keeping in mind the experience gained in the Winter War and Soviet tests of the German Panzer III tank. However, the new and complicated T-50 and its diesel engine encountered production problems and the new tank had not entered series production before the German-Soviet War. The majority of the Red Army's T-26 tanks in European military districts were lost in the first months of the German-Soviet War, mainly to enemy artillery and air strikes. In addition, the limited availability of recovery vehicles and spare parts meant that broken down tanks and other non-combat losses often could not be repaired. Tanks with even insignificant technical failures had to be blown up or burned by their crews upon retreat. The 12th Mechanized Corps, deployed in Baltic Special Military District, had 449 T-26 tanks, 2 flame-throwing tanks and 4 T-26T artillery tractors on 22 June 1941. The corps lost 201 T-26 tanks and all flame-throwing tanks and artillery tractors by 7 July 1941. A further 186 T-26 tanks were lost to technical failures. However, many T-26 crews did their best to combat the enemy's advance. For example, a composite battalion of the 55th Tank Division (made up of 18 single-turreted T-26 tanks and 18 twin-turreted T-26 tanks) supported the retreating 117th Infantry Division near Zhlobin. Single-turreted T-26 tanks destroyed 17 German tanks. Nine tanks of the battalion crossed the Dnieper River but eleven remained in enemy territory after the bridge was destroyed, with the remainder having been lost in combat. The T-26 light tank was inferior to the German Panzer III and Panzer IV medium tanks in gun calibre, speed, manoeuvrability, armour but the T-26's armament was superior in comparison with the Panzer I, Panzer II, Panzer 35(t) and Panzer 38(t), which formed about 50% of the German panzer forces in June 1941. The Soviet 45 mm 20K tank gun could also penetrate the armour of Panzer III and Panzer IV at combat distances. The main reasons for the high loss rate of Soviet light tanks in June–July 1941 were the low production quality of 45 mm armour-piercing shells (which were themselves in short supply in tank units), the insufficient power of 45 mm 20K tank guns produced in 1932–1934, and poor coordination between different units of the Red Army. German air superiority and frequent technical problems with older tanks also plagued Soviet forces. Despite high losses, T-26 tanks still formed a significant