and incapacitate electronic equipment. After that, according to the scenario, the real attack would start. Post-staging After stage separation, the rocket launch appeared on radar similar to Multiple Reentry vehicles (MRVs); the Russian control center did not immediately realize that the Norwegian scientific rocket was headed out to sea, rather than toward Russia. Tracking the trajectory took 8 of the 10 minutes allotted to the process of deciding whether to launch a nuclear response to an impending attack; a submarine-launched Trident missile from the Barents Sea would be able to reach mainland Russia in 10 minutes. Response This event resulted in a full alert being passed up through the military chain of command all the way to President Boris Yeltsin, who was notified and the "nuclear briefcase" used to authorize nuclear launch was automatically activated. Yeltsin activated his "nuclear keys" for the first time. No warning was issued to the Russian populace of any incident; it was reported in the news a week afterward. As a result of the alert, Russian submarine commanders were ordered to go into a state of combat readiness and prepare for nuclear retaliation. Soon thereafter, Russian observers were able to determine that the rocket was heading away from Russian airspace and was not a threat. The rocket fell to earth as planned, near Spitsbergen, 24 minutes after launch. The Norwegian rocket incident was the first and thus far only known incident where any nuclear-weapons state had its nuclear briefcase activated and prepared for launching an attack. Prior notification The Norwegian and American scientists had notified thirty countries, including Russia, of their intention to launch a high-altitude scientific experiment aboard a rocket; however, the information was not passed on to the radar technicians. The launch was notified in good time to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But due to an error on the part of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the notification was never given to the Russian General Staff, or any part of the Russian military. An anonymous Russian general later told the press that the wording of Norway's missile launch message to "notify the upcoming launch of a meteorological rocket to sea-farers" was taken too literally by Russian bureaucrats. "Foreign Ministry officials took a literal attitude toward that request: sailors knew of the event. Not the military." Following the incident, notification and disclosure protocols were re-evaluated and redesigned. See also Able Archer 83 References