remarkable point of these letters is the desire or condition of China to hold the talks in Kathmandu and in secret, against the instructions of Nehru. These letters also mention some objectionable articles on Nepal published in two newspapers, Searchlight and The Statesman, as well as the statement of D.R. Regmi (foreign minister) on Tibet, which the Indian government called a “silly” statement. But these documents do not mention the contents of these articles or the statement. A number of brief letters (more than two dozen) written during the last days of M.P.’s prime ministerial tenure have also been reproduced. They deal with M.P.’s deteriorating relations with the Crown Prince and ministers (Tanka Prasad and Bhadrakali Mishra) (pp. 346–373). However these letters do not give any new information to the reader. 398 Studies in Nepali History and Society 13(2), 2008 On the whole, the documents produced in part two of the memoir give scattered information on Nepali politics from 1951 to 1955. They may be used by researchers as primary sources. A review of M.P.’s memoir is not complete until we mention the tenpage preface of Ganesh Raj Sharma, the undeclared editor of the book. Sharma argues that “M.P. was not as regular nor as expressive in his response to ideas and events as B.P. was” (p. viii), but, instead, “was a store house of knowledge about the personalities and events of Nepali politics, which remained unrevealed unlike in the case of B.P. Koirala” (p. ix). In my opinion, the memoir is more regular, if not more expressive, than B.P.’s Atmabrittanta, which is quite irregular in chronological terms. Sharma is correct to say that “M.P. was appointed Prime Minister in 1951 on the suggestion of Nehru,” but his claim that M.P. was removed from office in 1955 because of India's displeasure, as he along with King Tribhuvan opposed the aide-memoir sent by Nehru, is debatable (p. ix). He has produced a different version of the aide-memoir which reads, “... especially on matters of Nepal's relationship with Tibet and China, special advice will be sought from the Government of India” (p. xi), whereas Nehru's draft of the same speaks only about “consultations” with the Government of India (p. 298). On the basis of information supplied by M.P. and Rishikesh Shah, Sharma argues that Nehru had given tacit consent to King Mahendra for the royal takeover of December 1960, though it was