practice in the state courts, to admit evidence so taken, and §§ 868, 869, and 870 prescribe the manner of taking such depositions, and of the use of the subpoena duces tecum, and how it may be obtained. No one can examine these provisions for procuring testimony to be used in the courts of the United States and have any reasonable doubt that, so far as they apply, they were intended to provide a system to govern the practice in that respect in those courts. They are, in the first place, too complete, too far-reaching, and too minute to admit of any other conclusion. But we have not only this inference from the character of the legislation, but it is enforced by the express language of the law in providing a defined mode of proof in those courts, and in specifying the only exceptions to that mode which shall be admitted. This mode is "by oral testimony and examination of witnesses in open court, except as hereinafter provided." Justice Miller continued: The court found that if the acts of Congress forbid the use of this kind of testimony in the courts of the United States, no order for taking it made in the state court while the case was pending in that court, with a view to its use on a trial there, can change the law of evidence in the federal court. In that case, after it had been once heard on appeal in the Supreme Court of Illinois, it was removed into the circuit court of the United States. A writ would be issued on application to the clerk. See also List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 113 References External links 1885 in United States case law Legal history of New York (state) United States Supreme Court cases United States Supreme Court cases of the Waite Court United States Fifth Amendment self-incrimination case law United States habeas corpus case law Fraud trials