recorded transfers of 821 L per/s and 161 L per/s respectively. Water trading, is not a common practice in most areas of Chile and individuals do not have expectations that they can resolve their water allocation problems through water market transfers. This is due to problematic distribution between markets, cultural norms that couple land and water rights together, the urbanization of irrigated land, and high transaction costs in many areas including expenses in titling unregistered rights, information costs, costs to modify infrastructure, and the opportunity cost of time invested in the transaction. While not widespread throughout Chile, water markets have been well documented in the areas where they have been implemented. Studies have shown active trading for water use rights in the Limari Valley, where water is scarce with a high economic value, especially for the emerging agricultural sector. Trading between sectors has transferred water to growing urban areas in the Elqui Valley and the upper Mapocho watershed, where water companies and real estate developers are continuously buying water and accounted for 76% of water rights traded between 1993 and 1999. In contrast, water markets and trading has been more limited in the BioBio, Aconcagua and Cachapoal Valleys. The prevailing wisdom from the IDB, and the World Bank is that water markets in Chile have been a success. In some regions of Chile, water markets have been successful at achieving the original objectives of reallocating water to higher-value uses and capturing economic efficiencies through trading. Humberto Peña, the former Director of the General Water Directorate (DGA) in Chile, offers an opposing opinion while claiming that the scarcity of trading implies that water markets do not effectively redistribute water. In water pricing, two elements need to be distinguished: the price of untreated water at the source, and the price of treated water delivered to the final user. In most countries the use of water at the source is free and the price of water recovers part or all of the costs of treating and delivering it. Chile is an exception however; as the 1981 Water Code not only confirmed private property rights to water resources, but also allowed their sale, thus creating a water market and allowing the establishment of prices for water resources. Supply and demand were supposed to determine the allocated water and its price at the source. Price increases that range from 41% to 240% between 1986 and