the following chapters Chapter 2. Vote for Blackbeard – The Economics of Pirate Democracy: explores the origination of pirate democracy and how it was adopted from the experiences of sailors on merchant ships Chapter 3. An-arrgh-chy – The Economics of the Pirate Code: explains how pirates developed constitutions to govern their societies, effectively creating a democracy Chapter 4. Skull & Bones – The Economics of the Jolly Roger: identifies the economic phenomenon of “signaling” to the Jolly Roger flag Chapter 5. Walk the Plank – The Economics of Pirate Torture: details how the use of “brand names” by creating reputations of barbarity were implemented in order to ensure pirate revenue was not reduced at any level Chapter 6. Pressing Pegleg – The Economics of Pirate Conscription: investigates how pirates used conscription to fill their ranks by drafting sailors from vessels they overtook Chapter 7. Equal Pay for Equal Prey – The Economics of Pirate Tolerance: delves into pirate tolerance, and the integration of black bondsmen as free crew members on their ships, and how this tolerance was formed by the cost-benefit considerations Chapter 8. The Secrets of Pirate Management – discusses management in piracy and the lessons which can be learned Epilogue. Omnipresent Economics Summary The Invisible Hook is a nonfiction story that reveals the democratic and economic forces which drove pirates. Leeson identifies economic ways of thinking and how they administered in actions of piracy, and how these customs resulted from a national response to the economic conditions of the 18th century. Leeson uncovered that pirates were “pioneers of democracy” (Weiss, 2008). Long before these methods were used in modern government, they were used effectively on pirate ships. Lesson explores how pirates were the first developed “orderly and honesty societies” to rebel against 17th and 18th century governments. Pirates formed their own democratic ways, many of these adopted from experiences on merchant ships, and created a system of checks and balances to reduce the captain’s control over many aspects of pirate life. Leeson also explains how the implementation of constitutions governed pirate societies through “pirate codes” – a system of rules – upon the ship. These rules prevented “negative externalities” and created a “rule of law” that placed captains on equal footing to their crew. Quartermasters were also elected to ensure the captain would not abuse his power. Captains were allowed to “control the governed”, but not break the