then why should our expectations of future market direction have any bearing on our hedging decisions? If we hedge 50% of our exposure, instead of 80% or 100%, because we feel that the price/rate of the underlying exposure is more likely to move in our favor, does this meet the criteria for speculation?... On one level (at the extremes), there is no doubt that hedging and speculation are very different activities. However, once you move beyond the straightforward elimination of open positions, into more nuanced transactions involving complex hedging strategies or tenuous relationships between hedges and exposures, the distinction between a hedge and a bet becomes increasingly vague."