proper operation of the market as an allocation mechanism". In his book on Chilean water law, "The Siren Song", Carl. J. Bauer provides a balanced critique of the Chilean model with both positive attributes and areas where the model has not worked so well. The problems include poor "environmental protection, river basin management, public interest, social equity, coordination of multiple uses, and resolution of water conflicts". Furthermore, Bauer writes that the legal and institutional framework has become unable to deal with problems related to the model. He goes on by saying that, "the current framework is characterized by a combination of elements that reinforce each other to maintain the status quo: strong and broadly defined private economic rights tightly restricted regulatory authority a powerful but erratic judiciary untrained in public policy issues and holding a narrow and formalistic conception of the law". With support from World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank economists and opposition from command and control proponents, the Chilean model is widely studied and documented for its methods that are at the same time innovative and ideologically divisive. The 1981 Water Code ushered Chile into a regulatory environment based on free-market water management and away from the command and control methods that had failed prior to 1981 to effectively allocate water resources and capture economic gains. Bauer proposed that together with the 1980 constitution, the 1981 water code has been successful in achieving many of its original priorities, especially those strengthening private property rights. Original priorities of the Chilean model according to Bauer include, but are not limited to: "1) security of private property rights to encourage private investment in water use and infrastructure allowing new mining in northern Chile and the planting of high-value fruits and vegetables for export. 2) Tightly restricted government regulation of water use and water management. 3) Freedom to trade water rights to allow reallocation of water resources from low-value use to high-value use where transaction costs are low and water is scarce. 4) Autonomy of private canal users' associations from the government. This has encouraged organizations to improve their administrative and technical capacity. These associations primarily operate in the agricultural sector. 5) Creation of non-consumptive water rights to encourage hydropower developments". Summarized below, power sharing and divided responsibility are hallmarks of the 1981 Water Code: The executive power of the government is charged with the authority to plan, regulate, and promote the